



Arms Transfer and Security Assistance






Thesis Advisor: Prof. Claude A. Buss





Arms Transfer and Security Assistance





Thesis Advisor: Prof. Claude A. Buss









2. OOVT ACCESSION NO 1. RECIPIENT'S CAT ALOG NUMBER
• TITLE (*nd Suotult,
Arms Transfer and Security Assistance
to the Korean Peninsula, 1945-1980:
Impact and Implications
5. TYPE OF HSPOUT ft PCRIOO COVERED
Master's Thesis;
June 19 8
• PERFORMING OHO. KI'ORT NuMltR
7. AuTMO»r«>
Richard P. Cassidy
• CONTRACT OR GRANT nimICKi »)
» PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
io. program Element, project task
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS





11- NUMBER OF PAGES
344
14 MONITORING AGENCY NAME A AOORESSrif Htllmrmtl tram Controlling OHIe»)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
It. SECURITY CLASS, (o* (Ma report)
Unclassified
1S«. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
i* Distribution STATEMENT (at thlm Hmmtt)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (at t*» »mmirmci ~<t»r+4 In •!•• 20, II dltlotmtl hmm /t*aor«J
IB SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
KEY WOROS iCwilnu* on rmwormm *t4m II nmc»m»mrr ana} Hamtltr my »/oc« niatirj
arms transfers, effects on economic development, supplier-
recipient relationship, South Korea, North Korea, the United
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China.
20 ABSTRACT (Continue on tu*tm» tldm II «ae
Since the Korean War
the People's Republic o
stability on the Korean
toward maintaining such
factors: economic aid,
the United States, a co
forces. The phenomena
has played a major role
•••**? ana) tm*n>ttr •* mime* nummt)
,
the United States, the Soviet Union, and
f China have sought to maintain a peaceful
peninsula. Their strategies oriented
a stability has been based on three major
military assistance, and, in the case of
ntinued presence of American military
of arms transfers and security assistance








SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (Whi, Dmtm Kntmrmd)

Unclassified
t«euwTr ci amihc*tio« ow twit »»ot^iw.«.t n«<« «*<•*.«
20. of both Koreas; moreover, it has resulted in supplier
entanglement for the three major suppliers. From the latter
1960s, these major suppliers have displayed great interest
in maintaining a status quo, while the Koreans have moved
toward limited independence by developing indigenous arms
industries, expanding their defense budgets, and continuing
an upward economic mobility. A consequence of these develop-
ments has been a reduction in the ability of the suppliers
to control or influence their client states and a possible




S/N 0102-014-6601 steuaiw ciami'icatiom o* thii *4air»»>«« o«*« *«•»•»•*)
1A

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Arms Transfer and Security Assistance




B.A., University of 'Wisconsin, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






Since the Korean War, the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the People's Republic of China have sought to maintain a
peaceful stability on the Korean peninsula. Their strategies
oriented toward maintaining such a stability has been based on
three major factors: economic aid, military assistance, and,
in the case of the United States, a continued presence of
American military forces. The phenomena of arms transfers
and security assistance has played a major role in the overall
nation state development of both Koreas; moreover, it has
resulted in supplier entanglement for the three major suppliers.
From the latter 1960s, these major suppliers have displayed
great interest in maintaining a status quo, while the Koreans
have moved toward limited independence by developing indigenous
arms industries, expanding their defense budgets, and continuing
an upward economic mobility. A consequence of these develop-
ments has been a reduction in the ability of the suppliers to
control or influence their client states and a possible future
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Since 1950, the United States has, as an important facet
of its forward defense strategy in the Far East, emphasized
stability in the Korean peninsula. This strategy of stability
has been based on three major variables: economic and military
aid to the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred as South Korea)
complemented by the continued presence of United States military
forces. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China,
especially in recent years, also have sought to maintain the
peaceful stability of the Korean peninsula. Their strategy,
though based on separate though equally motivating reasons, has
been founded on two major variables: economic and military aid
to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter referred
as North Korea)
.
It is important to note, however, that despite the contin-
uity of relative stability since 1953, the strategic environment
in Northeast Asia has changed and will continue to change.
This changing strategic environment has affected and often
determined the quantity and quality of arms transfers to North
Korea and South Korea. This phenomenon of arms transfer has
played a major role in the overall nation state development
of both Koreas; it has also resulted in supplier entrammel-
ment for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's
Republic of China. From the latter 1960's, especially after
12

the rapprochement between the United States and the People's
Republic of China, the strategic powers in Northeast Asia
have displayed great interest in maintaining a status quo
between the two Koreas. Their respective military assistance
and arms transfer policies have reflected this concern for
sustaining a manageable military capability equilibrium.
However, both Koreas have resented the dependency impli-
cations in the current supplier-recipient relationship. North
Korea has attempted limited independence by balancing arms
transfers from the Soviets and the Chinese. South Korea has
worked hard on developing an economy sufficient to support
indigenous defense requirements while continuing its upward
economic mobility. Both countries have developed their own
indigenous arms industries, expanded their defense budgets,
implemented armed forces modernization programs, and initiated
bi-lateral North-South talks. A consequence of these develop-
ments has been a reduction in the ability of the strategic
powers to control or influence their client states and a threat
to their desire for a continuance of the status quo.
For over. 25 years, the Korean peninsula has been one of
the few geographic areas in the world where the highest state
of readiness has been sustained by both sides. Full scale
hositilities could be initiated by either side in a matter of
hours. The situation was made potentially more volatile by
the withdrawal of United Nations observers from the Demili-
tarized Zone. Stability in this area has been a key factor
13

affecting and determining policy formulation not only for the
two Koreas but also for the interested strategic powers.
The dangers inherent with an outbreak of hostilities are
obviously numerous and extremely important considerations to
all concerned nation states. An outbreak of hostilities in
the Korean peninsula would be catastrophic for the People's
Republic of China's modernization programs. Hostilities would
adversely affect East-West detente and pose serious logistics
problems to both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Supplier entrammelment into the actual conflict would be a
logical reaction to a perceived defeat of a client state. A
war in the peninsula would undoubtedly result in a shift in
Japanese defense strategy, threat perception, and rearmament
attitudes
.
The objective of this thesis and its accompanying research
is to analyze the impact and implications of arms transfers
and security assistance to North Korea and South Korea and to
form and offer conclusions drawn from the trends developed
since the beginning of the security assistance and arms transfer
programs and the problems still existing in the policies of
both suppliers and recipients.
Thus, by analyzing the effects of arms transfers to the
Korean states, a better understanding of strategic power
policy formulation may be reached. Additionally, it is all
the more important to analyze recent developments in the
phenomena of arms transfer in that important changes in the
14

supplier-recipient relationship are currently evolving. This
relationship change has the potential to alter the strategic
environment in the Korean peninsula; a situation that could
evolve into future conflict or, hopefully, a lessening of
tensions between the two Koreas.
During the 1970' s, both North and South Korea have
committed an increasingly larger share of their national
resources toward achieving relatively autonomous defense
industries, armament capabilities, and enhanced force develop-
ment which is significantly reducing the constraints imposed
upon them in previous decades by the super powers' arms
transfer policies. This hypothesis, if true, could have
serious implications for the stability of Northeast Asia and
the ability of the strategic powers to maintain a stable
status quo.
This work will be an analytical study of the security
assistance and arms transfers which have been made between
1945 and 1979 from the United States to South Korea, the
Soviet Union to North Korea, and the People's Republic of
China to North Korea. This thesis will analyze the changing
strategic environment in which those transfers were made and
show in clearly defined periods since World War II the impact
of those transfers on the recipients and the resultant
implications for the major suppliers. Additionally, the thesis
will stress the recent changes which have occurred since the
15

advent of the Carter Administration. Conclusions will be
reached and offered as a result of the impacts and implica-
tions developed since the beginning of this particular arms
transfer phenomena and of the problems which still exist
in the policies of the various suppliers and recipients.
Chapter I provides an overview of the phenomena of arms
transfer at the most general level. This overview provides
the reader an insight into how arms transfers may impact on
or affect certain variables; such as the economic-politico-
military objectives of the supplying and recipient nations,
the supplier-client relationship, and the stability of a region.
Chapter II examines the effect arms transfers and military
assistance had on the strategic environment of Northeast Asia
from 1945 to 1964. Three chosen year groupings will be
analyzed: the years leading into the Korean War (1945-1950)
;
the war years (1950-1953); and, the period between the Armistice
and the beginning of the major United States involvement in
Vietnam (1953-1964)
.
Chapter III deals with the period of intense American
involvement in Southeast Asia. This section examines the
arms transfer to both Koreas, the South Korean involvement
in the Vietnam War, the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on
South Korea, and the subsequent evolution of the Nixon-Ford
Administrations' arms transfer policies.
Chapter IV provides an in-depth look into the triangular
relationship of North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the People's
16

Republic of China, for the North Korean factor in the Sino-
Soviet dispute has had major implications in the stability
or instability of the Korean peninsula and affects the inter-
relationships of all the major actors. That North Korea has
had to utilize this triangle to maintain its defense capa-
bility is an important factor when considering the effects
of arms transfers to the peninsula.
Chapter V deals with the first three years of the Carter
Administration. President Carter's troop withdrawal plan
and his stance on human rights resulted in a major shift
from the previous arms transfer policies of previous
administrations. This section examines the impact his
withdrawal plan had on not only the Korean peninsula, but
also on Japan and the related Asian perception of United
States willingness to continue previously agreed upon
security commitments in Northeast Asia. Other factors, to
include the U.S.-PRC normalization of relations, the con-
flicts in Southeast Asia, the virtual freeze on U.S.-
Soviet detente, and the events in South Asia, and their
impact on arms transfers and military assistance programs
to the Korean peninsula are examined.
Chapter VI presents reflections and concluding
observations. The chapter will present the author's
perception of the total impact of arms transfers on the
Korean peninsula and its implication for the future of
peace and stability in Northeast Asia
17

I. THE PHENOMENA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS 1
The transfer of conventional arms is, more often than
not, a complicated interaction between the diffuse polit-
ical, military, and economic interests of recipient and
supplier nations. Arms transfers are often utilized to
enhance the politico-military interests of both suppliers
and recipients. However, the supply or acquisition invari
ably involves risks as well as benefits. It is important
to note that arms trade is only one aspect of the politico
military-economic relationship between a supplier and his
client. Therefore, it is often difficult to define with
reliability the exact impact an arms transfer may produce*
This chapter provides an overview on how conventional
arms transfers affects suppliers and recipients and the
stability of an area in a most generalized manner. By
acquainting the reader with the general effects arms trans
fers and security assistance may have on suppliers and
recipients, as this chapter attempts to accomplish, a
better perspective on how the specific arms transfers
made to the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1980 may be
reached. The subsequent chapters will address these spe-
cific arms transfers and the corresponding security
assistance programs. It is important to keep in mind,
during this chapter's discussions, that the three major
18

suppliers of arms and military aid to Korea have been and
remain the United States (to South Korea) , the Soviet Union
(to North Korea) and the People's Republic of China (also
to North Korea)
.
A. POLITICO-MILITARY EFFECTS ON SUPPLIERS
The political effects of arms transfers are often
difficult to assess. Nevertheless, there are obvious polit-
ical benefits to be derived from arms transfers and security
assistance. Arms transfer, as in the case of all three
major suppliers, provides an opportunity to show tangible
support for their client. In the present situation con-
cerning the Soviet Union and North Korea, security assistance
provides the Soviets the means to maintain a level of polit-
ical influence in Korea, though considerably less than that
of China. Both Communist suppliers regard weapons transfers
as a means of projecting their image as champions and
leaders in world revolution.
By providing security assistance, arms, and military
training, suppliers often establish and strengthen ties
with the recipient nation's leaders, particularly its
military leaders. Since military officers play important
political roles in both Koreas, the friendship and alle-
giances that developed have yielded significant returns to
the suppliers, especially to the United States.
19

However, political objectives pursued via arms transfers
sometimes work to the detriment of the supplier. Because arms
transfers tend to link suppliers with not only external policies,
but also with the domestic policies of recipient nations, sup-
pliers often receive both domestic and international criticism
for supporting unpopular and dictatorial regimes. In recent
years, the United States has borne the brunt of such criticism
in its support of the Park government. The refusal to provide
arms may also work to a suppliers disadvantage. When Khruschchev
cut off military aid in 1962, North Korea regarded such a refus-
al as an unfriendly act. Later, the Soviet Union resumed mili-
tary aid, but never regained the level of political influence
it previously held.
At times, the relationship between supplier and recipient
allows the supplier to persuade (or coerce) the recipient
nation to take or not take actions against its will. This
leverage results from the excessive dependence on a single
supplier for the major portion of its military acquisitions.
Recipients are then reluctant to take actions which are incom-
patible with the policies or desires of the principal supplier.
South Korea's past relationship with the United States exemp-
lifies this situation well.
Military benefits which supplier nations seek to
achieve via arms transfers and military aid are more
tangible and measurable than political benefits. Military
objectives may include improvement of the recipient's
20

armed forces, acquisition or usage of military facilities
in the recipient's country, and the ability to influence
the recipient nation's military establishment.
Transfer of arms to South Korea has been a major
component of U.S. arms exports with the expressed goal of
bolstering and maintaining an effective ally. The Nixon
Doctrine furthered this goal by emphasizing the improvement
of South Korean self-defense capabilities with increased
arms transfers. It must be noted, however, that while
improvement of South Korea's self-defense capabilities was
being enhanced by arms transfers from the United States,
arms transfers to North Korea largely offset this
strengthening.
Arms provided under the assumption that they be
employed only for external defense have occasionally been
utilized by recipient governments to suppress domestic
dissidents. South Korea's use of army troops (utilizing
U.S. provided or licensed arms) to quell disturbances has
resulted in increasing Congressional and human rights
activists' criticism of U.S. arms transfer policies toward
South Korea. By carefully selecting the quality and types of
arms to provide or sell, the suppliers are able to restrict
the military capabilities and options of the recipient
states. As will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, all
the suppliers have exercised a level of technology control
on arms transfers to both Koreas. The transfer of a high
21

technology weapon, such as the F-16 to South Korea, would
invariably cause the North Koreans to demand from its sup-
pliers MiG-23s. The reverse situation would yield the same
demands from South Korea.
However, even when other suppliers in the world are
willing to provide the desired high technology, the recip-
ient, fearful of disrupting the existing supply relationship,
will accept their supplier's imposed technology control.
South Korea desiring a better quality aircraft requested
F-16s but settled on up-dated F-4s and F-5s when the Carter
Administration denied its request. North Korea desired
MiG-23s from the Soviet Union but has also been refused.
Since China does not yet have the capabilities to mass
produce their MiG-23s, North Korea had to accept the lesser
quality MiG-21s from the Soviets,
The ability of a supplier to exert leverage over a
recipient has been difficult to achieve and will become
even more so. When particular issues are viewed as
extremely important and sensitive to their own national
interests, recipients may refuse to accept a supplier's
pressure, accept the termination of a security assistance
relationship, and turn to another supplier.
B. POLITICO-MILITARY EFFECTS ON RECIPIENTS
Obviously, the most demanding reason for arms acquisi-
tion is to enable a recipient to maintain and enhance its
armed forces to meet security needs, both external and
22

internal. Additionally, arms transfers may allow a
recipient to wage war, or pursue an expansionistic goal,
such as Kim Il-Sung's reunification goal.
Receipt of high technology weapons systems enhances
a recipient's military force, but it also requires the
supplier to often provide support services and training
reducing a recipient's freedom of action. Additionally,
a supplier may be less willing to provide sizeable quanti-
ties of spare parts. This reluctance requires the recipient
to maintain a dependency relationship and generally prohibits
the ability to wage a long term war. The Soviet Union may
be applying this factor to North Korea, probably more for
the latter reason than the former.
Arms transfers also impacts on the political structure
of recipient nations. Recognizing that both the Soviet
and the Chinese fear a loss of influence to each other,
North Korea plays one off against the other in order to
obtain relative independence and obtain better terms. Addi-
tionally, arms transfers allows a recipient nation's
leadership the opportunity to satisfy their military leader-
ships' needs and desires, thereby obtaining their support
and loyalty. As both Koreas' governments are top heavy with




The disadvantages to the recipients include vulnerabil-
ity to political pressure from its suppliers, and the
retardation of economic growth due to diverting resources
from more productive utilization. North Korea's economic
growth, though spectacular through the early 1960s, suffered
serious set backs in the later years, partly due to exces-
sive defense expenditures, This economic set back has
resulted in North Korea yielding to the South the role of
economic leadership in the peninsula, in turn severely
handicapping Kim Il-Sung's reunification propaganda.
C. THE IMPACT OF ARMS TRANSFERS ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY
Arms transfers, beside affecting the politico-military
variables of supplier and recipient nations, also impacts
on the stability of the recipients' geographical region.
The Korean War had been fought almost entirely with foreign-
produced arms. Though the peninsula continues to enjoy
peace, eventhough that peace was not incident free, the
region has been one of the world's largest receptacles of
arms to date and remains one of the most volatile. The
Korean peninsula is a dangerous region not only due to the
fervent hostility between North and South Korea, but also
because the major powers, who are also the primary suppliers,
are involved. Armed conflict would affect all the powers




But even in regions of confrontation, as in the Korean
peninsula, the transfer of arms would not necessarily be
the primary cause of armed conflict. There would be under-
lying causes involving matters such as ideology, territory,
economics, and nationalism. The recipient nations acquire
foreign weapons which are not available through indigenous
production to strengthen their positions in such confronta-
tions. Thus, it can be argued that the transfer of arms
to the two Koreas has played a role in convincing their two
leaders, particularly Kim, that the risks of resorting to
force would outweigh any gains achieved through military
action.
Stability may be facilitated by furnishing only certain
weapons to maintain or to establish a status quo power
base. Additionally, the psychological/political importance
of arms transfer can either reassure a recipient of con-
tinued supplies (South Korea) , or dissuade an adversary
which would be tempted to strike (North Korea)
.
Regional stability can be affected in both a negative
and positive manner by the relationship between the recip-
ient and its major suppliers who are themselves involved
in dispute. The rivalry between China and the Soviet Union
has allowed North Korea the opportunity to steer a more
independent course of action, and to receive more advanced
and costly weapons than may otherwise have been possible
considering its economic situation. The Korean conflict
25

showed that once hostilities commenced, the supply of arms
by the major suppliers had the effect of prolonging the
conflict and complicating the process of reaching a peace
settlement. The close ties developed between suppliers
and recipients prior to and during the Korean War resulted
in a much greater stake in the outcome for the major powers.
There is the chance that the major powers may become
involved in more than just a supplier role in another armed
conflict. However, the only instance where arms transfers/
military assistance has led to a direct military confronta-
tion between suppliers was between the United States and the
People's Republic of China in the Korean War. Even in this
case, the conflict was limited in weapons technology and
geographical region.
Depending on the circumstances, arms transfers may be
neither stabilizing nor destabilizing to a region. While
it may be possible to analyze the past transfers' impact
on regional stability, it is difficult to predict in
advance what future transfers' effects would be. There
will always be the danger that arms transfers intended to
maintain and support peace may, in the future, contribute
to greater instability and armed conflict. On the other
hand, the strengthening of the military balance between the
two adversaries in Korea may convince both sides that
utilizing armed force to alter the status quo would be too
26

costly or futile. The recent North-South talks have shown
an increased willingness to resolve differences by peaceful
means
.
D. THE IMPACT OF ARMS TRANSFERS ON THE ECONOMIES OF
SUPPLYING AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
Though economic concerns are of some importance, in the
case of the three major suppliers to Korea, political and
military motivations are the principal elements in arms
transfer decisions. In recent years, however, the Soviet
Union has been using arms sales, primarily in the Middle
East, as a hard-currency earner, the reason in part due to
limitations on arms production. When assessing economic
effects of arms transfers, one must distinguish betxveen
the impact on defense industries and the impact on the
supplier government.
Preproduction costs (R§D and establishment of the
assembly lines) account for the largest share of the total
cost of a weapons system. By increasing the numbers of
weapons produced at the same plant these initial costs can
be spread over a larger number of units, thus reducing the
average cost per weapon system. Where domestic weapons
demands are immense, such as in the United States and the
Soviet Union, exports are less essential to ensure econom-
ical production. However, rising costs and inflation has
made it increasingly important to obtain lower average
27

costs through arms exports. This is especially true in
the case of advanced jet aircraft, which are very expensive
to manufacture and are generally required in smaller numbers
than other less expensive weapons systems .^ Another obvious
effect of increased arms exports by suppliers is to maintain
high employment among workers in their defense industries.
In the case of military equipment deemed obsolete to
the needs of supplying nations, export enables the supplier
government to recoup a portion of the initial purchase price
of the equipment while also improving its balance-of-
payments. In the case of the United States, exports to
South Korea helps to offset the unfavorable balance of
payments resulting from essential United States military
deployment in South Korea. > An examination of both North
Korea's and South Korea's armed forces shows a predominance
of Soviet and U.S. equipment no longer utilized by either
suppliers' armed forces. (See Tables 1 § 2).
However, it should be noted that a sizable share of
the weapons provided have been on a grant or discount
basis and were surplus or used equipment. Both the Soviet
Union and the United States maintain a practice of discount-
ing or allowing relatively easy credit terms in their arms
transfer transactions with the Koreans. The terms China
places on transfers is generally unknown but it is believed
that what arms China does provides to North Korea, there is




Military Equipment of North Korea - 1979
Army
350 T-34, 1,800 T-54/-55 and Type 59 med, 100 PT-76, 50 T-62 It tks;
800 BTR-40/-60/-152, M-1967 APC; 3,500 guns and how up to 152mm;
1,300 RL; 9,000 82mm, 120mm and 160mm mor; 1,500 82mm RCL; 57mm to
100mm ATK guns; 9 FROG -5 SSM; 5,000 AA guns, incl 37mm, 57mm,
85mm, 100mm, ZSU -57-2 SP.
Navy
15 submarines (4 ex-Sov W-, 11 ex-Ch R-class).
3 Najin frigates (1 building).
27 large patrol craft: 3 ex-Sov (2 Tral , 1 Artillerist), 15 S01, 4 ex-
Ch Hai Nan, 3 Sari wan, 2 Taechong.
18 ex-Sov FAC(m) (8 Csa-I, 10 Komar< with Styx SSM).
134 FAC(G): 16 ex-Ch (8 Shanghai, 8 Swatow), 4 Chodo, 4K -48, 20
ex-Sov M0 IV<, 60 Chaho<, 30 Chong-Jin<).
169 FAC(t): 78 ex-Sov (4 Shershen, 62 P6< , 12 P4< ) , 15 Iwon< , 6 An
Ju<, 60 Sin Hung< and Kosong< , 10 KM4.
70 Nampo< landing craft, 5-10 LCU, 15 LCM.
Air Force
565 combat aircraft.
3 It bbr sqns with 85 11-28.
3 FGA sqns with 20 Su-7, 40 MiG-15/-17.
21 Interceptor sqns with 120 MiG-21 and 300 MiG-15/-17/-19.
Tpts incl 200 An-2, 40 An-24, 10 I1-14/-18, 1 Tu-154.
Hel incl 50 Mi-4, 10 Mi-8.
Trainers incl 70 Yak-18, 100 Mig-15UTI/-21 U, 11-28.
M-2 Atol AAM.
3 SAM bdes with 250 SA-2.
Source: The Military Balance 1970-80
,
(London^ International




Military Equipment of South Korea - 1979
Army
60 M-60, 800 M-47/-48 med tks; 500 M-113/-577, 20 Fiat 6614 APC; 2,000
105mm, 203mm towed, 76M-109 155mm, 12 M-107 175mm, 16 M-110 203mm SP
guns/how; 5,300 81mm, 107mm mor; Honest John SSM; 80 M-18 76mm, 100
M-36 90mm ATK guns; 57mm, 75mm, 106mm RCL; TOW, LAW ATGW; 66 Vulcan
20mm, 40 40mm AA guns; 80 HAWK 45 Nike Hercules SAM; 14 0-2A ac; 20
UH-1B, 44 0H-6A, 5 KH-4, 25 Hughes Defender Hel
.
(On order: 150 Fiat 6614 APC, 37 M-109 155mm SP how, TOW ATGW, 56
0H-6A Helo)
Navy
9 ex-US destroyers (4 Gearing, 2 Sumner, 3 Fletcher).
7 ex-US frigates (1 Rudderow, 6 Lawrence/Crossley).
6 ex-US corvettes (3 Auk, 3 PCE 827).
8 FAC(M) with Standard SSM (7 PSMM 5, 1 ex-US Asheville).
1 CPIC FAC(P)<.
10 large patrol craft (8 ex-US Cape< , 2 100-ft.)
23 coastal patrol craft: 10 School boy<, 13 Sewart< (9 65-ft, 4 40-ft.)
8 MSC 268/294 coastal minesweepers, 1 minesweeping boat<.
22 ex-US landing ships (1 LSD, 8 LST, 12 LSM, 1 LCU).





9 FB sqns: 3 with 37 F-4D/E, 4 with 135 F-5E, 2 with 50 F-86F.
1 recce sqn with 12 RF-5A.
1 ASW sqn 20 S-2F.
1 SAR sqn with 6 UH-19, 5 UH-1D, 2 Bell 212 helo
Tpts incl 12 C-46, 10 C-54, 10 C-123, 2 HS-748, Aero Commander.
Trainers incl 20 T-28D, 30 T-33A, 20 T-41D, 30 F-5B, 3 F-5F.
Hel incl 4 UH-19, 50 Hughes 500MD.
Sidewinder, Sparrow AAM.
(Ch order: 18 F-4E, 14 F-5E fighters, 24 CV-10G COIN, 6 C-130H tpts,
6 CH-47C, 50 Hughes 500MD, 27 UH-1H hel., AIM-9L Super Sidewinder AAM,
Maverick ASM.)
Source: The Military Balance 1979-1980
,
(London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 68-69.
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most or all of the Soviet arms provided North Korea have
been paid for or are supplied against credits. Payment
usually is over 8 to 10 years at 2 to 2.5 percent interest.
The Soviets have also been willing to accept commerce goods
or local currency and has reduced frequently or postponed
payments when North Korea was unable to meet them. Soviet
arms are priced usually lower than comparable Western equip-
ment. The list price is based primarily on what Soviet
planners estimate the recipient can afford.
Arms provided on a grant basis to a recipient country
creates no economy of scale for producing them, thus allow-
ing fewer resources for use by the supplier in capital
formation. The United States provided South Korea with
nearly all its military needs on a grant basis under the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) until 1971, at which
time South Korea began to purchase weapons on a cash or
credit basis. When MAP grants to South Korea ended in 1976,
South Korea was able to purchase considerably more arms
under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits than had been
obtained through MAP in a like time period. (See Table 17)
.
Congressional interest toward which countries received this
expensive military assistance program aid resulted in a
decline in grant aid and an upsurge in FMS. Through the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Congress separated
sales legislation from grant-aid military legislation. As
Secretary of State Rusk said:
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"...this legislation will permit the
financially independent countries of the
free world to buy from the United States
equipment needed to bear their share of
the common defense burden.""
In recent years, supplier nations have begun selling
and transferring technical information, and production
know-how, rather than the weapons themselves. This is
known as production of foreign-designed weapons under
license. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have
licensing arrangements with their client states in Korea.
The economic benefits derived from such an arrangement
include the buyer (recipient) obtaining the ability to pro-
duce a weapon without the extra burden of research and
development costs (R§D) attached while the supplier is able
to recoup somewhat on his own R§D costs without setting up
an expensive production line.
Unlike the major suppliers, the recipient's economies
are affected more drastically by the costs of arms imports.
Given the need for capital and foreign exchange in the two
developing countries of Korea, a diversion of resources by
military imports, or just as significantly, the freeing of
resources by grant military aid, may be significant. Due
to the high level of U.S. grant aid received, South Korea
was able to sustain a low military spending/GNP ratio for
over 20 years after the Korean War, facilitating its rapid
economic growth. Conversely, the high military spending/
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GNP ratio North Korea began obtaining in the later 1960s
resulted in a significantly slowed economic growth rate.
Whether arms acquisition will favorably or adversely
affect the recipient's economy depends on several factors 9 :
1) the types and numbers of military equipment acquired,
2) the degree to which such a transfer would require the
recipient country to increase spending on manpower, main-
tenance, and other related military functions, 3) the
applicability of military equipment and training to civilian
uses, 4) the terms of the arms transfer, and 5) the manner
in which resources already allocated to existing import
programs would be utilized in the absence of those programs.
The more expensive the arms imports, for example, jet
aircraft, the greater is the diversion of the recipient's
resources from domestic uses. The more specialized the
military equipment and training, the smaller will be the
civilian utilization. Learning how to build roads and
bridges has considerably more civilian utility than learning
how to operate a surface-to-air missile. The terms of arms
transfers have important bearings of the economic effects of
weapons acquisition. Grant aid, as discussed earlier,
stimulates economic development by minimizing the diversion
of domestic resources to the military sector. Equally true
is the lower the proportion of the full price of the weapon
the recipient is required to pay, the lesser will be the
adverse effects on domestic economic growth.
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To summarize the foregoing, factors which normally
contribute to a favorable effect on economic development
include: 1) arms acquisitions on a grant or low term
credit basis, 2) imports which do not require excessive
expenditures on support services, and 3) military equipment
and training which have beneficial civilian adaptability.
Factors which normally contribute toward an adverse effect
on economic growth are: 1) the acquisition of weapons,
especially expensive systems, at full price or with stiff
credit terms, 2) large additional expenditures in spending
on support services, 3) training and infrastructure programs
which have little civilian "spin-off", and 4) a recipient
government's willingness to divert manpower and foreign
exchange from capital formation to the military sector*
In the case of both Koreas, a mix of these positive and
negative factors may be found. Whether the net effects
of arms transfers on their economic development are positive
or negative depended on the nature of the mix and the
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A. 1945-1950 PREPARATION FOR THE KOREAN WAR
For nearly six centuries the Yi dynasty of Korea will-
ingly accepted its tributory status under the Chinese
imperial order. By the 20th century, this "heririt kingdom"
had become one of the most sought after of China's tributaries
by the Japanese and Russians. An era of imperial exploita-
tion was climaxing in Asia with Korea as one of the focal
points. Korea soon found itself an important colony of the
expanding Japanese empire. Unfortunately, the end of 35 years
of Japanese suzerainty did not result in a return to a unified
Korea ruled by Koreans. General Order No 1, approved by the
governments of the U.S., the UK, the USSR, and China, had
legitimized the temporary partition of Korea.
In accordance with this agreement, the Soviet Union, which
entered the war with Japan eight days before the Japanese sur-
render, promptly dispatched troops to their assigned area north
of the 38th Parallel, and were equally prompt in establishing
their own government. The Soviet move into Korea closely
paralleling her actions in Eastern Europe helped to establish
the Korean communists as the leaders in the North.
As the cold war developed, neither the United States
nor the Soviets were willing to meet the terms of the other
concerning the establishment of a national government in
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Korea. Both major powers began to favor and support Koreans
within their respective zones. Gradually two completely
political, social, and economic systems took root in Korea.
Thus, Korea paralleled the path taken in Germany with
separate and hostile governments under tutelage by antag-
onistic and rival major powers, rather than the Austrian
pattern with a single national government under joint great-
power authority.
2
Various military assistance programs were developed as
part of the American strategy to counter Soviet challenges
throughout the world. Military aid in the immediate post-
war period was an outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine, under
which the United States provided economic and military aid
to not only Free World allies, but also to those countries
faced with either internal or external communist „aggres-
sion. President Truman summed up United States policy
considerations in the First Semiannual Report on the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program:
"The concept of peace for the United
States has become indistinguishable from
the concept of peace in the world as a
whole. American security and well-being
are now dependent upon, and inextricably
bound up with, the security and well-
being of free peoples everywhere. "3
These post-World War II U.S. military aid programs
began with emphasis placed on providing local forces ade-
quate equipment to perform military tasks considered in the
interest of the United States, or "substituting for what in
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many cases might otherwise be a vastly more expensive direct
American military presence". 4 The majority of American
major weapons exports went to countries contiguous to the
Soviet Union or China, better known as the "forward defense
areas". The magnitude of military aid and arms transferred
varied proportionately to both the American perceived threat
and its willingness to commit troops for combat.
5
Two events in 1950 focused United States attention on
the possibility of external threats in the Far East: the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the outbreak of the
Korean War. The Communist victory in the Chinese civil war
and the subsequent alliance with the Soviet Union forced the
United States to formulate a new Far Eastern policy. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to President Truman
in September 1947 that Korea offered little strategic value
to the United States. 6 Even General MacArthur considered
Korea militarily indefensible and recommended a United
States pullout as sensible. ? Therefore, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson's famous speech in January 1950 gave voice to
a policy which his president had already approved a number
of years earlier. Though Acheson did not write off Korea
as completely as has been charged, he did clearly place it
outside the area of primary U.S. defense interests in
Asia.° Such public statements (including a similar one by
General MacArthur a year earlier) , combined with the removal
39

of United States troops, made it appear to the Soviets and
the North Koreans that the United States had limited military
concern over Korea.
9
The U.S. approach to Korea had been somewhat ambivalent
before the outbreak of war. The American occupation Army
had provided some arms and training to the South Koreans,
but had taken the precaution to arm the South Korean Army
with only light weapons for defensive purposes so as to
preclude any temptation by the South to invade North Korea.
In January, 1946 the National Constabulary was established
with a cadre of Korean officers and men who had served
with Japanese armies in Japan, Manchuria, and China. This
Constabulary was the nucleus of the National Defense Force
created in August 1948 when the Republic of Korea was
inaugurated. At that time the total strength of the Army
constituted 5 divisions comprised of about 50,500 officers
and men. The Korean Coast Guard created in 1945, and
equipped with only a few PT (Patrol § Torpedo) boats,
became the basis for the Korean Navy. The Air Force
developed from the National Constabulary's Reconnaissance
Unit in October, 1949. It was provided with no combat air-
craft and started the Korean War with a handful of L-4 and
L-5 light planes and 10 C-4 propeller-drive non-combat
aircraft, all provided by the United States.^
By 1950, the South Korean Army totaled eight organized
divisions and about 100,000 men. With the exception of the
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Republic of Korea soldiers (ROKs) maintained in southern
South Korea to counter Communist guerrilla units, the ROK
divisions were armed with American M-l rifles left behind
in 1948, American machine-guns, some small mortars, and 51
battalions of field artillery, all equipped with M-3 105mm
howitzers which the American Army had junked. Those ROK
units fighting guerrillas in the south were armed with old
Japanese model 99 rifles. When the United States combat
units withdrew, they had left behind arms for only about
50,000 men. This military force, labeled the "best damn
army outside the United States" by outgoing Korean Military
Advisory Group (KMAG) commander Brigadier General William
L. Roberts, had no tanks, no medium artillery, no 4.2 inch
mortars, no recoilless rifles, and no spare parts for their
transport. The ROK leaders also lacked training in large-
unit maneuvers and integrating all the combat arms in a
concerted effort. The South Koreans didnot even have a
single combat aircraft.^
At briefings only 5 months before the conflict began,
United States and South Korean officials were regarding
inflation, not defense, as their major problem. The KMAG
commander, BG Roberts was reporting the ROK Army excellent,
but in need of some antiaircraft guns, a few fast naval





This inadequacy of the South Korean military was not
totally due to lack of United States concern for the neces-
sary defense of South Korea, but rather it was due in
large part to the fear that properly armed for offense,
President Syngman Rhee would punch northward toward
Pyongyang. Former Ambassador John J. Muccio recalled on the
25th anniversary of the Korean War:
"President Rhee had a very unrealistic
attitude towards that whole issue. He
thought that the people in the North were
waiting for him to arrive on a white charger,
that they would all get up and acclaim him,
and that Korea would be unified. And, . .
.
as many incursions north took place as
incursions across the 38th Parallel into
the South. That tied our hands, for there
was a danger that the aggression would
occur from the South. "13
Therefore, as Ambassador Muccio points out, the South
Korean military did not possess tanks, medium or heavy artil-
lery, or combat aircraft because the American Embassy did
not want them to have any. KMAG, under State Department
control because the United States was determined to show
the world its intentions in Korea were nonaggressive , had
been instructed by Ambassador Muccio to take no chances
with the possibilities that the South Koreans may attack
the Communists in the north. In January 1950, General
Roberts told members of the U.N. Commission on Korea that
the government of the Republic of Korea had been informed
that if it launched an attack against the North, all
military and economic aid from the United States would cease. 5
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President Rhee's harsh character and belligerency were
trying at best to the American diplomats and KMAG officers
assigned to Seoul. Moreover, President Rhee even possessed
"an ace in the hole" to stymie any movement toward peaceful
unification. The Korean Aid Bill passed by the U.S. Congress
in February 1950 carried a proviso that stipulated termina-
tion of aid "in the event of the formation in the Republic
of Korea of a coalition government which included one or
more members of the Communist Party or of the party now in
control of the government of North Korea."'"
Not knowing the kind of tough, disciplined armies that
were being built in Asia by the Communists, KNf,AG and
Ambassador Muccio had no reason to expect that the South
Koreans would have to fight. Combine this factor with the
consistent bellicose attitude of President Rhee, and it is
perhaps, understandable that United States military and
political observers discounted the increasing warnings of
North Korean incursions into the south, warnings which
originated from South Korean intelligence sources.
During this same period, North Korea was becoming
totally Soviet dominated and dependent. The first few
months of Soviet occupation provoked fear and resentment
among the Korean people. The one quarter million men
occupation force's behavior was marked by low moral
standards and a lack of discipline. However, unlike the
American occupation forces, the Russian Army brought with
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it a staff of Koreans and Korean-speaking Russians to
facilitate establishing Russian control over all aspects
of the sector in which they occupied. ^ Eventually, discip
line was tightened, but the impression lasted long after
the last Soviet soldier left North Korea. The Soviets were
the sole supplier of arms, ammunition, gasoline, vehicles,
and other military equipment, with an estimated economic
and military aid value of $56 million."^
One of the more significant measures adopted by the
newly formed and Soviet advised North Korean government
was the creation of a large standing army. Conscription
was introduced, military training schools established, and
the schooling of Korean cadets and officers begun. The
first units, called "poandae" (public security units) were
activated in February 1946 under the guidance and control
of Soviet occupation forces. By the first half of 1947 the
"poandae" totaled nearly 150,000 men to include two para-
military divisions equipped with Soviet material. By 1948,
the North Korean armed forces had attained a strength of
nearly 200,000 men. Formation of a conventional military
force appears to have begun covertly in mid-1946. There-
fore, the 1948 strength figures must have included both
"poandae" and regular force units. Formal establishment
of the Korean People's Army (KPA) was announced in February




The Soviets put over 200 Soviet planes for training at
the disposal of this new army at an airfield near Pyongyang.
In addition, the Soviets supplied North Korea Yak-9P fighters
and 11-10 bombers, a total of about 150 first-line aircraft. 20
About 15 new airfields were also built by the Soviet forces
and the Korean People's Army. 21 By the time the Soviet
forces had completed their withdrawal from North Korea at
the end of 1948, the KPA' s strength was near 60,000. Kim
Il-Sung and his supporters had by then secured the con-
trolling positions within the KPA. From that time until
the beginning of the Korean War, the KPA underwent a massive
buildup, all the while Soviet materiel streaming into the
North. By summer, 1950 the KPA strength was estimated to
be nearly 200,000 men, 10,000 of which were officers and
technicians trained in the Soviet Union, and 40,000 of whom
were veterans of the Chinese People's Liberation Army
(PLA).22
Though the Soviets provided massive deliveries of tanks,
trucks, and artillery, coupled with advice and training to
the North Korean Army, it purposely refused to help ex-
pedite the formation of a North Korean air force. A former
Red Army Colonel revealed that the Americans were not the
only ones dubious of Korean intentions. Colonel C. D.
Kalinow, who had been a member of the Soviet military
mission to North Korea at the end of 1948, and attached to
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the Soviet General Stafi; under General Zakharov in 1949,
states that General Zakharov and the Politbureau refused
an appeal by the Korean Communist Party for an air force.
According to General Zakharov:
"It is necessary to be careful with
these Koreans.,.. We are going to form
a modern army, . . . but we are not going
to act like the sorcerer's apprentice,
creating a force which could make mis-
chief in the Far East. (and) ... bring
war with the United States ... and we are
not interested in provoking such a war."
From the military view, the North Korean military
machine in 1950 was undoubtedly superior to the one fielded
by the South Koreans. On one side of the 38th Parallel
stood a 150,000 man, well equipped, trained and organized
(using the Russian model) North Korean Army. On the other
side, a 100,000 man, ill equipped, poorly trained and newly
organized South Korean Army. The South Korean Government
had repeatedly emphasized border clashes as a reason for
seeking sufficient American military aid. However, apart
from the equipment transferred from the departing U.S.
combat troops in 1948, no direct aid reached South Korea
until after hostilities had commenced. This was the case
despite appropriations already approved by Congress under
the October 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Program and a
subsequent South Korean - United States agreement signed
26 January 1950. 24
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Soviet policy toward the further development of the
Korean situation had to consider the impression given by
the United States that Korea was not a country in the
defense of which particular American interests were vital.
According to Mr. Khrushchev's memoirs, when Kim consulted
Stalin as to his plan for forceful reunification, Stalin
gave him the nod. There is little doubt that if Stalin
had chose to do so, he could have hindered if not completely
blocked Kim's crossing the 38th Parallel in June, 1950*25
B. 19 50-19 53 THE KOREAN WAR
The war began with an invasion across the 38th Parallel
on 25 June 1950. Almost immediately, the conflict escalated
to an East-West polarized conflict. South Korea became an
important part of the U.S. "forward defense zone" of the
Far East and has remained so since. The conflict changed
the American strategy for stability from primarily providing
economic aid and limited military assistance to providing
massive military assistance including arms and equipment
to South Korea's military forces and the direct employment
of United States combat forces. Throughout the war, however,
U.S. priorities remained in the supply of its own troops.
Although both South and North Korea acquired increasing
autonomy in the latter stages of the conflict and their
perceptions of the conflict differed from the super-power
suppliers, the war had to be considered in the context
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of super-power competition. One of the most important spin-
offs of arms suppliers in that war was the manner in which
supplying nations got drawn into the conflict. The Korean
War provided the first example of supplier entanglement in
a polarized context.
By providing weapons to the Koreans, the Soviet Union
and the United States were implicitly and explicitly lending
support. Both recipients became heavily dependent upon
their respective suppliers. Neither super-power was willing
to allow their client country to be defeated because a
defeat for the recipient was considered a defeat for the
supplier. Thus, dependency developed into a two-edged
sword. The United States found it necessary to increase
its military support to the extent of inserting its own
combat troops. The variable of direct intervention of a
supplier nation directly affected the variable of direct
confrontation with other supplier states. The Chinese
intervention proved this hypothesis correct.
Another example of this two-edged sword, i.e. mutual
dependence involving a polarized conflict, was the inability
to withdraw tangible support. The Soviet's perception of a
North Korean defeat as a serious set-back for the survival
of the entire socialist camp as a whole resulted in increased
pressure on North Korea and China to accept an armistice in
1953. Soviet fear of being involved as an actual partici-
pant most likely led to the cease-fire pressure. The same
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reasoning would later guide Soviet military assistance
policy in Southeast Asia. 26
The Soviets, however, were not the only ones concerned
with the survival of the socialist camp. It is quite
possible North Korea would have been defeated by the U.N.
forces if China had not sent her 2.5 million "volunteers".
This "aid", much more than the large quantities of equip-
ment, supplies, and credits supplied by both the Soviets
and Chinese, constituted a "debt" on the part of the North
Koreans that would have later ramifications for all the
major actors in the Korean peninsula. 27
Not surprisingly, Soviet history has put Soviet and
Chinese contributions to the Korean War on a par. A Soviet
book written in 1972 on Soviet-Chinese relations contained
a rare Soviet admission of a Soviet active combat role
during the war:
"Close military cooperation was realized
between the USSR and the PRC in the period
of military operations in Korea. The Soviet
Union uninterruptedly supplied the people's
army of Korea and the Chinese volunteers with
arms, military supplies, fuel, foodstuffs and
medicines. There were Soviet military advisers
in Korea including outstanding military leaders.
Soviet fliers took part in battles against the
aggressors. "28
An earlier history also revealed that the Soviets were
prepared to send into Korea 5 air divisions. The Soviets
did not send those air divisions per se, but the fact that




against United Nations forces is an established fact.
By the end of July 1950, North Korean aircraft had been
reduced to about eighteen aircraft. The success of the United
Nations offensive in the Fall of 1950 had the effect of not
only bringing in the Chinese volunteers, but also of
persuading the Soviets that if they wished not to see their
client defeated, considerable materiel, especially aircraft,
would have to be supplied. The Russians decided the best
application of their air power would be in a defensive
role. Thus, in November 1950, a new generation of Russian
fighters, the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15, appeared in North
Korean skies." The introduction of this aircraft, only
two years into production, was to significantly change the
course of the war and the technology of weapons brought to
bear in the conflict.
By December 1952, the strength of Soviet supplied air-
craft had risen to some 2100 aircraft of which nearly 1150
were jets, of these 950 were MiG-15's. Of even more sig-
nificance was the entry of the Russian Ilyushin 11-28 twin-
jet medium bombers, the latest aircraft produced by Russia
at the time. The United Nations forces possessed no high
performance aircraft to counter night use of these new
bombers
.
It quickly became clear to the United States Air Force
that the Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star was no match, per-
formance-wise, to the MiG-15s. This required the Americans
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to deploy its latest fighter, the F-86A Sabre to counter
the Soviet introduction. Technically, the MiG-15 had
slightly superior attributes in its fighter characteristics.
Tactically, however, the Sabre pilots proved superior to
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their communist counterparts. This factor proved decisive
in not only the air battles, but also in the outcome of the
war.
The military balance on the Korean peninsula by the 1953
cease-fire was anything but equal. The North Korean Army
had suffered enormous casualties and equipment losses. Its
national air force, the Korean People's Armed Forces Air
Corp (KPAFAC) , had to be completely regrouped and retrained
due to the heavy losses suffered in the early stages of the
war. The extensive industrial damage and acute manpower
shortage forecast a continued dependence on both the Soviets
and Chinese following the war.
By the Armistice, the South Korean forces were not in
much better condition. As denoted earlier, the supply to
indigenous forces had played only a minor role in the
United States war effort. But, the experience of the war
resulted in a shift of the American forward defense strategy.
Inherent in this shift was a change in U.S. military and
economic assistance. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 had
combined legislation concerning both military and economic
assistance. It was believed by American policy-makers that
political, economic, and military aid to the forward
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defense areas, coupled with the threat of massive retalia-
tion, would prevent a similar situation in which United
States troops would need to be deployed. This period was
also denoted by numerous mutual defense treaties, including
34
the one signed with South Korea in October 1953.
By capsulizing the major military aid programs on the
Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1953 a number of factors
stand out. These factors affected or impacted on all the
major states interacting on the peninsula. First, total
Soviet control north of the 38th Parallel in the pre-war
years resulted in total North Korean dependency. North
Korea was substantially aided, trained, and equipped by the
Soviets. Once the tide turned against the North Koreans,
the Soviets increased military assistance primarily in
aircraft, tanks and artillery to preclude the defeat of
their socialist brother. " The Soviets then persuaded the
Chinese to assist. The Chinese assistance, in both military
and economic aid, resulted in supplier entanglement in the
actual conflict when it introduced 2.5 million "volunteers".
This direct intervention of Chinese troops also resulted in
a United States shift of threat perception to the People's
Republic of China.
As for South Korea, she was totally dependent on the
United States for both security and livelihood. The
majority of the industrial sector of Korea had been located
north of the 38th Parallel before the conflict began.
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Therefore, economic growth and rising post -WW II inflation
were the major concerns of United States and South Korean
officials. Fearful of a "march-north" by President Rhee
,
the United States purposefully equipped and trained South
Koreans only marginally. The United States reaction to the
North Korean invasion was immediate intervention with troops
and increased, though still minimal, aid to South Korean
forces - the purpose to preclude the defeat of a democratic
protege by a communist nation. When the Soviet Union
introduced a weapon system capable of shifting the tide of
battle, the Americans had to quickly counter with the intro-
duction of a like weapons system. Though high technology
weapons were brought to bear in the conflict, weapons pro-
vided the Koreans were relative to their military needs and
capabilities.
A pattern was initiated with this war, i.e., arms
transfers patterns would be dominated by the conflict in
the area. North and South Korea received nearly three-
quarters of all major arms imports world-wide in the period
1950-1953. 36 Both the United States and the Soviet Union
learned that in a polarized world, supplier entanglement
was unavoidable. Realizing this, the Soviets pressured
both North Korea and the People's Republic of China to
agree to a cease-fire before it was drawn into the conflict
as a major participant, not just a supplier. 37 Because
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this pressure eliminated Kim Il-Sung's objective of reunifi-
cation, the Soviets lost face in the eyes of both the North
Koreans and their ally, the People's Republic of China,
This resulted in reduced Soviet political influence and control
over its Asian client states. Most important, both the
Soviets and Americans learned through this experience that
the supplier-recipient relationship comprised a two-sided
dependency factor.
C. 1953-1965 FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM
The armistice was a military one, with all signators
being military leaders representing the United Nations,
the Chinese and the North Koreans. The sixteen nations
who had fought under the United Nations Command issued a
statement in August 1953, pledging themselves to renew the
3 8
war if Communist aggression again occurred. This armistice
agreement also prohibited the introduction of new weapons
and any increase in combat aircraft. However, the UN com-
mand which was highly U.S. influenced, voided the limitation
39
in 1958 due to alleged North Korean non-adherence.
This was not the first instance since the Second World
War that supplier countries had beer^ urged to refrain from
introducing armaments in a region. In 1948, the Security
Council had recommended termination of all imports of war
materiel to the Middle East during Palestine cease-fire
agreements. In the 1951, the General Assembly, over Soviet
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objections, had imposed a strategic embargo against North
Korea and the People's Republic of China, In 1949, seven
NATO members, as a result of an American initiative,
established the Consultative Group (CG) on East-West trade
policy. Its Coordinating Committee (COCOM) focused on
coordinating trade policies and maintaining lists of arms
and other strategic materials to be embargoed to Soviet-
dominated Eastern European countries. In 1950, at the urging
of the United States, these COCOM control lists were expanded
to include the People's Republic of China and North Korea.
In 1953, COCOM revised its lists to reflect changes in the
European political climate and technological advances. How-
ever, the United States continued a virtual complete embargo
on trade and financial transactions with Asian Communist
countries, until President Nixon ended the embargo on trade
40
with the People's Republic in April 1971.
The armistice also ushered in a period of confrontation
between the United States and the People's Republic of
China. The threat to American interests in Asia (those
interests being peace and access to both Korea and the
Chinese mainland) was now perceived squarely in Peking. The
United States strategy of forward defense became better
known as a "containment" policy.
During this period, it was believed that the main threat
to the forward defense areas was an external threat . As
noted earlier, following the Korean War, the U.S. had decided
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on a strategy of mutual deterrence based on massive nuclear
retaliation. In line with this view, it was decided that
local forces should carry the burden of meeting a limited
conventional attack. 41 Subsequently, greater emphasis
was lent to supporting assistance. Military aid to South
Korea was necessary not only to enable its military to meet
possible aggressions from the north, but also to make the
United States commitment meaningful in accordance with its
Mutual Defense Treaty. The capacity of the South Koreans
to fight a limited conventional war was seen as an alter-
native to surrender or nuclear warfare.
Korea largely passed out of the consciousness of the
American public after 1953. Troop reductions in South
Korea were rapid and significant. From a total of over
200,000 stationed in South Korea in 1954, the total force
count by 1960 was below 60,000. Regardless of a general
apathy by the American public, the U.S. Government still
considered the Korean problem an active one. The United
States began to devote extensive time and resources in order
to improve both the South Korean economy and its security
posture. 42
The United States also began attempts to reach a peace-
ful settlement of the Korean Unification question. A
Korean political conference was held in Geneva in 1954
for such a purpose. Most of the signators of the Armistice
were present. However, the two sides (UN representatives
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versus Communist representatives) failed to agree on three
key issues: the authority and role of the United Nations,
the principle of free elections, and the withdrawal of
foreign troops. The conference ended without reaching any
agreement on any points discussed. This disagreement on
the above three issues remains today and provides the lesson
that perhaps no lasting solution to the reunification issue
can be reached without the agreement of the major powers
invo lved. 43
The South Korean economy was slowly rehabilitated with
United States aid and advice, but its development was not
given a high priority by Seoul during the 1950' s. This
caused many American observers to become increasingly pessi-
mistic, especially when contrasting the South' s poor economic
growth rate to the rapid growth in the North. To permit
South Korean resources to be concentrated on nation building
and economics, the United States assumed the total costs for
the support of theSouth Korean armed forces. It also pro-
vided the equalizing force margin by retaining two U.S. Army
divisions, backed up with supporting air and logistics. In
this process, America exercised the right to "prescribe the
size, configuration, and weaponry of the South Korean armed
forces . " 44
United States major weapon exports to South Korea rose
steadily throughout the fifties, reaching a peak in the
years 1958-60.45 President Rhee had, as a condition to agree
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to an Armistice, extracted from the United States a pledge
of large scale-American aid and a direct American security
guarantee - the Mutual Security Treaty formalized in 1954.
Nearly all of these arms exported to South Korea were WW II
surplus, obsolete, or second hand. Additionally, these
arms were single weapons (as opposed to weapon systems)
,
which required minimal maintenance or few complex spare
parts. 46 Aircraft imports between 1954 and 1960 consisted
mainly of F-86 Sabre fighter-bombers; naval imports were
primarily landing craft. 47
In North Korea, Kim Il-Sung had consolidated his power
base. The Soviet initiative for an armistice had created
widespread resentment among North Korean leaders who
realized the lives lost were in vain and the goal of reuni-
fication could not be achieved. Kim showed his resentment
by embarking on an independent path of reconstruction with-
out Soviet approval. His efforts were facilitated by the
presence until 1958 of Chinese troops. The People's Repub-
lic of China did much to help ease the manpower shortage by
keeping more than 200,000 troops in Korea. Not only did
the CPLA help with logistics and training, their presence
alone made possible a significant reduction in the Korean
People's Army. The greatly facilitated North Korea's efforts
in reconstruction and economic development . 48
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As Soviet influence had been paramount during the late
1940s, the diversification of North Korea's trade and
political relationships after 1955 tended to reduce it more
than it reduced a significantly lower Chinese influence
level. Post-war economic aid to North Korea was consider-
able. Chinese aid, an estimated $1.8 billion up to 1961
was nearly as large as Soviet aid ($2.0 billion), with
Eastern European Communist countries providing nearly $620
million. 49
Nevertheless, the Soviets retained their primacy of
influence in North Korea through the summer of 1958.50 They
also remained the sole suppliers of major weapons to North
Korea. Between 1955 and 1957, North Korea was supplied and
trained in the use of 11-28 jet bombers and MiG-17s to
replace obsolescent MiG-15s.51 Also during this period,
Kim Il-Sung was able to develop within his newly formed
armed forces a strong peasant base loyal to himself and to
the Korean Workers Party. 52
By 1958, Kim was walking a diplomatic tight-rope between
the pressures of China and Russia to take a side on the
mounting Sino-Soviet dispute. To avoid becoming a pawn to
either, he chose an independent line. Eventually, he leaned
more toward China's side after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization
(anti-cult) campain and "peaceful coexistence policy". 53
(Chapter IV deals more in detail with the triangular rela-
tionship between North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the
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People's Republic of China») However, China had limited
capacity to deliver major weapons prior to 1957. It wasn't
until 1958 that Chinese-built MiG-15s and MiG-17s were
delivered. 54 Therefore, Kim saw no alternative but to
play a dual role of subservience to Moscow and Peking in
return for the much needed economic and military aid.
Upon the assumption of office, President Kennedy changed
the Eisenhower Administration's strategy of reliance on the
threat of massive retaliation to a doctrine of flexible
response, a doctrine implying a willingness to commit con-
ventional troops for combat. The Kennedy strategy essen-
tially left open the possibilities of response geared to
the level of threat perception.
The increase in guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia
also resulted in a re-appraisal of the threat perception.
Subsequently, in the Far East, external threat perception
gave way to the belief that an internal threat within South-
east Asia was more of a danger to American interests than an
external one. Furthermore, an increased willingness by the
Kennedy Administration to commit troops to limited wars
(i.e., a doctrine of flexible response), coupled with a
refocusing of threat perception, resulted in a reappraisal
of the United States military aid programs for the Far East
forward defense areas. The decision was made to concentrate
more on countering the internal threats, particularly in
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the Philippines, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
American military aid would be used to concentrate on
training and equipping indigenous forces to counter their
internal threats.
The United States' view of the authoritarian nature of
President Rhee s rule was one of discouragement. The Rhee
government's authoritarianism, corruption, and lack of
substantial economic growth rate was proving to be an
embarrassment to the United States. Therefore, it was not
surprising that the April, 1960 bloodless coup overthrowing
the Rhee regime was welcomed by Washington. Politically,
the high tide of United States influence was probably
reached in that short lived administration of Dr. Chang
Myon. 55 Conversely, the coup d' etat of May 1961 led by
then General Park Chung Hee and a group of military officers
clearly worried the United States. A military rule was
distinctly repugnant to Americans and the new Kennedy
Administration. During the coup d' etat, the United Nations
/
Command was seriously weakened in prestige when the military
junta supporting General Park utilized unilaterally some
Korean armed forces units, technically under UN Command, in
support of the take-over action^ 56 )
Prolonged efforts of persuasion and pressure were
directed at General Park to restore civilian government to
hold elections. General Park and his group of military
officers responded by attempting to mold the former civilian
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oriented government into a form more regimentized and order-
ly. The Kennedy Administration responded forcefully, threat'
ening to terminate not only economic aid but also military
aid. Finally, in 1963 finding he had no choice but to
acquiesce to Washington's pressure, General Park promulgated
a new Constitution and held election^. 57 South Korea grad-
ually developed a ruling base under a democratic system that
the United States was no longer overly embarrassed to be
associated with. The Kennedy Administration was equally
pleased that President Park had entered into negotiations
with Tokyo over normalization issues.
Military aid programs to South Korea fluctuated sig-
nificantly during this period. U.S. military assistance
to South Korea is shown in Table 17. The high point of
U.S. assistance to South Korea during this period was fiscal
year 1961. From that period until 1968, U.S. military
assistance to South Korea decreased below the 1961 level.
The major reason for the aid decrease was most likely the
substantial increase in military assistance to Southeast
Asia, particularly to South Vietnam rather than to disatis-
faction with the Park government. Nevertheless, as the
figures in Table 18 show, considerable supplies of con-
ventional armaments continued to flow into South Korea.
This was the period when advanced missiles such as Nike
Hercules, Honest John and the Hawk were supplied to the ROK
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forces, the first deliveries made in 1961.58 it is important
to note that, though the supplies of conventional armaments
continued, the share of U.S. military aid for new procure-
ment was falling during thie period. By 1964-65, nearly 80
per cent of military assistant grants went toward ammunition,
parts, food and training. 59
To North Korea, the period 1960-1965 proved to be the
historical low point in Soviet-North Korean relations.
Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy was widely interpreted
in Asia as repudiating the cult of personality which meant
in Asian terms, anti-Mao and anti-Kim. Kim Il-Sung, a great
admirer of Stalin (and probably of Mao) refused to abide
with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign.
"Indeed, North Korea has never ex-
perienced 'de-Stalinization'. 'The
adulation given him by all mass media'
,
Dr. Scalapino writes, 'exceeds even that
given Mao; the cult of personality reigns
supreme. '"60
In 1961 mutual defense treaties with both the Chinese and
the Soviets were concluded by North Korea. The same year
Kim introduced his 7-Year Economic Development Plan defying
the Soviets who were trying to coordinate and direct all
socialist planning. This action, coupled with a North
Korean refusal to accept Soviet military command dominance
resulted in the cessation of all Soviet military aid. 61
The Soviet's "Retreat" in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
added fuel to the North Korean contention that Peking's
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hard line attitude toward the United States offered more
protection from the United States than Moscow was willing
to provide. North Korea was particularly impressed when
the Chinese wholly endorsed Kim's political and territorial
ambitions. The Chinese also supported North Korea's con-
tention that the United States alone obstructed the unifi-
cation of the two Koreas and the two Chinas by its presence
in the Republic of Korea and in the Taiwan Straits. This
commonality of attitudes toward the U.S. was one of the
major factors binding the two countries.
Thus, in the early 1960s the Chinese shared its scarce
supplies of jet fuel and aircraft spare parts with the
North Koreans. The Chinese also influenced North Korean
training and organization during this period. The KPAFAC
(North Korean Air Force) reorganized along Chinese lines
while receiving new Chinese-built MiG-17s. By 1963, the
KPAFAC had received 380 Chinese-built MiG-17s and MiG-15s,
new Chen Shen yang Yak-18s and MiG-15 UTIs as well as Fong
Shou No. 2 transports. Estimates credited the KPAFAC with
465 combat planes by 1964. Another significant aspect
of this period was the near doubling of North Korean expend-
itures which were nearly three times those of South Korea.
See Table 16.
In examining the varied military assistance programs
and arms transfers to the Korean peninsula between 1953
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and 1965, a number of variables affecting the major actors
can be identified and analyzed for their impact on both the
recipients and their suppliers.
D. THE SUPPLIER-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIP
The ties between the United States and South Korea were
made stronger during this period. Due to the massive eco-
nomic and military aid provided, the United States wielded
considerable influence over nearly all aspects of South
Korean development and policy orientation. This relation-
ship was also strengthened in a large degree by mutual
agreed objectives, i.e., a democratic structured society
based upon a free-enterprise system (which, of course, was
patterned on the American model) . The United States had
reappraised its ongoing military assistance programs in
the early 1960s and shifted emphasis toward countering
internal threats in Asia. Because internal security was
not perceived as a major problem for South Korea, United
States supplies decreased somewhat. However, the rise of
grant aid and the continued presence of American forces
allowed the South Korean government the ability to pursue
economic goals.
While the ties between the People's Republic of China
and North Korea strengthened, the relationship between
both the Chinese and the North Koreans with the Soviets
became strained. The Soviet Union's price for military
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and economic aid was support for Soviet programs, ideas,
and ideology. Additionally, North Korean resentment
remained over the Soviet willingness to "capitulate" to the
United Nation demands of a cease-fire. Conversely, the North
Koreans were very aware of the "debt" they owed the Chinese
for their help in the Korean War. Additionally, the Chinese
did not require a quid pro quo for military or economic aid
like the Soviets. Probably due to Chinese aid and parti-
cularly Mao's commitment of troops during the war, Kim II-
Sung did not side with Moscow in the developing Sino-Soviet
dispute. Pyongyang chose instead to take a neutral stand.
However, by not supporting Khrushchev's de-Stalinization
program, the Soviet proposed joint forces concept, and
embarking on an agriculture reform program similar to China's,
North Korea was identified by Moscow as being too independent,
requiring a lesson. In 1963, the Soviet Union suspended all
types of military aid to North Korea. Peking quickly stepped
in to fill the gap. However, Chinese ability to supply North
Korea with adequate and current major weapons programs was
extremely limited. North Korea, realizing aid from China
was insufficient for her desired programs embarked on a
policy of self-reliance to which Peking had earlier advocated.
This movement toward self-sufficiency or chuch'
e
was to have




During this period, North Korea was resupplied only the
necessary arms and equipment by both its suppliers to be
able to defend itself adequately. The Soviet supplied arms
began to taper off once parity with the South Korean forces
was achieved.
South Korean forces were also equipped with sufficient
arms, though generally technologically inferior to North
Korea's, to deter a limited conventional conflict. This
was in accordance with the policy of arming all forward
defensive area nations sufficiently to preclude surrender
or a United States resort to nuclear weapons. However, the
American troop presence, coupled with the concept of "mas-
sive retaliation", comprised the real deterrence to renewed
conflict on the peninsula.
E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AID AND ECONOMIC AID
The importance of economic aid supplementing military
assistance in "containing communism" was recognized by the
United States shortly after the Korean War. Two primary
objectives of United States economic aid were assistance
designed to increase economic development, thereby reducing
internal discontent so easily exploited by communism, and
supporting assistance designed to support the build-up of
local military forces to counter a communist threat. Support
ing assistance also ensured access to overseas bases in
South Korea and financed strategic imports. 64
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The Korean War experience lent greater importance to
American supporting assistance because it focused on the
external threat. The Mutual Security Acts of 1953 and 1957
reflected Congressional support for the tie-in of both types
of aid. 65
A later shift in attitude in the U.S. Congress toward the
relationship between economics and military aid resulted in
pressure on the Kennedy Administration to make changes. The
result was the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Secretary of
Defense McNamara proposed that "revolutions arise from
poverty". 66 Thus, from 1961, economic aid increased while
supporting assistance fell. South Korean supporting
assistance was not drastically affected initially. However,
as the United States role in Southeast Asia increased, South
Korean supporting assistance decreased proportionately. 67
By 1960, North Korea was outpacing China in economic
development. Therefore, Chinese economic aid was less needed
than military aid. Moreover, North Korea's rapid economic
development required broader economic ties with the Soviets.
In dealings with the Socialist nations, Moscow always puts a
political price on all aid regardless of type. 68 So it was
with North Korea. Subsequently, when the Soviets saw the need
to teach North Korea a lesson, all types of aid were cut.
Though military aid was considered necessary by the North
Koreans, the near cut-off of economic aid was considered
particularly harmful and resented.
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"The Korean government bitterly
criticized the Soviet Union for this and
publicly cited evidence of the harmful
effects of Soviet aid". 69
This Soviet policy of combining both types of aid for one
purpose, i.e., influence, had a great deal to do with North
Korea pursuing a policy of self-reliance.
F. THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
When the two sides involved in Sino-Soviet dispute
created pressures on North Korea, Kim Il-Sung attempted
accommodation to both. Although the Soviet pressures exerted
on Kim Il-Sung were sufficient to defeat his Seven Year (1961-
1967) Economic Plan, political interest prevailed with Kim
Il-Sung persistently supporting Mao Zedong. In an atmos-
phere of increasingly mounting international tensions, the
Sino-Soviet dispute converged to the point that Kim had to
openly side with Mao against Khrushchev. Kim's lack of
total support to the Soviet side resulted in decreased
economic aid and eventual shut-off of all military aid. '®
However, because the level that Chinese economic develop-
ment had reached was not much different than that in North
Korea, Kim Il-Sung also felt the need to move his country
more toward self-sufficiency. Subsequently, large amounts
of funds had to be transferred or be planned for transfer




Two significant events occurred in South Korea during
this period: the student uprisings in 1960 which led to
the overthrow of Syngman Rhee, and the subsequent military-
coup in 1961 which ousted the Yun Po-son and Chang Myon
government of the Second Republic. ' The emergence of a
military government in South Korea drastically altered Kim
Il-Sung's plans to take advantage of the instability in
South Korea resulting from the weakness of Dr. Chang Myon's
administration. This golden opportunity, as Kim saw it,
quickly vanished when President Park instituted rational
economic reforms and increased the South' s political stability,
Due largely to the vast amounts of United States grant mil-
itary aid and the deterrent presence of American troops,
President Park was able to place primary emphasis in econo-
mic development. Thus, by the end of 1965, South Korea was
successfully carrying out its First Five-Year (1962-1966)
Economic Plan while Kim's Seven Year (1961-1967) Plan was
heading for failure.
G. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF SOURCES
South Korea had virtually no option for diversification.
Subsequently, it had to accept United States implied influ-
ence and accept what ever it was offered, Moreover, South
Korea's state of economy obviously precluded her from shop-
ping elsewhere for desired arms. However, having the United
States as its only source of arms cannot be considered a
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disadvantage in that South Korean goals continued to coin-
cide with American goals.
North Korea had been able to maintain a relative degree
of independence by balancing Soviet and Chinese supplies.
However, this exploitation of competition between her two
suppliers failed to provide North Korea any significant
edge over South Korea. By 1963, North Korea found herself
essentially in the same position as South Korea - only one
source available for military assistance - the People's
Republic of China. Even more significant, the ability of
China to provide North Korea higher technology weapons was
consequentially less than the Soviet Union's. It was not
until 1965 that North Korea acquired missile systems, four




Though both North Korea and South Korea received major
weapons from the super-powers, the only true modern equip-
ment transferred to the peninsula was Soviet warships and
MiG-17s transferred to North Korea in 1956, and 200 F-86
Sabre fighter-bombers transferred to South Korea between
1956 and I960. 2 Missile systems had been in the Korean
peninsula before the 1960s. However, it is significant to
note that the recipient nations finally received their own
missile systems during this period: South Korea in 1961,
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North Korea in 1965. South Korea's Navy was first provided
modern warships in 1963. North Korea had been equipped with
Soviet-built ships in 1956. Of the above mentioned equip-
ment and arms transferred, only the missile systems were
still being utilized by the suppliers' own armed forces
(see Tables 18 and 19). 73
I. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-SUPPLIERS
At the conclusion of the Korean War, the United States
perceived its chief threat in Asia as an external one, i.e.,
the Soviet Union and/or the People's Republic of China. Its
military assistance and arms transfer policies were so
reflected in the various Mutual Security Acts initiated in
the mid-1950s. Transferring arms and providing military
assistance to South Korea was in the interests of American
security strategy which was to arm South Korea, thus creat-
ing a buffer zone for Japan. By 1960, the perceived threat
in the Far East had changed from external to internal.
United States security interests shifted to counter the
insurgency actions of communist sponsored "national libera-
tion movements". And since the South Koreans had no serious
internal threat, emphasis in military assistance shifted
from the Korean peninsula/Taiwan to Southeast Asia. The
era of pre-emptive supply began. Although there were some
decreases in actual arms transfers to South Korea in the
early 1960s, the decreases were relatively modest considering
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the great amounts being transferred to peninsular Southeast
Asia during the same time frame. (See Table 17).
Immediately following the Korean War, both China and
the Soviet Union perceived their major threat as the United
States, not South Korea. However, it is likely that both
accepted the tenet that the United States was more interested
in a status quo on the peninsula than a Southern initiated
forceful reunification. It is also important to note that
China's perceived threat had shifted from a possibly rearmed
Japan of the future to a United States becoming more and
more involved with neighbors to her south.
The Soviet Union believed continued support and assistance
to North Korea was necessary because,
"North Korea is an indispensable forward
and buffer zone to the Soviet Far Eastern
strategy, especially in view of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, and it is also a potential
vehicle for future expansion of Soviet in-
fluence, not only to the whole Korean
peninsula but also to Asia in general." 74
China's security interests closely paralleled the Soviet's,
in that North Korea acted as a buffer not only between China
and the United States, but also as a buffer to future Soviet
and Japanese expansionistic aims.
As Soviet influence fell in Asia so did its interest in
transferring arms there. Attention turned to the West and
Europe. The Cuban missile crisis perhaps was the turning
point for Soviet strategic thinking. With the fall of
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Khrushchev, the new Soviet leadership began to try to
strengthen their position and reassert influence in Asia,
while at the same time challenging the spread of Chinese
influence. Though not realized until many years later in
the United States, the Soviet threat perception had shifted
toward China. Soviet aid to both North Korea and China were
decreased significantly during this period of shifting threat
perceptions
.
Though the major threat to the People's Republic of
China remained the United States, disputes with the Soviet
Union were beginning to dominate the Chinese leadership's
attention. Chinese military aid to North Korea increased
significantly when the Soviets cut off all military aid in
1963. The need to reduce American influence and to gain
North Korean support in the Sino-Soviet dispute were the
foremost Chinese security interests during this period.
J. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-
RECIPIENTS
The primary threat perception held by both North and
South Korea was that each desired reunification by force.
Therefore, arms transfers were imperative to deter the
other from taking offensive military action. Both con-
sidered its received aid insufficient, but could do little
to otherwise influence their suppliers. ^5 The arms sup-
pliers provided arms for potential use in an indigenous
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limited war or for self-defense, not one in which the super-
powers and China would become immediately involved.
While South Korea's perceived threat level may have
been enhanced by the switch of suppliers to North Korea,
North Korea's perceived threat remained focused on the
American troop presence in South Korea. A commonality of
perceived threat brought the North Koreans closer to the
Chinese.
The United States provided military aid to South Korea
to enable local troops to perform functions that were in
the interest of the United States. This was possible
because of two factors: South Korean interests were har-
monious with those of the United States and the United
States was in a position to control the forces of South Korea
(all South Korean forces were under UN command during this
period)
.
The above was not the case for North Korea. North
Korean security interests did not exactly coincide with either
Soviet or Chinese interests. Significantly, by 1957 the
North Korean military was totally independent of external
control. Therefore, military aid was provided by the Soviets
in order to "retain friendships and to protect the inroads
already won", while Chinese aid was provided to counter
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III. AID TO KOREA DURING THE NIXON, FORD, AND
VIETNAM YEARS
A. 1964-1968 AID TO NORTH KOREA
Beginning in 1965, relations between North Korea and the
Soviet Union began to improve. A number of factors can be
attributed to this changing relationship. First there was
the Chinese involved coup attempt failure in Indonesia.
Secondly, events initiating the Cultural Revolution within
China began to alienate North Korea; and probably more
important than the first two reasons, the negative effects
of Soviet aid cut-off placed planned North Korean industrial-
ization and economic goals behind scheduled expectations.
The base line was that Kim's Seven-Year Plan could not work
without Soviet aid. Subsequent developments showed that the
North Korea and the Soviet Union relationship was improving.
The shifting of closer ties with the Soviet since 1965
was most probably motivated by the need to extract economic
and military aid. As one student of North Korea pointed out:
"To be blunt about the whole changing
attitude, Pyongyang needed more and new mili-
tary equipment, scientific knowledges (sic)
and, above all, oil from the Soviet Union.
From China, they had little to gain or "study."
In addition to these, the American bombings of
North Vietnam since the beginning of February
last year (1965) made themselves increasingly
felt in North Korea. Pyongyang's desire for a
new defense guarantee from Moscow increased. .
.
factors that contributed to the warming of
relations .... included Moscow's successful
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psychological manipulation of North Korean
leaders, Pyongyang's urgent need for modern
military equipment partly caused by the
worsening development of the Vietnamese war
and finally, Kim's own desire to acquire more
practical economic and technical "interests"
from the Soviet Union."
2
Therefore, in February, 1965 when Premier Kosygin
visited North Korea and negotiations on military aid began,
there was little doubt that North Koreans were anxious to
gain Soviet military aid to relieve the losses to economic
development caused by high defense expenditures. There
were also three reasons strictly in the North Korean military
view why Soviet military aid had to be resumed: 1) United
States bombing strategy in North Vietnam called for a need
to upgrade North Korean air-defense capabilities; 2) United
States transfers of 60 F-5 fighters to South Korea that
year; and 3) the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army modernization
program was perceived as a threat to the superior North
Korean ground force capabilities. A joint military agree-
ment was signed, and although the terms were secret, North
Korea soon received SA-2s, later model jet fighters (MiG-21
FLs) , heavy field artillery and other weapons.
3
The rapprochement, however, did not result in an over-
night "pro-Soviet" general policy. North Korean media
stressed the need for North Korea to retain its economic,
cultural, and ideological independence. This independence
policy would result in eventual indigenous production of





The nature and extent of Soviet military aid to North
Korea between 1967-68 was substantial. As reported in The
New York Times in February, 1968, Moscow provided: more
than half of North Korea's 500 combat aircraft to include 21
MiG-21s, 350 MiG-17s, 80 MiG-15s, and 80 11-28 bombers; 10
air-defense complexes containing 500 missiles; almost 1001
Soviet equipment for its army; and 2 Soviet W-class sub-
marines, 4 Komar-class guided missile ships, 40 motor
torpedo boats, and 2 coastal defense complexes equipped
with Soviet surface to ship missiles and radar.
5
To further cement the improving Soviet-North Korean
relationship, the Soviets championed North Korean causes
at the United Nation's 22nd Session calling for among other
things, an appeal for North Korean membership, the withdraw-
al of all foreign troops from South Korea, the dissolution
of the UN Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea (UNCURK) , and an international conference to settle
once and for all the question of Korean unification.
°
While relations with the Soviets improved, relations
with China worsened considerably between 1965-1968, the
peak years of the Cultural Revolution. Though Kim continued
his policy of neutralism in the widening Sino-Soviet dispute,
China began accusing Kim himself of revisionism and siding
with the "Soviet revisionists". Mao had even presented
North Korea with a territorial claim on the Yalu-Tuman
border on April 28, 1966. China claimed nearly a hundred
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square miles of North Korean territory near Mt . Paektu as
"compensation" for its assistance during the Korean War.
There were even a number of border clashes with China in
September, 1967.7 Under such conditions, North Korea probab-
ly had more reason to fear military action from China than
from either the United States or South Korea. During this
period, China made no new aid promise to North Korea, nor is
there evidence that earlier grant aid promised was delivered.
8
As previously noted, the economic and political threat
from South Korea was highlighted by the South Korean's
successful economic and foreign policies. South Korea had
also been quite successful in its anti-Communist diplomacy.
For example, South Korea instituted a free Asian bloc with
nine Asian countries (Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)) in
1966, had normalized relations with Japan the year prior,
and was successfully wooing Japanese business away from
North Korea. At the same time South Korea was providing
combat troops to South Vietnam.
9
All of these developments were strong enough to persuade
Kim Il-Sung that his program concerning national defense
was inadequate. In spite of the North Korean worsening
financial and economic situation, Kim began to adopt a
national defense program utilizing increasingly prohibitive











% of Nat. Budget
1963 1.9
1964 2,500 300 12.00 5.8
1965 2,500 350 14.00 10.1
1966 2,900 350 12.07 12.5
1967 3,000 470 15.67 30.4
1968 3,500 610 17.43 32.4
1969 4,000 615 15.37 31.0
1970 4,500 700 15.0 31.0
unit: million U.S. dollars
As a result, the share of national defense to the total budget
rose from an average of 6.4% during 1963-1966 to an average
of 31.2% between 1967-1970. In the same period, the percent-
age of defense to national income jumped from an average of
3.1% during 1956-1966 to an average of nearly 11% during 1967-
1970. ]1
Although difficult to quantify, the consequences of
large defense expenditure were substantial, to include an
inherent shortage of labor. Nevertheless, Kim was determined
to strengthen North Korea's defense capacity even if it
required a restriction on the people's economic development.
Expressed in the slogan "Weapon in One Hand and Hammer and
Sickle in the Other," Kim described to his 1970 Party Congress





"The outcome of war depends largely on
whether or not the manpower and materials
requirements of the front and the rear are
fully met over a long duration of time. We
should secure an ample reserve of necessary
materials by intensifying the struggle for
increased production and economy in all
fields of the national economy, develop
the munitions industry, reorganize the
economy in conformity with the demans of
the situation . . . prepare ourselves in
advance ... build up a firm material basis
to implement more thoroughly the principle
of self defense in national defense. "12
In that same report Kim repeated what he had told the Party
in October 1966 regarding the cost of the military part of
the "parallel development" policy:
Our national defense power has been
gained at a very large and dear price.
Frankly speaking, our spendings on national
defense have been too heavy a burden for us
in the light of the small size of the country
and its population. Had even a part of the
nation's defense spendings been diverted to
economic construction, our national economy
would have developed more rapidly and the
living standard of our people have improved
much more. But the situation never allowed
us to do so. We could not throw to the
winds the fundamental interests of the
revolution to seek a temporary comfortJ3
Not all North Korean leaders had supported Kim's view-
point, however. A group of military generals had urged
Kim to concentrate on economic reconstruction rather than
overemphasizing military strength at the expense of a
delay in the Seven-Year Economic Plan. These generals also
feared Kim's growing insistence on a self-reliant posture
and his anti-Soviet policy, which came at a time when the
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Soviets were still providing all of North Korea's sophis-
ticated military equipment. These generals apparently
confronted Kim during the 15th and 16th plenums of the 4th
Party Congress in 1967. By the 5th Party Congress in 1970,
eight of the eleven members of the Political Committee of
the party had been purged and replaced with hardliners. 14
Between 1966 and 1971, Pyongyang was also committed on
a fairly large scale in financial and military aid to sup-
porting insurgent movements elsewhere in the world. The
North Koreans reportedly set up a dozen training camps for
insurgents from 25 countries. The North Korean instructors
were also utilizing their own embassies in various countries
for training and financing these guerrillas. North Korea
was the first nation to offer "volunteers" to fight in
Cambodia after the depose of Prince Sihanouk in 1970.
Rationale for such efforts was not solely ideological. North
Korea hoped to create as many "Vietnams" as possible for
the United States, thereby weakening America through over-
extension of resources, hopefully humiliating her through
defeats, and finally causing her total withdrawal from East
Asia J ^
No doubt, the resumption of Soviet aid, resulting in an
improved military posture, lent Kim increased confidence to
renew overt military actions against the South. In the
latter half of 1965, North Korean guerrilla tactics increased
dramatically, from six cases reported between 1963 and 1964 » to
88

27 incidents.^ In 1967, North Korean - South Korean clashes
in the DMZ totalled over 500 with over 600 casualties, includ-
ing some Americans. I? The year 1968 proved to be the most
violent year for the peninsula since the Korean War. On 21
January 1968, a 31-man North Korean commando force attacked
the South Korean Presidential mansion resulting in nearly
130 casualties, including two American soldiers killed and
12 wounded. ^8 two days later, North Korean patrol boats
seized the U. S. S. Pueblo resulting in an international
crisis. President Johnson responded by calling up reservists
in the U.S., redeploying the carrier U. S. S. Enterprise off
the South Korean coast, reinforcing the U.S. forces in South
Korea by about 5000 men, and taking the issue to the United
Nations. 1^ Later, the next year, the North Koreans shot
down a U.S. reconnaissance plane. ^0 Noteworthy is the
restraint shown in the U.S. response.
With the Cultural Revolution winding down in 1968,
relations between China and North Korea began to slightly
improve. Chou En-lai visited North Korea in 1970 promising
a resumption of both military and economic aid. The military
assistance promised was in the form of ships, fuel and tech-
nical personnel. Mao might have made these promises with
the purpose of sounding out the North Koreans in terms of
their relations with the Soviets and the North Korean stance
on the Sino-Soviet dispute that had developed into armed
clashes the previous year. 21
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B. SOUTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR 1964 § AFTER
The increasing involvement of the United States in
Vietnam resulted in increased counter-insurgency aid to
Southeast Asia at the expense of military aid given to the
forward defense nations. However, in the case of South Korea
(and the Philippines), an exception to this trend occurred.
Military aid remained at a stable level from FY 1965 - FY
1967 and thereafter increased each year. In essence, the
American intervention in Vietnam can be considered largely
responsible for the rise in South Korea's arms imports.
Arms were supplied from 196 5 as a quid pro quo for the
deployment and use of South Korean troops in Vietnam.
The coup de etat of May 1961 had, as pointed out in the
preceeding chapter, resulted in a decrease in American
public support for the South Korean government. However,
when South Korean troops fought in the Vietnamese conflict
alongside Americans, the image of South Korea and its leader-
ship improved dramatically. This participation of South
Korean troops in the Vietnam War requires further examina-
tion. The American and South Korean involvement in that
conflict affected the direction in which future American pol-
icy in Asia would be directed and the manner in which mil-
itary assistance programs would be carried out.
Korean participation in the Vietnam War began in late
1964. The first South Korean unit dispatched was a ROK
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Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). All expenses in 1964
concerning this unit were paid for by the South Korean
government. In December, 1964 discussions were undertaken
by the Korean and American governments with respect to
sending combat units to Vietnam. In these talks, the United
States agreed to pay subsistence, maintenance and operation
costs, and special combat allowances. This payment of per-
sonal allowances was the first instance that the United
States had ever paid allowances of this type to individual
soldiers of another country."
In May 1965 while President Park was on a state visit
to the United States, President Johnson obtained a verbal
agreement from the South Korean president to commit combat
troops to the Republic of Vietnam. " This agreement was .
followed up the next month by a formal request from the
Republic of Vietnam for a combat division. Talks between
South Korean and American authorities on the troop deploy-
ment had by then set down the necessary conditions and terms
of United States support for these troops in Vietnam. The
United States agreed to the following: 24
1) No American or South Korean force reduction would
be made in Korea without prior consultation.
2) The MAP allocation for FY 1966 would not be
affected by the deployment.
3) The MAP allocation for FY 1966 plus a $7 million




4) The MAP transfer program would be suspended for
FY 1966 and the transfer items were to be procured by MAP
in Korea. 25
5) The South Korean military forces in Korea would
be provided equipment and training to improve their defense
capability and modernize equipment relating to fire power,
communications, and mobility.
6) The United States would provide, as necessary,
the equipment, logistical support, construction, training,
transportation, subsistence, overseas allowances, funds for
any legitimate non-combatant claim brought against ROK
forces in South Vietnam, and restitution of any cash losses
not resulting from negligence of ROK forces in South Vietnam
The first Korean combat troops (the Tiger Division)
arrived in South Vietnam in October 1965. In February 1966,
another formal request for additional South Korean combat
troops was made by the South Vietnamese government. Again,
discussions between American and Korean authorities provided
yet another set of commitments for the United States: 26
1) The United States would provide over the next
few years substantial items of equipment for modernization
of ROK forces in Korea which included complete equipping
for three ready divisions and plans to expedite the moderni-
zation of 17 army divisions and one marine division.
2) The United States would provide the necessary
equipment to expand the ROK arsenal for increased ammunition
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production in Korea, and contribute to the improvement of
ROK anti-infiltration equipment and procedure.
3) The united States would reimburse to South Korea
all net costs, in won, incurred for the deployment of addi-
tional Korean forces to Vietnam as well as for the mobiliza-
tion and maintenance in Korea of one reserve division, one
brigade, and their supporting units. The South Korean air
force would also be provided four C-54 aircraft for support
of ROK troops in Vietnam.
4) The United States would procure in Korea, for the
use of ROK forces, the items of supplies so suspended under
the MAP transfer program in FY 1966, plus those on the FY 1967
list, utilizing U.S. dollars not American goods as payment.
5) The United States would provide various amounts
of program and AID loans to South Korea.
In addition to the above terms of American support for
South Korean troops in Vietnam, the daily allowance rates
were increased, and death gratuities and wounded-in-action
(WIA) benefits were paid for by the United States. The
following table reflects the daily allowance rates for




U.S. Financed Daily Allowance to South Koreans
























Private 1st class— 1.35
Private -— 1.25
The first units of this second combat troop deployment
arrived in Vietnam in April i966. In June 1967, the South
Korean government, desiring to round out their forces in
Vietnam, proposed a further 3000 troop reinforcement. These
soldiers departed for Vietnam "in July, that same year. In
all, the South Korean government had deployed at least 47,872
military personnel to the Republic of Vietnam in four major
increments.
Tabie 5
Major Deployments of South Korean Forces







Med/Engr (DOVE) - 2,128
Tiger Div (-RCT) w/spt forces and Marine bde- 18,904
9th Div (_RCT and spt forces) 23,865
Marine bn (-) and other spt forces 2,963
1969 Authorized increase C-46 crews' 12
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The 1967 dispatch of troops required no new commitments as
far as United States support was concerned.
There had been no costs absorbed by the United States in
support of ROK forces deployed to Vietnam in FY 1964. However,
beginning in FY 1965 and ending in FY 1973, the total cost of
United States support provided was approximately $1,458 bil-
lion. ^9 xhe support costs to the United States to maintain
one ROK soldier in Vietnam one year was approximately $5,000
compared to $13,000 for an American soldier. 30
Beginning in 1965, the United States began honoring the
above listed commitments to South Korea. F-5 Freedom fighter
aircraft began arriving to replace the aging F-86s. To begin
equipping the three ready divisions and expedite the modern-
ization of all front-line ROK units, South Korea received,
between 1966-1974, tanks, large amounts of artillery, small
arms, patrol crafts, and other miscellaneous equipment. 31
Nike-Hercules and Hawk air defense equipment, funded through
MAP and not a part of the Vietnam quid pro quo agreement, was
provided in 1965 and 1966 respectively . 32
A second reason responsible for an increased influx of
American arms to South Korea apart from the above listed
quid pro quo agreements was the increasing incidents of
violence along the DMZ and in South Korea, the Pueblo inci-
dent, and the shooting down of a EC-121 reconnaissance plane.
Fiscal Years 1968-1969 saw a major increase of U.S. arms
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supplies and military assistance. When Cyrus Vance visited
Korea in January, 1968 the South Koreans requested a squadron
of F-4s to counter the recent acquisition by North Korea of
MiG-21 jet aircraft. The following year, a $100 million
additional request to the already approved appropriations
bill provided further anti-aircraft systems, fast patrol
boats, radar, 2 helicopters, additional F-5A fighter air-
craft and the squadron (19) of F-4E Phantoms South Korea had
requested the prior year. 33
Furthermore, the United States loaned South Korea two
more destroyers in 1968 and 1969 respectively. With a
previous loan in 1963, this transaction brought the ROKN
destroyer strength up to three. These were to be utilized
in counter-infiltration patrols against North Korean agent
boats. 34 To protect not only ROK aircraft, but also forward
deployed United States air squadrons, a program of hardening
aircraft shelters and their pads was undertaken. The cost
of putting in the shelters came to approximately $13 million
per shelter. 35 jn 1969, during Secretary Packard's visit,
the South Korean Minister of National Defense urgently
requested about two million rifles and small arms to equip
the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) in order to provide
effective infiltration counter-measures. The United States
responded by shipping 790,000 excess weapons (M-l, M-l and
M-2 carbines, and M-3 SMGs) with accompanying ammunition,
repair parts, and basic issue items. This shipment was made
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at no cost to MAP except packaging and handling. Worthy
of mention was the visit in June, 1969 by representatives of
Colt Firearms Company to discuss the production of M-16
rifles in South Korea. Other companies soon followed. South
Korea was about to embark on its own indigenous arms program. 36
South Korea received more than just the above mentioned
aid and material for its role in South Vietnam. Also
included in the U.S. defense budgets beginning in 1966 were
the following programs, all applicable to South Korea: 37
1) Deliveries of excess stocks - weapons considered
excess by U.S. armed forces were supplied without Congres-
sional restriction until 1971. Prior to 1970, only the cost
of shipping and refurbishing was charged to MAP.
2) Naval vessel loans - authorized under special
legislation.
3) Supporting assistance - usually economic assist-
ance was authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act and
administered by AID.
4) Food for Peace Program (Public Law 480) -
countries purchase surplus U.S. agricultural commodities with
local currency. A share of the counterpart funds is
allocated for military assistance and for supporting
assistance.
5) Public Safety Program - assistance to police
forces, administered by AID. In South Korea, the police




By 1971, due in large part to the military aid and
assistance provided by the United States, a strong military
machine was gradually developing in South Korea. Though com-
mon sense dictated a strong South Korean defense capability,
the extensive military aid provided by the United States
meant it was strengthening the potential political role of
the South Korean military. As perceived in Washington, there
was no problem to this as long as South Korea maintained a
democratic direction.
The instability in most of Southeast Asia, particularly
former French Indochina, galvanized United States attention
to the point that the stability characterized in Northeast
Asia since the Korean War was largely taken for granted. The
bipolarity structure of Northeast Asia - the Soviets, Com-
munist Chinese, and North Koreans on one side faced by the
Americans, Japanese, Nationalist Chinese, and South Koreans
on the other - no longer existed by the late 1950s. The
most important change in Hast Asia since the Second World
War, the Sino-Soviet dispute, had split the movement known
as "international communism. "38 However, United States
uncertainty as to the depth and durability of that dispute,
coupled with continued Chinese and Soviet hostility toward
the United States and Japan during the Vietnam War, caused
the analysts to be slow to pick up on the extent and impli-
cations of the dispute until the armed clashes between Chinese
and Soviet troops along the Ursuri River in 1969.39
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C. 1969-1973 THE NIXON YEARS
In this new international political context, American
strategists had to reassess the meaning of United States
involvement in Asia. Under this new multicentered inter-
national system which John Spanier has labeled a bipolycentric
world, Korea had essentially became a buffer nation separating
40
Japan from the communist giants in Asia. When the Nixon-
Kissinger team decided to promote detente, Korea was seen
as a place where America could possibly be dragged into an
unwanted war. Accordingly, the first steps were planned
for eventual United States disengagement of military forces
41from East Asia.
Thus, the doctrine of flexible responsible and the
containment concept ended with the election of Richard
Nixon. As Ralph Clough succinctly summed up: "the changes
in East Asia had made a reassessment of the containment
policy desirable; the public reaction in the United states
4?
to the Vietnam War made it imperative." In 1969, President
Nixon announced a new policy toward Asia (tagged as the Guam
or Nixon Doctrine) pledging that the United States would not
automatically be involved in a new war in Asia. President
Nixon stated:
" we shall look to the nation
directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower
for its defense. "43
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The foundation of this policy was, as Zbigniew Brzezinski
called it, a Bismarckian balance of power. Later pursued
by Henry Kissinger, this policy balanced a psuedo-alliance
system among the United States, Japan, and China against an
equally psuedo-alliance system composed of the United States,
Japan and the Soviet Union, allowing the United States the
ability to play one off the other and to enjoy a dominant
position without a risk of war and without a large military
presence in East Asia. Nixon's later decision for Sino-
American detente comes from this balancing scheme. 44
Essentially, Nixon was advocating more arms transfers to
our allies to assume that responsibility noted above. /To
assuage any doubts the South Koreans might have Tiarbored at
the time, the American commitment to help South Korea defend
themselves from external attack was reiterated in early 1969
by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Laird stated:
"Regardless of the form of our assistance,
its basic objective has remained the same:
to ensure that other countries either in-
dividually or collectively, have the necessary
military capability to deter aggression
and, failing this, to withstand an armed
attack until supporting forces arrive. "45
Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford put the new
U.S. strategy in Asia in another perspective:
" Besides costing substantially less
(an Asian soldier costs about 1/15 as
much as his American counterpart) , there
are compelling political and psychological
advantages on both sides of the Pacific
for such a policy. "46
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At an address to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations,
22 October 1970, Melvin Laird said:
"The U.S. Military Assistance Program
and the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Pro-
gram serve as key instruments in the
implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. "47
Also implicit in President Nixon's Guam declaration was
the United States' intention to gradually reduce its military
presence in Asia. A year after his famous announcement, the
President announced he would reduce American forces in South
Korea by 20,000 men.
But, the South Korean willingness to dispatch troops to
Vietnam and her strong objections to the proposed troop with-
drawal placed Seoul in a relatively strong bargaining position
for extensive military aid. Because the American troop level
was being lowered and the need for economic aid declining,
Seoul showed that, despite her need for more military aid,
she was demonstrating an ability for self-help. Subsequent
negotiations from 1970 to 1971 resulted in an agreement by
the United States to largely underwrite a South Korean
modernization program. Although labeled the 1st 5-year
Modernization Program, the program was, in reality, set up
to fill gaps in specific areas such as high performance air-
craft needs, rather than developing the ROK Army into a truly
modern force by Western standards. ^°
Under this program, South Korea received in 1971, 18
F-4D Phantom fighters, 50 M-48 tanks, APCs, heavy artillery,
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and 12 Honest John SSMs at a cost of $95 million, all financed
under MAP. Also promised was much of the 7th Division's
equipment to include approximately 50 M-60 main battle
tanks.^ The redeployment of the 7th Infantry Division
was completed in 1971.
Largely due to increased U.S. involvement in Southeast
Asia, Congressional opposition to the programs of military
aid, credit, and sales had gained momentum. Much of the
criticism was directed towards U.S. overseas commitments,
arms transfers, and military assistance provided to non-
democratic or autocratic regimes. Arms transfers had been
increasingly employed as primary instruments of United
States bilateral diplomacy. Secretary Kissinger, in partic-
ular, perceived arms sales as an important factor in countering
Soviet influence in the Third World. Major decisions to
escalate the quantity and quality of arms exports to a region
often came from high level diplomatic discussions, often
without the review of the relevant government agencies. One
of these precedent-setting transactions included the transfer
of F-4s to South Korea in 1969.50
Many in Congress were also angered over the way the
administration evaded Congressional limitations established
within the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act. One way utilized
often by the Nixon Administration was the transfer of surplus
American weapons which under law were not subject to Congres-
sional authorization. 51 Nevertheless, Congressional
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criticism during the JMixon years never adversely affected the
military assistance programs targeted for South Korea.
While the Nixon Doctrine was disconcerting to the Park
regime, North Korean policy planners were encouraged and
began to shift their strategic focus to a "more sophisticated
politics - military manoeuvre (sic). "52 North Korea, by
this time, came to realize a direct conventional attack would
fail due to strengthened South Korean forces backed by a
continued U.S. presence. However, to President Park, the
North Korean threat, backed by the Soviets and Chinese was
very real. South Korean confidence was further aggravated
by four events between July 1971 and September 1972:
Kissinger's trip to Peking, the People's Republic of China's
admission to the UN, the Nixon trip to Peking, and finally
Japanese Premier Tanaka's visit to China. Understandably,
those events confused and dismayed the leadership in Seoul.
President Park's reaction to the rapid changes surrounding
South Korea was to tighten internal security on one hand,
and move toward a rapprochement with North Korea on the
other. 53
To President Park, the rapprochement with North Korea
meant three implications : 54 i) South Korea proved it could
respond to change in the international arena; 2) South
Korea proved it was serious in past statements when it called
for a peaceful negotiated unification; and 3) by showing
progress in the above two areas, President Park was able to
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strengthen his power base and facilitate the "coup in office"
President Park initiated his coup by declaring a state of
national emergency on December 6, 1971. According to Park,
the emergency was "necessitated by the need to cope with
changes in the international situation and to meet North
Korea's 'aggressive design' ".55 Between the emergency
declaration to the imposition of martial law in October,
1972, President Park repeatedly called upon the North Korean
government to halt its aggressive attitude toward South
Korea.
The year 1972 was significant for a number of reasons.
In Vietnam, the last U.S. combat troops were leaving for
home. In Washington, it was election time and Watergate was
about to shatter the U.S. public confidence. President Nixon
and Premier Tanaka visited China opening the door for future
normalization of relations. And in the Korean peninsula,
President Park promulgated his infamous Yushin Constitution,
while initial contacts (initiated in 1971) between Red Cross
representatives of North and South Korea were blossoming
into the important North - South communique of July 4, 1972.
Premiere Kim-Il-Sung had finally responded to President
Parks' call for a North-South dialogue in April 1972 with an
extraordinary overture completely contrary to previous stands:
"it is my assertion that we should
attempt direct North-South talks right
away. The withdrawal of American troops
is not a precondition for political talks. "56
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This statement signalled a North Korean acceptance to the
reality of the situation in East Asia. Three reasons can be
attributed to this change in policy:^ first, the rapproche-
ment between the U.S. and China, and detente between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R, brought about significant changes in the
external milieu of the Korean peninsula; second, the detente
among the Korean peninsula's two arms suppliers questioned
the future viability of Soviet support for any North Korean
initiated war for the purpose of forces unification; and
finally, a reduction in tensions would allow Kim to redirect
military assets and expenditures toward the industrial sector.
As previously noted, during the period 1967 to 1971, North
Korea had been spending an average of 31% of its entire budget
on defense. Defense spending was also taking more than 16% of
the GNP (See Table 6) . Adding to this problem was North
Table 6
North Korean Defense Expenditures (in million of won) 58
Year Total Budget Military Spending % of Budget
1953 496.0 75.4 15.2
1954 729,6 58.4 8.0
1955 988,0 61.3 6.2
1956 956.0 56.4 5.9
1957 1,022.4 54.2 5.3
"1958 1,649.6 56.8 4.8
1959 1,649.6 61.0 3.7
1960 1,967.9 61.0 3.1
1961 2,338.0 60.8 2,6









1964 3,418.2 198,3 5.8
1965 3,476.1 278.1 8.0
1966 3,571.4 357.1 I0o0
1967 3,948.2 1, 200.2 30,4
1968 4,812.9 1,559.4 32.4
1969 5,048o6 1,565.1 31.0
1970 6,186.6 1,917.9 31.0
1971 7,277.3 2,183,2 30.0
1972 7,344.0 1,256.1 17.0
1973 8,543.5 1,281.2 15.0
1974 9,801.2 1,568.2 16.0
Korea's high rate of military recruitment causing critical
labor shortages in the domestic sector. Furthermore, because
investment tended toward the heavy defense oriented industries,
the lack of consequential light industry helped maintain the
low living standards suffered by the North Korean populace.
Even Kim acknowledged that the rising defense spending had
59proved a serious burden.
The attempt to continue high defense expenditures while
raising the standard of living pushed North Korea toward a
serious deficit spending problem. Beginning in 1970, North
Korea had begun large-scale purchases of industrial plants
and equipment from Western nations, most notably from Japan.
The probable reason for the shift to Western technology was
that that quality of western products was considerably higher
than the quality coming from the socialist countries. While
trade with Western nations increased dramatically between
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1971 and 1974, trade with the Soviets steadily decreased.
As imports from Moscow rose, exports declined significantly,
resulting in a severe balance of payments deficit. °
The attitude of the Soviets toward North Korea at this
time was "correct but cool " In a major review of policy at
the 29th Party Congress, Brezhnev included North Korea as
one of four communist-ruled states whose relationship with
the Soviet Union was not described as one of "friendship ." 61
Though the Soviets were still providing a considerable
amount of military aid to the North Koreans, payment was made
in cash or credits; it is doubtful that grant aid was
extended. °^
By late 1972 the North Korean military was generally well
equipped due to the program of expansion and modernization
begun in 1967. Other than small arms ammunition, AK-47
rifles, Semyonov automatic rifles, frigates, and trucks,
which were being manufactured domestically, the great majority
of weapons had to still be purchased from foreign countries.
In the early 1970s, intelligence reports indicated the
Chinese were beginning to supply a considerable amount of
military equipment to North Korea, and by 1972 China was
reportedly providing more military aid than the Soviet
Union."-3 Eighteen fast patrol boats, and a number of heavy
and light gunboats were acquired for the North Korean Navy
from the Soviets. Soviet and Chinese transfers of combat
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aircraft raised the North Korean strengths to about 300 MiG-
15s and MiG-17s and another 200 MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighter
bombers. °4
At this time the North Korean air force was almost total-
ly dependent upon the Soviet Union for aircraft replacement
and parts, and aircraft fuel and oil. Also, as a result of
construction programs begun in the late 1960s, nearly all
combat aircraft by 1973 were protected by hardened shelters
or revetments. These works, along with underground command
posts and gun emplacements, were modeled after the Soviet
system and constituted one of the most extensive systems of
its kind in the world. J Also, during 1972-1973, their radar^
missile defense system was considerably improved. When
considering the estimated cost of hardening shelters in
South Korea ($9-13 million/per shelter), this undertaking
had to have been extremely costly to the North Koreans.
Another very costly program undertaken by the North
Koreans at this time appears to have been their tunneling
program. °' It is difficult to understand Pyongyang's
reasoning behind this effort, especially when considering
the excessive costs put into this program while its domestic
economy was in a dangerous downward spiral. Obviously, the
tunnels were to serve a useful military purpose such as a
suprise attack on the South. The North Korean leadership
must have concluded that they had much to gain if the tunnels
were completed undetected, but little to lose if discovered.
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Another possibility is that one branch of government was
ignorant of the operations of another and therefore acted
independently.
Though military equipment was largely of Soviet manufac-
ture, North Korea had by now established its own military
school system; this was an attempt to break from both the
Soviet and Chinese military models. Nevertheless, a number
of North Korean command and staff officers continued to
receive training in military institutions within the Soviet
Union. 69
The fact that North Korea undertook an intensive arms
build-up coupled with a costly tunnel digging commitment
at the time it was entering into a dialogue with South
Korea and the United States was reducing its forces in South
Korea, suggests North Korea's forceful unification strategy
had not been shelved.
On the other hand, President Park's imposition of martial
law can be looked at as an example of ironic rationale.
Prior to 1972, the requirement to counter a North Korean
threat of aggression provided the rationale to curtail
political liberties. However, while the world was exper-
iencing super-power detente, Park, finding himself with no
alternative but to carry on a dialogue with North Korea,
considered such pressure a justification for a curtailment of
democratic rights. Thus, the Yushin Constitution was
promulgated. On December 23, 1972 President Park was
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re-elected to his fourth term by a 2,357 to vote. There
was no opposition. Understandably the above listed restric-
tions, coupled with Park's "coup in office" precipitated
adverse reaction in the United States. The United States
Government, which had by 1972 invested over $11 billion in
military and economic aid was caught in the dilemma of having
to deal with an authoritarian government located in what it
regarded as a strategically important region of the world. 71
D. 1974-1976 THE FORD YEARS
Though the imposition of martial law by President Park
resulted in a slight down turn in political relations between
the United States and South Korea, what shocked the American
public and the free world more was the political kidnapping
in 1973, of the former presidential candidate, Kim Dae Jung,
the opposition party's chief opponent to President Park.
Subsequent revelations that the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency (KCIA) was responsible for this act tended to galvanize
much of the American public, particularly the academe and
press, against the South Korean government.'^ South Korean
political and student unrest through 1974 resulted in a series
of Park decrees aimed at stifling all manner of political
dissent.
At the same time the United States Congress began holding
special hearings on the "human rights situation" in South
Korea. Some Congressmen and Senators were calling for a
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significant reduction of aid (including military) to Seoul
to protest their displeasure in a tangible manner. Repre-
sentative Donald Fraser pushed through an amendment to the
FY 1975 Aid Authorization Act, setting a condition that the
last $20 million of the $165 million authorized that year
would only be provided if President Park rectified his
restrictions on human and political liberties in South
Korea. 73 j n a later letter written by Congressman Fraser to
Assistant Secretary McCloskey on May 23, 1974, he threatened:
"... If U.S. policy toward Korea does not
change, some of us in Congress will be forced
once again to use the question of military
aid and troop levels as levers to force some
change in the Korean Government's position. "<"
Human rights was not the only issue Congress tied to
military and economic aid during the Ford Administration.
Feelings ran very high about allegations of Korean CIA
activities within the United States. Congressman Obey summed
up their feelings by stating:
"If some of those allegations are true,
I would have no intention of voting one dime
for Korea for any purpose. I don't care if
it is economic loans, grants, military loans,
grants, Public Law 480, anything." 75
When President Ford paid a visit to South Korea in
November 1974, he told Park of the growing U.S. Congres-
sional criticism over the suppression of human rights in
South Korea. The President emphasized that the human rights
issue would be a major factor in whether he could fulfill
earlier assurances of continued military assistance. In the
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face of mounting criticism and President Ford's advice, Park
did make a gesture of moderation by releasing some jailed
dissidents. ° On balance, however, Ford's visit represented
a modest triumph for the Park government. Park not only
received from Ford a commitment for continued American
security assistance but also demonstrated to his critics that
the United States foreign policy interests in East Asia would
require the Americans to deal with the existing Korean govern-
ment regardless of its internal policies. The Ford-Kissinger
team obviously believed that for the United States to reduce
military assistance in an almost certainly futile attempt to
force political reform on a country which was located in an
area of immense importance to the United States made little
sense in the world of 'real politik.
'
Nevertheless, Congress held true to its earlier threat
when it approved only $79.5 million in grant funding to South
Korea in FY 1975. An additional $20 million was withheld
until the President was satisfied that democracy had been
restored in South Korea. '° The $20 million never was allocated
The FY 1975 MAP and IMET appropriation reflected a $13.1 mil-
lion drop from the FY 1974 appropriation (See Table 17).
During the Ford Administration, Congress began, through
a series of laws and bills, to assert its voice and influence
on arms sales and military programs. The power of Congress
to veto a specific arms transaction was reflected by the
"Nelson Amendment," which had been attached to a military
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assistance bill in December, 1974. This amendment required
the State Department to provide advance notice to Congress of
any proposed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts in excess
of $25 million and provided that the Congress would have 20
days in which to block the transaction.
™
The linkage between human rights violations and military
aid was addressed by provisions and amendments in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974 and the 1975 Military Assistance
Authorization Bill. The 1974 law directed the President to
"reduce or terminate military or economic assistance to any
government which engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights..."
However, under another provision of the same law, the Presi-
dent may furnish aid inspite of human rights violations by
advising Congress of extraordinary circumstances deeming
military and economic assistance necessary. Amendments to
the 1975 bill required the State Department to provide
reports on the status of human rights in various countries
and allowed Congress to terminate assistance based on these
reports .80
Congress attempted to further its influence on United
States arms sales policies by sending to the President on
April 28, 1976, the first version of the Arms Export Control
Act which was vetoed by the President. Backed by Senate
Democratic liberals, including Senators Kennedy and Humphrey,
the Congress was able to work out a compromise bill which was
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eventually signed by the President on June 30, 1976.°' The
thrust of this act was toward restraint and balance in
administration procedures and guidelines, in the levels of
arms sales approved, and to identify the direction to be
taken in influencing the scope of the world's arms trade. 82
The human rights, arms control and political ramifica-
tions of arms transfers reflected in this act were under-
stood by Congress; however, to actually bar a sale required
specifics supplied mostly by the State Department which often
were outweighed by security or political advantages. Congres-
sional sentiment was best summarized by Senator Humphrey,
whose subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee ini-
tiated the 1976 act. His position was that arms sales should
be generalized neither good nor bad; they require a careful
balancing of the pros and cons by the executive branch, over-
sight by Congress, and openness to both public and congres-
sional scrutiny. So long as the executive appears to have
considered the risks and consequences of a sale, the majority
of Congress will support that decision. 83
Under pressure by Congress due to some controversial
sales to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other countries (not Korea)
,
President Ford created an interagency committee to coordinate
the official policies of the State Department, Defense Depart-
ment, National Security Council and Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency over any future arms sales to foreign
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countries. ^4 Further controls and restraints would be
placed on arms transactions by the Carter Administration
which will be further discussed in Chapter V.
Congress was seriously considering yet another signifi-
cant reduction in FY 1976 military aid to South Korea based
on the above considerations when an assassination attempt
against President Park on 15 August 1974 killed Mrs. Park.°^
When South Korean authorities disclosed that the assassin
was linked to a North Korean organization in Japan, Seoul-
Tokyo relations sank to an all time post-war low, not to be
improved until the following year. The assassination attempt
and death of Mrs. Park offered Park an excuse to further
tighten political dissent. Surprisingly, the reverse
occurred. A new period of limited political liberalization
began. ^6 The linkage of the assassin to North Korea resulted
in a reassessment of North Korean intentions. Park concluded
the following :^ first, North Korea obviously remained
committed to reunification through communization regardless
of the cost; second, South Korea must heighten their vigilance
and act to deter further aggression; and third, short term
sacrifices in political liberty would more than be offset by
the long term benefits of preventing a forceful reunification
by the North. It is significant to note that South Korean
defense expenditures for 1974 were increased nearly 25% from
the previous year. This was a marked upturn for South Korean
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The year 1975 proved that some of President Park's
warnings of the threat from the North were well-founded.
Armed clashes occurred off the east and west coasts of South
Korea, and a second tunnel under the DMZ was discovered by
the UN command (the first had been discovered in November
1974) , 89
However, the most dramatic event in 1975 disturbing the
South Koreans most was the sudden collapse of the South
Vietnamese government. This event, coupled with the earlier
communist takeovers in Laos and Cambodia, shifted the balance
of power in Southeast Asia and caused Asian allies consterna-
tion and doubt over future willingness of the United States
to come to their aid if they had to face an overt military
threat
.
South Korean fears were further compounded by the ambigu-
ities American leaders were providing when questioned about
the United States commitments to the Republic of China
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(Taiwan). When Secretary Kissinger, in a speech to the Japan
Society in New York on June 18, 1975, reaffirmed United States
treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific, he failed
to include Taiwan. ^0 Furthermore, following the fall of
Saigon, American commitments to South Korea were being ques-
tioned in Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
during a re-examination of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia,
heard eight pollsters tell them:
"The current American mood is distrust-
ful - even of the President and the Congress -
preoccupied with our domestic needs, the
scarcity of resources to meet them, and wary
of any foreign policy moves that drain off
resources. . ."91
Lou Harris testified that 63% surveyed felt the United States
government would not be justified in backing authoritarian
governments that have overthrown democratic governments and
that 68% felt the United States should put pressure on
countries that systematically violated basic human rights. 2
Regardless of a seemingly prevalent public desire to
detach itself militarily from South Korea, both the State
and Defense departments made abundantly clear to Seoul that
the United States would honor its 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
with South Korea. Parallels between Korea and Vietnam were
more apparent and emotional than realistic. South Korea is
intricately locked into the economic and commercial web of
the Pacific community (of which the United States is the
largest member) , and reflects a governmental system, though
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not as democratically oriented as many would like, that is
unquestionably preferred over its rival regime in the North.
Cf these two key factors, South Vietnam could not lay claim
for comparison.
The fall of the Saigon government stopped, at least until
the Carter Administration, Congressional moves toward
decreasing and eventually withdrawing all American troops
from South Korea. A reappraisal of the Chinese threat to
the Korean peninsula had followed the improvement in United
States relations with the People's Republic of China begin-
ning in 1971. Consequently, the official rationale for
keeping American forces in Korea had changed. Then Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger told a Congressional committee
in February 1974 that the troops were "to serve as a symbol
of America's continued interest in the overall stability of
that part of the world during a period of some tension ...
(and that) the political purpose is primary now. "93 The
House of Representatives rejected on May 20, 1975, by a 311-
95 vote an amendment calling for, among others, a reduction
of 15,500 American troops from South Korea. 94 The United
States driven out of old "Indochina" had shifted the focus
of its Pacific defense policy to Northeast Asia.
Following the Communist victories in Southeast Asia,
President Park began publicity to express the view that
South Korea had to become self-sufficient militarily.
Knowing that the mood in the United States Congress tended
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to shift with public opinion, Park and his military chiefs
devised a plan to enable South Korea within 4-5 years (1976-
1980) to possess the capability of self-defense through an
indigenous defense industry. Specifically, South Korea
sought to develop within five years a force structure capable
of holding its own against any North Korean attack, with the
United States providing only necessary logistical support.
This multi-faceted project, named the Force Improvement
Program (FIP), was a follow-up to the five-year modernization
program launched in 1971
As pointed out earlier in this paper, the decision to
support South Korea's 1971 5-Year Modernization Plan was due
in large part to placate Park's fears over the withdrawal of
the 7th Division's 20,000 troops. The decision was an Exec-
utive one and was subject to authorization and appropriation
each year by Congress. The total commitment was $1,250 bil-
lion plus $250 million in excess defense articles. It was
also established by a Congressional committee that by with-
drawing those 20,000 troops and providing South Korea $1.5
billion in aid the United States would save nearly $500
million. 95 At the end of this five year period the United
States had provided nearly $1.3 billion in military assist-
ance, to include $890.4 million in grant aid and FMS credits
and $140.7 million in excess defense equipment transferred
against the $250 million goal. A breakdown in major
categories of equipment provided under that program is
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Total 774,678 115,683 890,361
In the FY 1971 to FY 1973 period, while U.S. assistance
in the form of grants, excess defense articles (HDA) , and
budget support remained important, the role of U.S. funding
declined. South Korea began to purchase small quantities of
defense articles under foreign military sales (FMS) credit
and cash programs. Grant aid support of Operations and
Maintenance ( 0§M) costs ended by 1974, and grant aid funding
for military equipment (investment) was terminated in FY
1976. Beginning in FY 1974, the United States provided
increasing amounts of FMS credits, while South Korea utilized
FMS cash purchase to cover 0§M requirements (See Table 9).
To complement the $5 billion FIP, President Park further
directed an expansion of South Korean defense industries to
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reduce the demands of defense requirements on scarce foreign
exchange resources, and to lessen the dependence on foreign
sources of supply. To finance this effort the defense
budget's share of the Gross National Product (GNP) rose from
3.8% in 1975 to 6.2% in 1976 and 6.6% in 1977 (See Table 16).
This increased share of the GNP was the first significant
increase since 1962 when it was 5.9%. Much of the money for
the industrial development program came from an 18 percent
defense sales tax introduced in 1976. The tax was designed
to raise nearly $3 billion over the proposed 5 year span.
The new program concentrated on increasing the number of
licensed production arrangements in South Korea, with an
estimated cost of $5 billion. President Park's goal was that
South Korea produce all its military needs with the exception
of highly sophisticated electronic equipment, high technology
fighter aircraft, and of course, nuclear weapons. 97 Inherent
in this program was the desire to be able to export South
Korean manufactured arms.
The South Korean FIP was greatly assisted by FMS credits
extended by the United States. In 1976, FMS credits totaled
$260 million while FMS orders by South Korea exceeded $616
million. The largest portion of South Korean FIP expenditures
was to be made in the United States.
In 1975, most of the $78.2 million in MAP funds were
spent on aircraft, trucks, and supply operations. In 1976,
the $59.4 million was utilized largely for aircraft, ships,
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FY 1973 1974 1975 1976
FMS Orders 1.6 100,3 214.3 616.5
FMS Deliveries 2.4 13.3 70.9 161.4
FMS Credits 25.0 56.7 59.0 260.0
Commercial Sale Delivered N/A 1.0 1.2 19.9
MAP Funded 296.6 91.1 78.2 59.4
MAP Delivered 264,7 91.7 134.1 175.6
Table 9 depicts United States security assistance to South
Korea during the Ford Administration.
Between 1975 and 1977, South Korea acquired or ordered
through FMS credit, 54 F-5E and 6F-5F fighters with ground
1 00
equipment and ten spare engines, 19 F-4E and 18F-4D
Phantom fighters, 120 Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles with 12
launchers, 24 Rockwell OV-10 recce/night observation helicop-
ters, 10 AH-1J helicopter gunships, 3 Improved Hawk battalions,
40 Standard missiles, 1000 Tow missiles and 5 mobile radar
systems. Honest John and Sergeant missiles were also being
phased out and replaced by Lance surface-to-surface missiles. '
One of the most significant transfers of 1975 to South
Korea was the purchase in December of the complete facilities
for manufacturing solid-fueled rocket motors from Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation. South Korea paid $2 million for the
facility which produces motors utilized for only two purposes:
for use on offensive or defensive missiles and rockets, or for
boosting satellites into space. Lockheed, unsuccessful in
122

obtaining U.S. approval to sell the equipment and to set up
a training program, sold the equipment to a commercial
exporter who, in turn, obtained a license from the Commerce
ID?
Department. The fruits of this missile-producing facility
would come out in 1978 when South Korea launched its first
indigenously produced ground-to-ground missile. 3
Equally noteworthy are the strides other indigenous defense
industries were making by the end of the Ford Administration.
South Korea was building its own patrol boats, had set up a
tank manufacturing plant (with European advice) , were co-
producing M-16 rifles, and had had talks with Brazil and some
African governments on building warships for them.'O^
When one examines South Korea's arms trading pattern, it
is readily apparent that it had been nearly 100 percent
dependent on the United States. Up through 1975, South Korea
had received $3<,7 billion through the United States Military
Assistance Program. Between 1973 and 1976, South Korea
imported arms valued at $770 million while exporting only
$15 million worth of military equipment J 05 In 1975, however,
South Korea made a single million dollar order with Italy to
co-produce 150 Fiat, 6614 Armored Personnel Carriers. Though
this was the first significant non-U. S. purchase, there had
been other less expensive buys in the past. South Korea had
purchased from Switzerland some Oerlikon radar-directed anti-
aircraft guns, 2 oiler tankers from Norway in 1953, 2
Kawasaki-Bell KH-4 aircraft from Japan in 1966, and 10 DHC-2
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Beaver aircraft from Canada, also in 1966. ° Beginning in
1974, the Korean government began sending representatives to
talk with European and Japanese (Mitsubishi) manufacturers
of arms.'O' This turning to Europe reflected Seoul's concern
over adverse Congressional reactions to its government's
internal policies and the subsequent reluctance of the American
Congress to provide all of its military requests.
The year 1976 was a year of unexpected gains and successes
for South Korea, mostly at the expense of North Korea. The
pivotal event was the 18 August axe-slaying of two U.S. Army
officers at Panmunjom. The United States reacted swiftly
and with a large show of force to include dispatching a carrier
task force from Japan, placing all American and South Korean
troops on full alert status along the DMZ , deployment of an
F-lll squadron from the United States, and aerial reinforce-
ments from Okinawa J^1 ^ On top of this event, North Korean
diplomats were ordered out of four European countries on
charges of drug trafficking and blackmarketeering. This
event lent substance to reports that North Korea was in dire
need of local currency. ^9 jn August, Kim in an unprecedented
move, issued a "semi-apology" to the United States for the
slaying of the two U.S. officers. Shortly after the apology,
North Korea asked the sponsors of a UN resolution calling for
the immediate U.S. withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea
to withdraw their resolution. ^ In partial response to the
North Korean actions, U.S. military aid appropriations to
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South Korea jumped from $195 million in FY 1975 to over
$438 million in FY 1976/76T. Those in Congress still
desiring to link South Korea's human rights scoresheet with
arms aid were losing support. While debating a military
assistance bill in June, 1976, a House committee voted to
limit spending for Korea due to repressive policies. A later
vote by the full house deleted the committee's limits.''
1976 was alwo a busy year for arms sales approvals to South
Korea (See Tables 17 and 18).
In the mid-1970s North Korean relations with the USSR
remained critically important. The Soviets were still the
North Korean's only source of high technology arms and its
principal trading partner. The North Koreans also looked to
the Soviets to champion their causes in the various inter-
national forums, particularly in the United Nations. Al-
though they endorsed Kim's policy of "peaceful" reunification,
the Soviets showed no willingness to risk detente with the
United States for the sake of reunification. Instead, the
Soviets tended to advocate a theme of peace and stability
in the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans angrily viewed
this Soviet theme as supporting the status quo. In retalia-
tion, North Korea refused to support Moscow's Asian Collective
Security System. Furthermore, the axe-murders of two American
officers at Panmunj om greatly embarrassed the Soviet Union and




Relations between Peking and North Korea remained cordial
during this period. Numerous visits back and forth between
Chinese and North Korean military officials were made in
1972-1975. Perhaps Kim desired to gain some independence
from Moscow by getting promises from Peking; or he intended
to use Chinese aid commitments to bribe more aid from the
Soviets.
When Kin Il-Sung visited Peking the same month Saigon fell
and asked for tangible support in his goal of reunification,
the Chinese only granted moral support for a peaceful
reunification, but refused to provide the advanced armaments
Kim was seeking. Prior to Kim's visit to China, it was
reported that Peking had promised military aid in the form
of tanks, torpedo boats, destroyers, submarines, and fighter
planes. Kim, apparently encouraged by the communist victory
in Vietnam had publicly called for this Chinese support and
assistance to renew his war against the South. ''^
The United States responded to Kim's public pronouncements
by threatening to use without hesitation nuclear weapons on
North Korean industrial centers if he launched an invasion
of the South.''** Furthermore, it is important to note that
there is no evidence that North Korea received all of the
above promised military aid from the People's Republic of
China. However, it is certain that by 1976, the size of the
North Korean submarine fleet had grown to a total of over
fourteen. Two Romeo L-class submarines had been delivered
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by the Chinese in 1973, two in 1974, and three in 1975. The
Russians had previously provided four W-class submarines.
In 1976, two more Romeo class submarines, reportedly in-
digenously produced, were put into active service. These
two had apparently been built utilizing sections already
produced in China, or at least, with substantial Chinese
technical assistance. 1 '*>
Considered by naval experts as among the most sophisti-
cated conventional submarines in use at the time, the
manufacture of this Romeo class submarine by North Korea
seriously upset the naval balance on the Korean Peninsula. °
The South Korean emphasis on obtaining fast partial inter-
diction craft and two additional destroyers were perhaps,
in part, a counter to this new threat.
Because the Soviet Union was showing restraint in its
supply of modern weapons, China was called upon to provide
the bulk of North Korean arms requests, especially MiG-21s
and T-59 tanks. However, China itself was in need of more
modern weapons for its own forces and too limited in its ability
to spare any of the higher technology weapons systems demanded.^?
Soviet arms transfers to North Korea dropped significantly
from $250 million in 1973 to only $32 million in 1976. "H 8 It
is uncertain whether this drop reflected Soviet unwillingness
to supply or North Korean inability to pay.
Signs of serious economic difficulties surfaced in 1975
when North Korea was unable to meet payments of part of its
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outstanding debts. This debt estimated at about $1,7 billion
was due to two political and two economical factors. The
two political factors are: 1) extravagant financial disburse
ments for Kim's "World Revolution", and 2) excessive defense
expenditures due to first, the military threat caused by
China during the Cultural Revolution, and secondly, to the
military and economic emergence of South Korea. The two
economic factors are: 1) extensive import of capital and
plants from Western countries, and 2) a decline in prices of
North Korean export goods. 19 Pyongyang's Six-Year (1971-
1976) Economic Plan had been based on continued high prices
for its staple exports of coal and iron ore. However, prices
fell about the same time the oil import bills were increasing
due to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Of that $1.7 billion debt, $700 million was owed to the
Soviets and about $50 million to the Chinese. When North
Korea began defaulting, both the Soviets and the Chinese
U a • J --I •* -a 12 °began reducing economic and military aid.
While the Chinese and Soviets were decreasing the level
of aid, North Korea was significantly raising its military
expenditures (See Table 16) . A look at North Korean budget
revenues and expenditures during this period shows serious
deficit spending during years 1971, 1972 and 1975. In 1971
and 1975 the imbalances were S% and 4% respectively. Only
in 1972 and 1973 did revenues exceed expenditures. Note-




normal those two years. By 1976, the ability of the
North to build its own arms had increased substantially,
thus allowing Kim to be less dependent on either the Soviets
or the Chinese. This indigenous arms industry, coupled with
stockpiling of reserve equipment and munitions, would allow
North Korea greater freedom of action, either militarily
or in later negotiations with Seoul.
When one attempts to differentiate the military related
industries from the civilian industries in the United States
or South Korea, it is a relatively simple matter. However,
in the opinion of the Korean analysts at the Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service (FBIS) , "there is no difference
between the military industry and the civilian industry in
North Korea." Furthermore, when tension increases in
the peninsula, North Korea conceals not only the names of
military units, but those of important factories . 123 This
factor makes the true nature of North Korea's defense
industry difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it is known
that North Korea by 1976 had begun to build submarines,
frigates, MiG-21 aircraft (less avionics), helicopters, M-1973
armored personnel carriers, T-59 tanks, K-61 amphibious
vehicles, artillery, AK-47s and all types of needed muni-
tions. 124 Apparently, the only arms not indigenously produced
by 1976 were missiles, avionics, and sophisticated electronic
gear. Through this impressive indigenous arms base, sup-
plemented, of course, with the military assistance provided
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by Peking and Moscow, North Korea was capable of dramatically
increasing its military force structure between the years
1971 and 1976.
North Korean armored forces were increased nearly four-
fold (mostly T-54/55s), with almost equally impressive gains
in the multiple rocket launcher, artillery, armored person-
nel carrier, and helicopter inventories. Fighter aircraft




North Korean Equipment Inventory Trends (1972-1976) '"













& Light Bombers (IL-28) 90 90 90 105 105
In the comparison of the respective force configurations
of the two Koreas, it is essential not to view force capabil-
ities solely on a numerical variable. Other factors such as
the strategic doctrine, the ability to achieve surprise,
and the level of technical training and familiarity with
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900 950 1050 1150 1300
600 850 1300 1700 1950
5 5 7 10 10-12
470 530 560 560 570
26 31 31 43 65
200 250 350 390 425-450
2500 2600 2700 2800 3000
150 250 400 500 750
18 20 60 65 90

modern weapons systems must be included when assessing the
military equation. *** Tables 11 and 12 depict the force
structure trends between North and South Korea during the
period 1975-1976.
Table 11
North Korean Force Structure Trends (1975-1976)
1975 1976
Manpower 467,000 (active) 495,000
330,000 (reserve)
Tanks 1,130, including 300 1,350, and 250 T-34, 900 T-54/
T-34, 700 T-54/55/59's 55/59, 150 PT-76, and 50 T-62
80 PT-76' s, and 50
T-62's
APC's 200 Same
Artillery 3,200 guns and negligible increase
howitzers up to 152-mm;
1800 RL's, 2,500 mortars,
RCL's, AT-guns, 2,500
AA-guns
Missiles 12 FR0G-5/7 SSM, 180 24 FROG , 250 SA-2
SA-2's
Combat A/C 588, including 70 SI-28, 600, mix about same
28 SU-7, 150 Mig-21,
40 Mig-19, 300
Mig-15/17's
Ships 185, including 12 subs, 250, now incl. 150 torpedo
18 Komar- and Osa- class boats, 14 submarines.
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Tanks 1,000 M-47, M-48,
M-60 med. tks.
APC's 400 M-113, M-577
Artillery 2,000 guns, howitzers
mortars, RCL's
Missiles 1 Honest John
SSM battalion; 2 SAM
bns. (Hawk and Nike
Hercules
Combat A/C 216, including 36
F-4C/D, 70 F-5A, 100
F86F, and 10 RF-5A






















2,000, now including 175 mm
and 8" guns
Same
204, including 72 F-4D/E, 50
F-86F, 70F-5A/E, and 12 RF-SA
(18F-4E and 60 F-5E/F on order)
174, including now 44 patrol






The Military Balance , 1976-1977, (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 57.
As depicted in the above tables, North Korea possessed
nearly a 2:1 advantage in tanks . However, nearly a quarter
of that North Korean tank force was comprised of aging T-34
tanks, hardly a match for the South Korean M-48s. North
Korea first received T-59 medium tanks from the Chinese in
1974. ' The imbalance in artillery pieces is in large part
due to the fact the North Korean army was (and. still is)
organized along Soviet doctrine. Conversely, the smaller
artillery inventory in South Korea's army reflects American
influence,, Both North and South Korea have reflected heavy
investment in combat equipment at the expense of logistic
capabilities. South Korea, in its 1st Force Improvement
Plan (FIP) , did not even seriously address this problem.
One of the major reasons American military officers felt
the South Koreans could not go it alone against a North
Korean invasion was the air equation. Though the F-4 had
proved more than a match for the MiG-19 and MiG-21, sheer
numbers was a significant variable., Moreover, North Korea
could operate out of 16 airfields all equipped with hardened
shelters, and rely on some pilots with combat experience.
The 28 SU-7s were probably provided by the Soviets, at the
insistence of North Korea, as a response to the supplying
of F-4's by the Americans (See Table 20).
133

As with the difficulties in force comparison, the same
holds true for attempting an objective comparison of defense
expenditures. The crux of this problem is that the direct
military aid and defense support from the major suppliers
often constituted a substantial portion of the two countries'
defense efforts. In the 1960s and early 1970s United States
security assistance offset the resource burden on South Korea
enabling South Korea to maintain stable economic growth.
Therefore, when comparisons between North and South Korea
are made, allowance for the foreign assistance, both past and
present must be made.
Again, by examining the military assistance programs and
arms transfers to the Korean peninsula between 1965 and 1976,
a number of variables affecting the major actors are apparent.
This section will analyze the impact these variable had on
both the recipients and their respective suppliers.
E. THE SUPPLIER-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIP
Though one would never find a government official stating
so "for the record", both the Soviet Union and the United
States exported arms to the Korean peninsula to exert, or in
the case of the Soviets, attempt to exert influence over their
client states. A hegemonic relationship via the vehicles
arms transfers and military assistance had evolved. The
Soviet Union, the major supplier to North Korea until 1972-
1973, in reality, found it could exert little control over
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Pyongyang's actions. The commando raid on the "Blue House"
and the axe-slayings of American officers at Panmunjom were
but two examples.
In the case of the United States, its monopoly in South
Korean arms imports fortified its ability to influence. Of
Soviet and American military influences, that of the United
States was by far the greatest. Except for a comparatively
few Soviet advisors in North Korea, American military pre-
sence had been pervasive since the Korean War. Also, the
training of South Korean officers in the United States was
far greater than comparable training provided the North
Koreans by the Soviets. Between 1963 and 1976, the South
Korean military had received arms and training costing nearly
three times that given to North Korea by both the Soviet
Union and China combined.''1 "
The deal to send South Korean combat troops to Vietnam
was a prime example of a hegemonic relationship utilizing
arms transfers and military assistance as the influence
variable. The United States involvement in Southeast Asia
placed a tremendous burden on its military assistance
programs. The quid pro quo agreements helped alleviate the
American manpower requirement, while South Korea benefitted
in a number of ways. First, it obtained the necessary
funding to modernize its forces while not adversely affecting
its economic progress. Secondly, South Korean forces obtained
valuable combat experience for nearly its entire regular ground
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force. And finally, the infusion of sophisticated weapons
such as F-4 and F-5 aircraft, surface-to-surface (SSMs)
,
and surface-to-air (SAMs) missiles gave the ROK armed forces
a credible deterrent against superior North Korean forces.
However, as the war in Vietnam created severe criticism
internationally against the United States, South Korea found
itself neither in a position to join the criticism or renege
on its promised commitments and support. To do so would have
meant possible loss of the much needed and desired military
aid programs. Thus, the supplier-recipient relationship
between the United States and South Korea remained one of
continued American strong-arm influence with heavy South
Korean dependence and total acquiescence.
The Nixon Doctrine, in reality, did not adversely affect
the relationship,. If anything, the onus of stronger dependency
on arms imports fell on the South Koreans with the subsequent
withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Division. However, the shifting
of strategy, inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, also required
the United States to concentrate more on arms transfers. When
the non-communist governments in Vietnam and Cambodia col-
lapsed, some Asian leaders began to doubt whether Washington
would honor its defense commitments, or even possessed the
will to respond militarily if an ally were threatened.
Furthermore, by late 1974 the relationship between Seoul
and Washington had became very strained over Park's modus
operandi within South Korea. For the first time since
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President Kennedy coerced Syngman Rhee to fulfill his commit-
ment for the institution of a democratic process, did the
United States actually resort to strong arm tactics to in-
fluence events in South Korea. The cuts in military aid in
FY 1975 marked a turning point in the Congressional -Adminis-
tration's relationship over the issue of arms exports and
military assistance. Mounting Congressional criticism over
the modus operandi of American arms exports led to the
enactment of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. One of the
major effects the AECA had on Korea was the end of Defense
Department control over arms requests. The change required
all requests to be forwarded through the State Department.
The year 1976 also saw the end of military assistance
program (MAP) grant aid to South Korea. By this time, how-
ever, South Korea was economically solvent and could rely
on either cash or foreign military sales credits (FMS) when
buying arms. The relationship between supplier-recipient was
no longer a big brother - little brother relationship.
Instead, Seoul had to contend with an increasingly belligerent
and powerful Congress holding the purse strings while the
Ford Administration had to cope with both an increasingly
independent Congress and Seoul* The situation seemed made
to order for President Park. Because of increased U.S
security interests in Northeast Asia, he felt he could
rely on this redefined United States stake in South Korea
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as a deterrent against North Korea, He also felt, possibly
for the first time, that he had leverage over the United
States concerning the flow of military assistance.
China's inward isolation during the Cultural Revolution
had completely reversed the developing supplier-recipient
relationship of the early 1960s with Pyongyang. By cutting
its aid to North Korea, China lost influence and support,
particularly at the time most needed. North Korea, by
necessity, had to look to the Soviets for support and
assistance. The Soviets obviously gained by China's loss.
The new leadership in Moscow had quickly perceived the need
to re-cultivate relationships with its Asian Socialist
brothers. By renewing economic and military aid, the
Soviets regained some of the influence they prviously lost due
to North Korean- ideological divergences. North Korea, though
obtaining its much needed military and economic aid to carry
through with Kim's Seven-Year Plan, became once more almost
totally dependent upon the Soviet Union to meet its economic
goals and supply its defense needs. Though he may have been
heavily dependent on the Soviets for livelihood, Kim showed
a great deal of independent action through a series of
armed provocations with South Korea and the United States
from 1968-1970. How much influence the Soviets were able to




In view of its own vulnerability to retaliation by the
United States, the Soviets would probably have counseled
against some of these provocations, if it had been consulted
in advance. It is hard to accept the premise that the
seizure of the Pueblo was part of a well-coordinated Com-
munist strategy to disperse American attention and power; i.e.,
the Tet offensive in Vietnam, actions in Eastern Europe,
the Seoul commando raid, and the Pueblo seizure.
Following this period of excessive militancy, North Korea
began to attempt minor independence from its supplier by
initiating an indigenous manufacturing capability. However,
regardless of the intent toward relative independence, North
Korean dependence on Soviet weapon technology was in fact
strengthened during this period. By 1976, arms transfers and
military assistance to the North Koreans had not bought the
Russians increased influence. North Korea continued to show
neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and, in fact was
beginning to lean more and more toward the Chinese. Never-
theless, Soviet-North Korean relations, though cool and
correct, remained strong. The renewal of the Soviet - North
Korean Mutual Defense Treaty in 1976 was ample evidence. More
importantly, Moscow, very interested in SALT II and detente
with the United States, saw little to gain in underwriting
a second installment of Kim's reunification campaign. .*
By 1973, China was providing the bulk of arms to North
Korea. However, China's inability to provide all of North
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Korea's needs furthered Kim's belief in self-sufficiency.
Subsequently, China, like her northern neighbor, was also
unable to exert significant influence over North Korean
foreign policy. The Chinese, like the Soviets were also
interested in maintaining its Washington connection. Thus,
the request made by Kim in Peking in 1975 for Chinese sup-
port in a renewed bid for "peaceful" reunification met with
polite silence.
F. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND THE
IMMINENCE OF WAR
North Korean indignation over the participation of South
Korean troops against a brother socialist nation, the embar-
rassing lack of comparison in economic growth, and frustra-
tion in not fulfilling the goal of unification seriously
contributed to the explosive nature of the Korean situation.
By stepping up its guerrilla activities against the South,
North Korea had hoped to hamper economic growth by showing
present and potential foreign investors the hazards of
investing in the South. Guerrilla and terrorists actions
also created psychological tensions in the South which were
intended to destabilize the Seoul government. Finally,
guerrilla actions, when utilized in home-use propaganda, were
justified as retaliation against initial South Korean
aggression. The North Korean people were told that because
of these South-initiated provocations, "massive preparation
for a renewed aggression" required building up North Korean
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military capabilities, "and that, consequently, (the country)
must divide its efforts between economic construction and
military preparedness . "'30 Thus, one can see how North
Korea, by emphasizing that "war is right around the bend",
justified continued arms imports, even when the military
balance tilted toward the North. On the other side of the
coin, South Koreans pointed to the same incidents to
emphasize their need for more arms imports.
There was little doubt that North Korea scored an
impressive propaganda victory in the Pueblo crisis. In
the short run i it enhanced Kim's stature in the Communist
world and strengthened his campaign to rally the North Korean
people against the "imperialist" Americans and their "lackeys"
in the south. However, in the long run, the seizure of the
Pueblo proved more counterproductive to North Korea.
American and South Korean leaders reassessed their percep-
tion of threat in the North resulting in a refortif ication
of their forces in South Korea. South Korea was voted a
special military aid grant by Congress, the United States
reinforced the 40,000 U.S. soldiers stationed below the DMZ
with an additional 5,000, and South Korea began forming an
armed militia of nearly 2.5 million reservists. More sig-
nificantly, South Korea decided to place more emphasis on
defense expenditures. In constant dollars, South Korea
steadily increased its defense expenditures by about $50




An interesting aspect of the Pueblo crisis involved a
serious set-back in U.S. intelligence capability. The ship
had contained:
"The most sophisticated and modern
intelligence mechanisms on board. The
equipment was fifteen years ahead of
anything Soviet Russia possesses.
the Pueblo's crew. .. .were the most
highly trained and skilled experts in
the cryptographic and intelligence
fields," 13 ^
It would be hard to accept the premise that the Soviets did
not remind the North Koreans just who gave them the means
to capture the Pueblo. A quid pro quo was in order. Soviet
arms transfers might have provided an unexpected bonus I
G. SUPPLY OF ARMS AND ITS EFFECT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNAL SOCIAL CONFLICTS
The United States had provided nearly $4 billion in
security assistance since the Korean War. Under the protec-
tion of the United States, South Koreans were able to devote
the majority of their resources and energy to economic
expansion. In 1965 for example, of the $112 million budgeted
for defense by South Korea, 64% was covered by United States
Military Budget Support derived from economic assistances
'
3 ^
This meant that the South Koreans had to provide only about
$41.5 million or 1.51 of the GNP from their own resources.
Additionally, the United States furnished $173.1 million in
grant security assistance aid„ By adding the two funds, the
United States had provided 851 of the total joint ROK/U.S.
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forces expenditure on Korean defense. The presence of two
United States combat divisions with supporting troops also
provided a significant input to the Korean economy. '33 By
multiplying similar commitments over the next five years,
it is not difficult to realize the economic impact United
States assistance had on the South Korean economy.
Another key contributing factor allowing Seoul's economy
to make impressive headway was South Korean participation in
the Vietnam War where it was the United States who paid for
the upkeep. South Vietnam also became a major importer of
South Korean goods. By combining the above two factors with
continued American MAP funding in Korea, South Korean leaders
were able to make great strides in their Second Five-Year
Economic Plan. South Korea's annual growth averaged about
10 percent. According to the South Korean Ministry of Culture
and Information the growth rate of South Korea's GNP was 7.8%
(1962-1966), 10.5% (1966-1971), and 11.2% (1971- 1976)
J
34
However, as the public mood within the United States
shifted its support away from the Vietnam cause, so it was
with Congressional support. By 1970, Congressional criticism
was being leveled at all aspects of the modus operandi of
American arms exports. While some critics felt the United
States was dealing in too much arms traffic to the lesser
developed countries, thereby linking itself to these countries'
military actions, the majority of criticism was directed
toward America's deep involvement in Southeast Asia. However,
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the 1968 incidents in the Korean peninsula helped to con-
solidate support for the continuing security assistance
programs to South Korea, President Park took advantage of
the bellicose North Korean gestures to maintain a high stage
of readiness and to clamp down on political dissidence. His
repressive actions did not totally enhance his security
objectives, but rather had the opposite effect when the
resultant decreased American aid is taken into account.
To offset the balance of payments costs of maintaining
American troops overseas, successive United States adminis-
trations considered selling arms a valid policy. Former
Defense Secretary McNamara stated that the three objectives
of American arms sales (during the Kennedy-Johnson years) were:
1) to promote the defense capabilities of allies, 2) to
promote standardization and the concept of cooperative logistics
with allies, and 3) to "offset the unfavorable balance of
payments resulting from essential United States military
deployment abroad." '^ it would also be safe to say the later
Nixon Doctrine gave the U.S. arms manufacturing industry
increased business.
As the South Korean economy strengthened during this
period, the United States continued to provide large amounts
of security assistance. However, the assistance shifted from
one of total grant aid to a system of credits. By 1976,
South Korea had become a major importer of American weapons
systems. It had also found the economic viability to lay
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the foundations of a self-supporting indigenous arms industry.
In spite of the above considerations, the high level of
military preparedness on the peninsula had placed both politi-
cal and economical burdens on the two Korea's governments.
There can be little doubt, however, that North Korea had borne
the heavier burden.
In competition with South Korea, economics has been a
most serious factor. Because North Korea realized it could
not easily persuade citizens of the South to choose its style
of government unless its own were economically superior to
the South' s, economic development had been given high priority
during the 1950s and most of the 1960s. Table 13 reflects
the annual growth rate in national income.
Table 13
North Korean Annual Growth Rate (1957-1970) 13 6
1957 - 1960 21 %
1960 - 1963 10.8 %
1964 - 1966 7.9 %
1967 - 1970 3.3 %
With the cut-off of virtually all types of Soviet aid in 1963,
significant economic hardships were suffered by North Korea.
To maintain its level of military readiness, North Korea had
utilized funds originally targeted for industrial growth.
Thus, by 1965 the Seven-Year Plan was far behind schedule.
The later infusion of large amounts of Soviet military aid
and arms following the ouster of Khrushchev allowed North
Korea to begin redirecting its funding back to industry.
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Up to the mid 1960s, North Korea had been winning the
"economic" battle with South Korea. However, as noted earlier
in this paper, Kim adopted in 1967-68 a policy of reunifica-
tion by force of which he succinctly described in an
interview:
"Only when we use force of arms can
we gain power. We cannot gain power simply
by holding elections. The most decisive and
positive of all forms of struggle is the
struggle with arms for the liberation of
our peopleJ37
The "Weapon in One Hand and Hammer and Sickle in the
Other" theme resulted in a drastic increase in defense
expenditures, from 12.5% in 1966 to over 30% in 1967, Defense
expenditures stayed over 30% of the budget for another three
years. When Soviet economic aid fell below what had been
planned for, the result was a serious crippling of the North
Korean economy. The failure of his reunification program
coupled with an almost bankrupt economy resulted in a re-
evaluation of the political climate. A continuance of defense
expenditures at the same rate was sure to bring further
economic problems. However, a reduction in military spending
also was considered a danger in that Seoul might feel the
time was right to attack northward. Hoping they could
simultaneously pursue economic development while maintaining
the momentum of military buildup, North Korean leaders chose
to decrease their defense expenditures to about 16% of the
budget and obtain credits and loans from Western and Japanese
sources. The result was major defaulting on all their loans.
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In a series of meetings over rescheduling of debts, the
creditors, to include the Soviet Union, presented a united
front to force North Korea to make progress toward payment.
The result was a three-year depression in North Korea causing
the then Six-Year Economic Plan to end in failure. 138
Tied in with dwindling and, most likely, reluctantly given
foreign aid by China and the Soviet Union, and North Korea's
policy of "chuche", the increased spending had to have caused
a depressing effect on the economy and probably played a
major role in shaping the course of economic development.
However, the poor performance cannot be attributed solely to
defense The basic problem appeared to be that the North
Korean economy was not structured or prepared to be competi-
tive with other Western nations,'-^
Comparative growth rates between North and South Korea
during the period 1971-1976, clearly show that South Korea
had surpassed North Korea's growth rate substantially. South
Korea's rate exceeded 10% while North Korea's was less than
6%. North Korea's GNP for 1976 was $7.3 billion as compared
to $25 billion for the South. Cf monumental significance to
both countries is the fact that these figures had provided
Seoul that "tangible but invaluable commodity: confidence"
by the international business community. ™0
H. DIVERSIFICATION OF SOURCES
The lack of a different supplier of arms and military
assistance other than the United States was not troublesome
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initially to Seoulo However, after watching the fall of
Vietnam, American rapprochement with a major enemy, and
having to placate Congressional criticism in order to
receive desired arms, Seoul began to look elsewhere in the
international arms business. Though no substantial deals
were made, Seoul made it clear to Washington that it was
willing and capable to go elsewhere if the United States
would not fulfill its perceived basic requirements.
North Korea, on the other hand, fluctuated between being
able to diversify and finding only one willing supplier. It
is important to note that even though the Soviet Union
renewed military assistance after the demise of Khrushchev,
Kim was not willing to allow the Soviets to exert undue
influence or pressure. Of equal significance was the shifting
in 1972 from the Soviets to Chinese as the major supplier of
arms to North Korea. Not only was there a shift to China as
a primary arms provider, but also in the area of crude oil
and other petroleum products essential to North Korea's
industrialization.
I. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
During the period of and immediately following the Vietnam
War, there was a significant influx of new technology to both
Koreas. In some cases, it was simply a case of replacing an
obsolete system with a more current one. In other cases,
such as the importation of high technology aircraft (F-4Ds,
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SU-7s, Romeo class submarines, etc.) there developed a mini-
arms race. When one side obtained a specific system that
was perceived as tipping the military balance, pressure was
placed on that side's supplier to provide an equalizer (or
better system. One student of Korean affairs feels that
"United States military aid to South Korea has been geared
to the relative Soviet and Chinese aid policies to North
Korea." ' If that were the case, the goals established
for the South Korean FIP were based on an out-dated evalua-
tion of North Korean capabilities held at the end of the 1960s.
J. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS-SUPPLIERS
In terms of the entire Far East, U.S. security strategy
in the beginning of the Kennedy administration was based pri-
mary on counterinsurgency . By the late 1960s, however, the
major threat was perceived to be external rather than internal.
The events beginning in 196 8 played a large part in shattering
the internal threat perception. First, the 196 8 Tet offensive
forced U.S. leaders to reappraise the U.S. role in Vietnam;
secondly, the increased violence in the Korean peninsula cul-
minating in the Pueblo incident resulted in a reassessment
of who really was the threat on the peninsula - the finger
had to be pointed at North Korea; third, and probably the
most important event, was the armed border clashes between
China and the Soviet Union. This third event finally
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made clear the fact that the United States did not face a
combined Sino-Soviet conspiracy in Asia, but rather a
separate and different type threat from each. The Nixon
strategy for U.S. security in the Far East discarded the
Kennedy-Johnson policy of committing U.S. troops to counter
the internal threat. Calling the previous strategy unworkable,
the new Guam Doctrine advocated an Asian self-defense concept.
Asian allies were to be provided the means (military and
economic aid) and the ways (new arms imports and moderniza-
tion programs) to defend against small neighbor aggression.
The U.S. would counter the super-power threat vis a vis
negotiation, detente, and mutual deterrence. Detente was
the strategy with the Soviets, normalization with the Chinese.
The foundation of this new policy could be labeled a
Bismarckian balance of power.
A basic theme of American defense and foreign policy
under the Nixon and Ford Administrations had stressed the
importance of maintaining a "worldwide military equilibrium."
In his FY 1975 annual report, former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger stated,
"The United States today ... bears the
principal burden of maintaining the worldwide
military equilibrium which is the foundation
for the security and survival of the free
world. "142
That commitment to the goal of maintaining a worldwide military
equilibrium, combined with the demise of the Thieu and Lon
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Nol governments, led policy makers to emphasize a "single
short-run goal. "143 That goal was to demonstrate continued
American interest in Asia by maintaining the current troop
level in South Korea and providing adequate arms for allies.
In applying this policy toward South Korea then, it becomes
clear that the real purpose of maintaining troops in Korea
is fundamentally political, and not military.
The 1972 Nixon visit to the People's Republic of China
rounded out the President's strategic design in Asia. By
removing a major war contingency in East Asia, Nixon was thus
able to replace the 2 1/2 war strategic concept with a 1 1/2
war concept that is still in effect as of this writing.
Inherent with this strategic concept was limited redeploy-
ment of some units and a reduction in the number of active
duty Army divisions by 3 1/3. One of those divisions ear-
marked for redeployment was the 7th Infantry Division in
Korea J 44
How did this changed United States security strategy
affect South Korean arms imports and military aid? From
the viewpoint of the South Korean military, the change
resulted in South Korean high technology weapons requests
seriously considered and often fullfilled. A case in point
was the import of F-4 and F-5 fighter aircraft, Honest John
SSMs , and the loan of two destroyers; all delivered shortly
after the Guam Doctrine announcement. These arms imports
greatly enhanced South Korean defensive capabilities.
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Furthermore, the American MAP and FMS programs were to serve
as the primary instruments in the implementation of Nixon's
doctrine. As seen in the past, a shift in U.S. security
strategy resulted in a change in military assistance
programs
.
With the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, Soviet military
and political leaders discarded Khrushchev's theory of mutual
deterrence based upon a one weapon concept. Soviet security
interests were better served in countering the new U.S.
"flexible response" concept advocated by the Kennedy-Johnson
administrations. The Soviet perceived threat in the Far East
included enhanced American influence in Southeast Asia and
enhanced Chinese influence in the whole of Asia. Subsequently,
Soviet arms exports were utilized to improve the Russian
image in Southeast Asia, specifically in North Vietnam,
thereby diminishing both American and Chinese influence levels.
The Russian success in this effort can be attributed to
arms exports and two other factors largely beyond their
control. First, the increased American involvement in Vietnam
was considered a security threat in both North Vietnam and
North Korea. The Soviets were the only suppliers capable
of providing sufficient arms to block a U.S. -South Vietnamese
victory. Secondly, China's Cultural Revolution resulted in
reduced relations with both North Korea and North Vietnam.
Renewing the relationship with North Korea offered the
Soviets the opportunity to counter Chinese influence in
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Northeast Asia. With the United States bogged down in South-
east Asia, the Soviets were able to place more emphasis on its
"Chinese problem". As the Sino-Soviet "cold war" turned into
a "hot war", Soviet security interests obviously shifted to
its border with China. Because the cultivation of North
Korea as a buffer stage was of strategic importance to the
Soviets, the massive military aid and arms imports to Pyong-
yang during the period 1965-1971 provided the Soviets the
catalyst for improvement of relations and the added insurance
of future arms dependency of Soviet not Chinese equipment.
This massive military aid provided North Korea was
expected to yield a tilt toward the Soviet view in the Sino-
Soviet conflict. However, as noted earlier, Soviet image in
North Korea was insufficient to significantly affect North
Korean - Chinese relations. Beginning in 1968, and particular-
ly after the 1972 Nixon visit to China, Soviet threat per-
ception in the Far East focused on the People's Republic of
China first and the United States second. Arms transfers
and military aid to North Korea after 1968 was as much a
function of countering a renewed Chinese interest in the
peninsula as the fulfillment of defense commitments.
Meanwhile, the Cultural Revolution had resulted in near
total international isolation for China. External security
interests were secondary to the purge of "revisionism" within.
After the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam showed the inadequacy
of American tactics, Peking realized the United States most
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likely would not invade China proper. Subsequently, Mao
sent out "feelers" to the U.S. hinting of a willingness to
lessen tensions and negotiate toward future normalization.
After the United States announced its intention of phased
withdrawal from Vietnam, China turned her attention to the
north and the Russians.
Essentially friendless in Asia due in large part to "the
adverse reaction to the events of the Cultural Revolution,
China embarked on a program in 1969 to regain influence
and friendly relations with its Socialist neighbors. The
end of the Cultural Revolution allowed China's foreign envoy
Chou En-lai to begin fence mending. Cne of the first fences
to be worked on was the one between China and North Korea.
For centuries the Korean peninsula had been an integral
part of China's buffer defense system. It was logical that
North Korea was one of the first states to receive renewed
Chinese interest. Promises of Chinese military and economic
aid were utilized as tokens of good will not only to reopen
North Korean doors but also to test Pyongyang to determine
the level of Soviet influence and their stance in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. However, the same carrot the Soviets used
to open North Korean doors earlier, i.e., massive military
and economic assistance, was realistically beyond the means
of the Chinese at this time.
The early 1970s saw a development of a quasi-detente
between the two adversaries. Even so, their number one
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perceived threat in Asia remained each other. How did this
mutual threat perception affect arms transfers to North
Korea? Both utilized arms transfers, military and economic
aid in the same manner and for the same purpose - enhanced
influence. It follows then that when North Korea began
leaning toward China in the early 1970s China was in fact
furnishing the majority of security assistance. Arms trans-
fers to North Korea was directly proportional to the leanings
of Pyongyang in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
K. THE PERCEIVED THREAT AND RELATED SECURITY INTERESTS -
RECIPIENTS
For perhaps the first time since the Korean War, North
Korea began to take a serious look at South Korean threat
factors. Prior to 1965, the only serious threat to North
Korea came from continued United States presence. However,
after 1965 a number of factors, all relating to the phenomena
of arms transfers, turned North Korean attention to its
southern neighbor. First, the successful completion of South
Korea's First Five-Year Economic Plan of 1962-1966 and even
more spectacular Second Five-Year Economic Plan of 1966-
1971 showed South Korea moving closer to the threshold of
economic self-reliance. Much of this success had come as a
result of South Korean participation in the Vietnam War. Due
to the quid pro quo deal with the United States, South Korea
received nearly all its armed forces modernization funding
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from the United States, enabling her to redirect budget
funding toward non -military industrial development. Another
off-shoot of South Korean involvement in Vietnam was the huge
influx of dollars poured into South Korea from export earn-
ings to South Vietnam and U.S. paid wage supplements to
Vietnam based South Korean soldiers. Secondly, South Korea
received a significant amount of high technology arms imports
between 1965 and 1972, most significantly the F-4 and F-5
fighter aircraft. Finally, the large influx of conventional
ground weapons (M-48 tanks, howitzers, and Honest John SSMs)
to the ROK Army, during and following the withdrawal of the
U.S. 7th Division, gave South Korea an impressive ground
offensive capability. The wit ldrawal of the 7th Infantry
Division did not belay North Korean apprehensions concerning
a continued American presence in South Korea; still present
were the 2nd Division and two USAF fighter wings,
Ch the other hand, the massive infusion of Soviet arms
to North Korea beginning in 1965, coupled with the dramatic
use of North Korean guerrilla raids, the armed clashes along
the DMZ , and the 1968 commando raid on the "Blue House"
obviously did nothing to belay South Korean fears of an
impending North Korean attack. Of even more significance,
North Korea's armed forces had been expanding at a much faster
rate than South Korea's. By 1971, North Korean defense
expenditures of $911 million was nearly three times the
South Korean expenditure of $394 million. The application
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of the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea also initially disturbed
the South Korean government. To them the "North Korean armed
threat, backed by China and the USSR, was real." 14 5
It could be said the events of the period proved out
President Park's contention that North Korea could not be
trusted. Though realizing that North Korea no longer possessed
the absolute support of either China or the Soviet Union, South
Korea was still militarily inferior to the North. However,
the presence of U.S. troops, a stated United States commitment
to employ nuclear weapons in the event of an invasion from
the North, and a sound economy had to lessen Park's apprehensions
toward the North. Because of events in the late 1960s and early
1970s, President Park had initiated a five-year Armed Forces
Modernization and Improvement Plan. Twenty-five per cent was
covered by U.S. grant aid (MAP) and the other seventy-five per
cent by military sales credits (FMS) . By the end of 1976,
that program was progressing well. South Korea was moving
toward self-sufficiency in all aspects; its economy was strong,
its military was steadily improving, and the political appara-
tus was securely in power.
As 1976 drew to a close, Pyongyang saw its policy options
severely limited. It was clear that neither the Soviets or
Chinese would provide support or help in the cause for armed
reunification. Any military act would have to be viewed as
unilateral. With both its suppliers pursuing better rela-
tions with its primary enemy, North Korean defense planners
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had to perceive the military equation as not being in their
favor. More arms imports would hardly make any difference.
The massive demonstration of American military response after
the axe-murders in Panmun j om showed Kim the U.S. fully
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IV. THE NORTH KOREA FACTOR IN THE
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China have shifted often as Kim Il-sung
has leaned one way and then toward the other in order to assert
his independence and secondly, to gain or maintain support for
his unification policies and goals. In recent years, Kim has
been less successful in that second objective. Moscow has not
accorded Korean affairs a high priority nor has Peking been
willing to give unquestioned support. Of even more importance
to Kim's unification goal is the viability of South Korea,
both economically and militarily. Nevertheless, Kim does
enjoy some advantage in his relationship with the Soviet Union
and China.
"If the Sino-Soviet conflict has dispelled any lingering
doubts about Peking's emergence as a power in its own
right, it has also provided Pyongyang with an opportunity
to assert autonomy. Its oscillating posture toward the
two feuding Communist powers over the years is symptomatic
of the degree to which the small country has succeeded in
neutralizing and, in effect, exploiting the considerable
political, economic, and military leverages of both Moscow
and Peking over Pyongyang. "1
When considering the Korean factor in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, one must analyze how North Korea has dealt with the
situation. Though the United States, Japan, and South Korea
play key roles in any peninsula interaction, North Korea has
been and continues to be a significant actor in the ongoing
Sino-Soviet dispute. It is necessary then to examine how
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North Korea has reacted to specific issues and events in
Sino-Soviet relations from the late 1950's through 1979.
The 38th parallel, planned as a temporary boundary pending
a four-power trusteeship agreement, soon developed into a
dangerous and heavily armed frontier. The 1950-1953 Korean
War resulted in United Nation, Chinese, and of course, Korean
military forces manuevering north and south of this frontier
zone. The Military Demarcation Line (MDL) , lying slightly
north of the 38th parallel and agreed upon by the Korean
Armistice on 27 July, 1953 denoted the second re-partitioning
of Korea. This MDL has since become a heavily fortified,
institutionalized border. It has also become the de facto
boundary between the Communist and non-Communist worlds in
Northeast Asia.
Four major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union,
the People's Republic of China, and Japan converge on the
Korean peninsula, largely due to their developed post-Korean
War alliance systems. The noted Asian historian, Harold C.
Hinton has written:
"Korea is involved, in various ways, in two armed
confrontations, one of which has led to war in the
past and the other of which could lead to war in
the future."*-
The former conflict was, of course, the one between the two
Koreas. The latter conflict referred to above involves the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China or in a better
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known term, the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus, it is understand-
able why these major powers remain interested in, for their
own reasons, the situation on the peninsula.
On the surface, the Sino-Soviet dispute may be seen as a
contest for influence between the two major powers with the
lesser neighboring states eventually drawn in and required to
take sides. This fact is essentially true but for one social-
ist state in North East Asia - the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (North Korea) . Initially, the Sino-Soviet dispute
posed a dilemma for North Korea and its leader Kim Il-Sung.
On the one hand, Kim was often confronted with pressure to
side with one of the antagonists; on the other, he could not
afford economically or militarily to alienate either China
or the Soviet Union. However, over the years, Kim Il-Sung
has become adroit in utilizing the dispute to his advantage.
He has been able to force both Moscow and Peking to court
his support in their ideological and political battles.
It is quite safe to state that the major powers presently
share the hope of no future war in the Korean peninsula.
Because of this desire, each of the four major powers in the
region prefers a status quo to any form of reunification that
could cause instability. Additionally, each of these major
powers seems to perceive only north Korea as the major threat
to the status quo and stability.
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The eight major sections of this chapter are arranged
chronologically, corresponding to North Korea's interaction
with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
The first section covers the period from WWII to 1957. The
section essentially gives a brief background of the Sino-
Soviet split. Section one explains how much and why the PRC
increased its influence over North Korea.
Section two examines the beginnings of the dispute and
how Pyongyang attempted to maintain a neutral stance between
the two protagonists. Section three examines why Pyongyang
began tilting toward Peking beginning in 1962. Section four
explains the shift back to Moscow during the Cultural Revolution
The fifth section brings the reader up to date with
Pyongyang firmly in the Peking camp. This section examines
the motivations and reasons why Moscow fell from Pyongyang's
favor. Sections six and seven look at current issues and
problems facing first the North Korean-Soviet relationship
and then the North Korean-Chinese relationship.
Finally, section eight presents some conclusions and
forecasts based on the interactions, issues, and problems
discussed in the previous sections.
A. BACKGROUND 1945-1957
It appears fairly certain that North Korea was fast-
becoming or had already attained the status of a Soviet
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satellite prior to the outbreak of hositilities in 1950.
Soviet advisors, officers, and technicians were positioned in
all levels of the North Korean government and economy. North
Korea was the first large-scale experiment in the application
of Soviet techniques of control and organization to a Far
Eastern agrarian, familial society.
^
North Korean Communists were required to adhere to three
implicit "articles of faith": (1) the Soviet Union was the
superior country and was the only source for any socialist
wisdom; (2) the Soviet model was the only way to achieve
human progress; and (3) the Soviet Union held the right to
determine the course of North Korea's foreign affairs. The
Soviets also attempted to Sovietize the people of North Korea
via cultural infiltration and economic integration .5
To develop their economy, the North Koreans turned to
the Soviets for help. A formal economic and cultural cooper-
ation agreement was signed in March, 1949. By 1950, over seventy
five percent of North Korea's total foreign trade was with the
Soviet Union, with a third of this trade in arms purchases.
Because of Soviet advisors orienting developing North Korean
heavy industry toward "meeting Soviet needs" and the extremely
unfavorable terms of trade imposed by the Soviets, North




Though Soviet occupation troops were finally withdrawn from
North Korea in 1948, the Soviets maintained control within
North Korea via advisors in the military, government, and
ruling Korean Worker's Party. After the withdrawal, the
North Koreans were provided by the USSR with large deliveries
of tanks, trucks, artillery, and planes with an estimated
aid value of $56 million.
The outbreak of the Korean War with the subsequent in-
fusion of 2.5 million "Chinese People's Volunteers" into
the conflict marked the end of sole Soviet dominance and in-
fluence in North Korean affairs. This massive intervention of
"Chinese Volunteers" undoubtedly saved North Korea from total
defeat and the North Koreans, particularly Kim Il-Sung, were
impressed and gratified by this Chinese assistance. Though
there were some problems in the relationship of some Korean
o
officers subordinated to Chinese commanders, ' the two nations
established, in the words of Jen-min Jih - pao
,
the CCP official
voice, "an unbreakable, militant friendship" that was "cemented
by blood." 9
The Soviet Union's esteem, however, suffered greatly in the
eyes of both the North Koreans and the Chinese. A fact not
lost on the North Koreans was that it was Chinese, not Russians,
who provided the crucial aid (fighting soldiers) which pre-
cluded the extinction of the North Korean state. Never again
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would the Soviets be able to exert the level of influence
over Pyongyang that it had prior to the end of the Korean
War. North Korea's exclusive military and economic dependence
upon Moscow dissolved after the war, with the People's
Republic of China surfacing as the Soviet's primary rival in
influencing North Korea.
China's primary motive in involving itself in the Korean
War and its subsequent post war aid to North Korea was to pro-
tect its own security by continuing the North Korean buffer
against United States' "imperialistic aims." It appears that
Peking's major strategy was to cultivate long-term goodwill with
North Korea rather than attempt to attain dominating control
over North Korean affairs. Regardless of this strategy, Soviet
primacy of influence, though weakened, was maintained until
1958 when Pyongyang began to show more interest in the Chinese
model rather than the Russian's.
Increased Chinese influence did not result in increased
influence for pro-Chinese KWP leaders after the war. Both
the pro-Soviet leaders and the Yenan group suffered extensive
purges led by Kim Il-Sung with the Yenan group suffering most.
A look at the KWP Central Committee membership showed that
in 1956, of 71 members, 65% were pro-Soviet, 211 pro-Chinese,
with the remaining 14% neutral. The Standing Committee was
composed of eleven members, eight pro-Soviet and three pro-
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Chinese. Clearly, the Soviets retained the primacy of in-
fluence. Soviet influence was most evident in the North
Korean army, where organization, training, discipline, and
equipment were all based on the Soviet model.
The three year war had not only destroyed an embryonic
North Korean industrial base, it caused the North to rely
even more heavily than before the war on economic and military
aid from the socialist bloc. The economic and military assis-
tance provided primarily from the Soviet Union and China
enabled the North Korean government to lay the foundation for
peaceful economic development. Significant economic gains
offered Kim Il-Sung the opportunity to begin establishing more
"self-reliance" or chuch '
e
. In 1955, Kim stressed the need
for "firmly established chuch '
e
and stated:
"Although certain people say that the Soviet way is best
or that the Chinese way is best, have we not now reached
the point where we can construct our own way?" 12
Five major factors were accountable for an increased em-
phasis of chuch'
e
: (1) memories of the war; (2) Kim's post-
war political consolidation; (3) impressive economic headway;
(4) the possibility that Soviet and Chinese influence levels
on North Korea affairs had reached a state of equilibrium;
and (5) the growing dispute between Moscow and Peking. ^
This steadily growing dispute between North Korea's two
neighbors placed the leadership in Pyongyang in a serious
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dilemma. The "cult of personality" attack on Stalin by
Khrushchev adversely reflected on both Mao Zedong and Kim
Il-Sung. Soviet co-existence policies toward the West, es-
pecially toward Pyongyang's number one enemy, the United States,
ran counter to stated North Korean foreign policy guidelines.
There now existed a fundamental question as to who had the right
to claim socialist camp leadership, Moscow or Peking? Finally,
what was the right model to follow when attempting to build
a true socialist and communistic state?
The Sino-Soviet dispute on the above issues would often
force Pyongyang to choose sides at a time when she could least
afford to alienate either. Continued support from both the
Soviet Union and China was required to further North Korea's
military, industrial, and scientific potential. Kim thus
embarked on a policy of avoiding total alignment which in
essence meant maintaining good relations with both. Though Kim
was partially successful because North Korea achieved limited
independence, the Sino-Soviet dispute also required Kim to
serve two masters .
B. NORTH KOREA IN THE GROWING SINO-SOVIET CLEAVAGE 1958-1961
Both sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict refrained from
making direct verbal attacks at each other through the years
1958-1959. Three important events dominated these years:
the emergence of Mao's "Great Leap Forward" and "people's com-
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mune" programs, the Chinese refutation of Khrushchev's strategy
for "peaceful coexistence", and the American deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea. The three Chinese
actions posed a threat to Moscow's traditional position as
leader and determiner of Communist bloc doctrine. Because Kim's
priority lay in the rapid development of the North's economy,
he knew this development would depend a great deal on the amount
of aid, particularly military aid, offered by the two protagon-
ists. Therefore, irrespective of how much Pyongyang desired
and stressed chuch '
e
,
or a self-reliant economy, she also needed
to remain neutral in the developing stages of the Sino-Soviet
split
.
Though Kim Il-Sung was primarily concerned with his
Five Year Economic Plan (1957-1961), he was also faced with
the desire to maintain a more aggressive ideological line.
China and North Korea shared similar views on socialism. Both
countries' leaders desired economic self-sufficiency; both
believed the way to achieve it was thru labor-intensive policies.
Thus, in the summer of 1958, North Korea moved to emulate
the Chinese Great Leap Forward. Kim's program, called the
Flying Horse Movement, ended like Mao's, a relative failure.
North Koreans, in their deviation from the Soviet model, found
themselves severely critized by the Soviets.^ This criticism
undoubtedly impressed Kim and other North Korean leaders of
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the wisdom in maintaining a position of neutrality in the
Sino-Soviet argument over which path to socialism and
Communism was the correct path.
Primarily due to Soviet and Chinese arms transfers vio-
lations of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the United States had
introduced tactical nuclear weapons systems into South Korea.
Both North Korea and China attempted to persuade the Soviets
to counter this move by also deploying tactical nuclear weapons
in the North. When Moscow refused, Peking withdrew its Chinese
People's Volunteers in October 1958. By not insisting upon
a quid pro quo from the United States, i.e., that U.S. forces
withdraw from South Korea at the same time, Peking gave up an
important lever for promoting an American withdrawal. North
Korean leaders were less than happy over this outcome. Peking's
level of influence over Pyongyang was "obviously reduced by
this performance . "15
North Korean emulation of Chinese policies did not, how-
ever, carry over into the military or political arenas.
More noteworthy is the fact that by the end of 1959 , Kim II-
Sung had, through extensive purges of pro-Soviet and Yenan
faction party leaders, attained undisputed control over both
the KWP and the government.^ Thereafter, neither Moscow nor
Peking maintained within Pyongyang's Party and governmental
structure a loyal faction which could be relied upon to support
a pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese viewpoint.
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When Khrushchev introduced his new foreign policy strategy
of "peaceful coexistence" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956)
,
China did not comment. She was more involved in the de-
Stalinization issue. However, in 1958 Peking publicly at-
tacked Khrushchev's new policy. Pyongyang, on the other hand
had been publicly supportive of the Moscow line since 1956;
she even supported by favorable reporting Khrushchev's visit
to the United States in 1960. North Korea also supported
Moscow's nuclear test ban and disarmament propositions to the
United States. 17
However, while Kim endorsed Moscow's peaceful coexistence
policy, he was not willing to apply such a strategy to his
relationship with either South Korea or the United States. In
fact, increased hostile actions against the South was the main
of Kim's unification policy. Pyongyang's non-adherence to
Moscow's policy strategy apparently worried Soviet leaders.
"In October 1959, Khrushchev publicly cautioned
the North Korean leaders against the use of
force because 'the United States is not seeking
a military conflict in Korea. '"18
North Korean leaders after 1959 began to view Khrushchev's
strategy as unworkable and possibly detrimental to the North
Korean goal of reunification. Even more noteworthy was the
compatibility of views expressed by the Chinese concerning
problems of great interest to the North Koreans. While the
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Chinese were essentially attacking American presence in
Taiwan, the polemics were also ascribable to the United States'
presence in South Korea. This American presence blocked
unification desires of both Mao and Kim.
Pyongyang's full support for the Chinese actions in the
Sino-Indian border conflict reflected an undeniable diver-
gence from Moscow's line on neutrality. The neutral stance
of the Soviets on the Sino-Indian border dispute revealed to
the world that all was not well between Moscow and Peking.
The June 1960 Bucharest Conference confirmed the fact that
indeed relations between the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China were severely strained. The conference
revealed an ever widening gulf between ideological and world
movement strategy. Khrushchev continued to emphasize peace-
ful competition, while China's representative P'eng Chen called
for more militancy. Though the Soviet attacks on the Chinese
line displeased the North Koreans, Pyongyang essentially re-
mained neutral, resulting in a position reflecting sympathy
toward both factions.^
Throughout the summer after the Bucharest Conference,
the angry denunciations directed at each other by the
Communist giants were complimented by the continued desire
of North Korea to remain neutral. However, both China and
the Soviet Union began to woo Pyongyang with earnest in the
expectation that North Korea would lend support in the up-
coming Moscow Conference (November, 1960) .
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Beginning in October 1960, Peking exerted a number of
pressures on Pyongyang. A loan of $105 million and promises
of military assistance, primarily in arms transfers , were
coupled with public statements reminding North Korea of the
close relationship established during the Korean War, pri-
marily due to the infusion of the Chinese People's Volunteers .20
This pressure coincided with Khrushchev's cancellation of a
scheduled visit to Pyongyang. Though Moscow attempted to
assuage Pyongyang's anger with a cancellation of a $190
million North Korean debt, feelings in Pyongyang remained
somewhat negative toward the Soviet Union. '
The Moscow Conference was perhaps the most important
gathering of its kind in the history of the Communistic
movement. The conference tended to confirm and even deepen
the dispute between the two Communist powers. "Polycentrism"
became a reality within the international Communist move-
ment. Chinese pressures on North Korea paid off in that
North Korea explicitly recognized Peking as a co-leader with
Moscow. However, to retain his stance of neutrality, Kim
publicly supported the majority of Soviet resolutions ."
From the Moscow Conference to the 22nd Congress of the
CPSU (November 1961) , there existed a tug-of-war between
Moscow and Peking for influence in Pyongyang. Both protag-
onists were willing to concede much in military and econom-
ic aid to gain support. Kim Il-Sung, desperately in need
182

of such assistance, utilized this opportunity to reap the
advantages of being wooed by rival powers. North Korea was
able to gain security treaties with Moscow (6 July 1961)
and Peking (10 September 1961) , important trade agreements
with both, and substantial promises of military assistance.
This period was one of great satisfaction for Kim Il-Sung.
Through the security treaties, he obtained assurance of sup-
port in the event of war with the West (particularly the United
States); and because of the economic and military assistance,
his country was moving far ahead of his southern neighbor in
strength, economically and militarily. Couple these factors
with unrest and the two coups in South Korea, and North Korea's
position looked very strong.
During the period 1958-1961, North Korea found itself
caught in the battle for influence between the Soviet Union
and China. Because of Kim's need for economic and military
assistance, he found a neutral stance to be of great benefit.
However, by the end of 1961, North Korea could not accept
Moscow's ideological line or its strategy of world communist
domination through peaceful means. Pyongyang began to lean
toward Peking.
C. PYONGYANG IN THE PEKING CAMP 1962-1964
As the Sino-Soviet relationship worsened, North Korea's
attempts to remain neutralwere aggravated by five events or
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issues in 1962. First, China, despite its own economic
problems, was becoming an increasingly important supplier of
goods, technology, and military material. ' Secondly,
Soviet economic and military assistance was not increased;
arms transfers were, in fact, greatly decreased. This factor
would have grave implications for the next 3-4 years on Kim's




Third, on the issue of the Sino-Indian border dispute,
Pyongyang gave full support to Peking's actions. Moreover,
although Pyongyang attacked the Indians as the instigators
of the dispute and supported Chinese defense against Indian
"aggression", official statements intentionally omitted any
mention of Soviet views. ^4
The turning point in North Korean policy toward the
Sino-Soviet dispute was Moscow's withdrawal of missiles from
Cuba in October 1962. Pyongyang strongly echoed Chinese
criticism of Khrushchev's "appeasement" policy toward the
"imperialist" United States. The North Korean leadership
considered the Cuban crisis as a surrender of socialism to
imperialism. Additionally,
"Moscow's 'adventurism' and 'capitulationism' in the
Cuban crisis may also have provoked the Pyongyang leader-
ship to recall the bitter memory of the Korean War. "25
Kim could not forget that the Korean War was to a large
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degree a Soviet sponsored 'adventure' which resulted in a
'capitulation' to the Americans when the Soviets pressured
him into accepting the Armistice.
Finally, during the East European Communist Congresses
held November and December 1962, North Korea began to attack
indirectly the Soviet Union, utilizing essentially Chinese
verbage. The Soviets, employing the Czechs and East Germans
as their mouth pieces, attacked the North Koreans for sup-
porting the Chinese position. ^° The Soviets began to pun-
ish North Korea for her verbal attacks by significantly de-
creasing economic aid and totally cutting off military aid.
As a result, Kim Il-Sung re-emphasized chuch'
e
and revised
his Seven-Year Economic Plan to strengthen the economy while
maintaining a high level of defense expansion. Annual in-
dustrial growth rate significantly dropped from 211 (1957-
1960) to 10.8% (between 1961-1963)
.
27 The severance of
Soviet aid was to adversely affect North Korea's annual
growth rate from 1962 to the present.
From 1963 until the ouster of Khrushchev in October
1964, Pyongyang mirrored the Chinese on all Sino-Soviet dis-
puted issues. Pyongyang and Peking refused to abide or
sign the 1963 Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Khrushchev personally
was attacked in early 1964. As North Korean polemics
echoed China's anti-Soviet pronouncements, Moscow began
applying economic pressure. Not only was Soviet military aid
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refused completely and economic aid drastically reduced,
Moscow was also isolating North Korea economically from other
socialist countries. Though China significantly increased
economic aid and became North Korea's sole supplier of weap-
ons, the important fact remained that China could not pro-
vide heavy machinery or factory equipment, items absolutely
essential to Kim's Seven-Year Plan. °
The Soviet boycott on North Korea, coupled with inade-
quate assistance from China, forced Kim Il-Sung to purchase
needed heavy industrial equipment in a number of non-commun-
ist countries, including Japan, West Germany, Great Britain,
France, the Netherlands and Austria. Equally noteworthy is
the fact that North Korea did not have diplomatic relations
with these countries. 29
There were eight basic factors that drew North Korea
to the Chinese side. First, Pyongyang accepted Peking's
hard line attitude toward America and found compatibility
in each other's unification policies. Second, both North
Korea and China were still in the formulative years of their
evolution; both were still militant Stalinistic states.
Third, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign was an attack
on Mao's and Kim's cult-of-personality. Fourth, both North
Korea and China held similar views toward economic develop-
ment; both stressed heavy industry and self-reliance.
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Fifth, North Korea was angry over the limited Soviet aid,
particularly military aid. Sixth, there was strong resent-
ment in Pyongyang over Khrushchev's attempts to interfere in
internal North Korean affairs. Seventh, North Koreans per-
ceived Soviet insensitivity toward Asians, i.e., Soviet
occupation behavior in North Korea after WWII and the lack
of a troop commitment in the North Korean War. Lastly, there
was the historically important cultural affinity between China
and North Korea.
D. THE SHIFT BACK TO MOSCOW 1964-1969
By 1964, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang had
deteriorated to its lowest level. However, after the fall
of Khrushchev in October, the new leadership moved to reestab-
lish friendlier relations with North Korea. Significantly, the
desire to reestablish better relations was not a Soviet uni-
lateral goal. North Korea also had reasons for reestablish-
ing ties with Moscow.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin team desired to reassert Soviet
influence over North Korea. They also were willing, appar-
ently, to pay the price to bring a member of the Chinese
camp back into the Soviet fold. The Soviets reinstituted
military assistance, increased significantly economic aid,




North Korea, meanwhile, had made a realistic assessment
of its policy of supporting China in the Sino-Soviet split.
Five factors were considered crucial. First, North Korea
realized the Soviet and Eastern European "boycott" had had
disastrous effects on its Seven-Year Plan and had strained
its national defense capability. Secondly, South Korea was
undergoing a military modernization program, largely assisted
by United States aid. Third, Japan was reasserting itself,
though only economically, on the Korean peninsula in South
Korea. 31 Fourth, the growing Chinese inflexibility on
ideological issues and the accompanying uncompromising
Chinese attitude toward "united action" against "international
imperialism" was causing concern in Pyongyang. Largely due
to Chinese inadequate technical assistance during the Soviet
"boycott", North Korea had decided to do business with these
"international imperialists". The decision to move away
from Chinese dogmatism was considered in Pyongyang's best
interests. Finally, once the Cultural Revolution gained
momentum, Chinese critism of North Korea, originating from
the radicals in charge, proved very distasteful to Kim and
his cohorts. ^2
The 23rd Congress of the CPSU (March-April 1966) proved
the turning point for Pyongyang-Moscow relations. Though the
North Korean delegation did not talk about any controversial
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Sino-Soviet disputed issues, they did praise the Soviet Union
profusely. Brezhnev reciprocated with a speech supporting
the North Korean's unification goals. 33
North Korea's changing attitude toward the Soviet Union,
however, did not result in exchanging one friend for another.
Rather, Kim Il-Sung's policy reflected a pragmatic assessment
of what was best for North Korea. Kim insured his policy of
neutrality with another purge of both Chinese and Soviet factions
from the higher ranks within the KWP . Thus, neither Chinese or
Russian oriented Korean Communists could manipulate against
the Kim leadership. Kim's overall posture in the Sino-Soviet
dispute remained "one of neutrality - not neutrality pure and
simple but with a slight slant in favor of Moscow".
^
E. THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK TO PEKING 1969-19 79
By 1969, the North Korean leadership once again felt
the need to reassess its policies toward its Communist
neighbors. Peking's policy was also changing. As the
Cultural Revolution was ending, Chou En-lai was able to re-
establish political relations with several countries.
North Korea was one of the first to receive renewed Chinese
attention. There were also indications that Soviet military
and economic assistance was neither abundant nor always
forthcoming as expected the past five years
.
Nevertheless, five years of Soviet aid had resulted in an
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improved military posture that lent Kim increased confi-
dence to renew overt military actions against South Korean
and American forces. The increasing involvement of the United
States in Vietnam had resulted in increased counter-insurg-
ency aid to South East Asia at the expense of military aid
given to forward defense nations. South Korea, as pointed out
in earlier chapters, was an exception. The United States was
able to persuade the ROK Army to involve itself in Vietnam by
promises of increased economic and military aid. When Kim
Il-Sung pressured Msocow for more arms, it was provided, but
with restraints. The Soviets refused to provide high tech-
nology weapons systems such as MiG-23s (which it provided to
some Middle East nations) , long range surface-to surface
missiles or sophisticated air defense systems. The United
States responded with similar restraint to high technology
demands from the South Koreans. It is apparent that even today,
both Moscow and Washington adhere to an unwritten agreement to
control arms transfers in order to preclude a tip in the
balance of power. 35
As Kim became more bellicose in subversive actions
directed at the South, Moscow's endorsements of such actions
were provided with less enthusiam then he felt was warranted
from a supporter. Relations slipped somewhat following
the downing of an EC-121 U.S. intelligence aircraft in April
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1969 when Moscow's endorsement of the attack came three
days after the Chinese endorsement. A visit by Podgorny in
May, probably designed to restrain North Korea's increasingly
aggressive actions, did not please Kim Il-Sung. As a result,
Kim refused to participate in the 1969 Moscow Conference .36
The turning point in Sino-North Korean relations was most
likely in October 1969 when President Choi Yong Kun of North
Korea's Supreme People's Assembly attended China's National
Day celebrations and reportedly received Chinese concessions
on the disputed Mt . Paektu territory as well as new trade
arrangements. This event was soon followed by the visit of
Chou En-lai to Pyongyang in April, the following year. As
a result of this visit, relations were restored, trade con-
tracts renewed, and promises of renewed military aid were
made. The promises of military assistance (ships, fuel,
and technical advisors) were made with the purpose of
sounding out the North Koreans in terms of their relations
with the Soviets and the North Korean stance on the Sino-
Soviet dispute that had developed into armed clashes the
previous year. 37
For reasons that need not be discussed in this paper,
events in 1969 along the Sino-Soviet border had forced
Peking to reevaluate its external priorities and to place
the Sino-Soviet rivalry and confrontation at the top of its
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lists. No longer was the United States China's foremost
enemy and threat; the threat from the Soviet Union now far out-
shadowed the perceived threat from either Japan or the
United States. Since 1969, Peking had become apprehensive
about further American withdrawals from Asia (less Vietnam
and Taiwan) . Therefore, it made sense to the Chinese to
counter a growing Soviet threat with a continued strong
American presence friendly to China.
In the early part of 1970, Chinese-North Korean relations
received a boost when Pyongyang withdrew under protest from an
international oceanographic project for the Sea of Japan,
due to Soviet insistence on the inclusion of Japanese scientists
The Chinese took immediate advantage of this incident by ener-
getically cultivating North Korean favor of Chinese actions .38
However, the 1971 Sino-US rapprochement was to initially
cause problems between Pyongyang and Peking. To assuage
North Korean apprehensions, Peking sent a number of high-level
delegations following the Kissinger-Nixon visits to China.
Upon receiving considerable economic and military assistance
promises from those delegations, Kim announced that the
Sino-US rapprochement had little bearing on North Korean
affairs. 39 Peking's task in wooing North Korea was made
easier by Pyongyang's shift in stated policy toward reuni-
fication with the South. On July 4, 1972 the first joint
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North-South Communique was issued declaring that both factions
desired unification through peaceful means.
The Soviets played upon Kim's apprehensions about the
Sino-US relationship by blasting the rapprochement and by
providing additional economic and military aid. Moscow's
attempt to gain influence met with limited success. Neverthe-
less, North Korean dependence on Soviet weapon technology
was strengthened due to large influxes of missile systems,
tanks, and missile-carrying patrol boats. 40 North Korea
appeared to gain significantly from both Nixon visits to Peking
and Moscow.
Because of mounting economic problems, largely due to
high defense expenditures and increasing credit problems
with the West and the Soviet Union, Pyongyang attempted to
use the Sino-Soviet split to obtain as much economic and
military assistance as possible. She was more successful
with Peking than with Moscow. Peking began providing cheap
oil to Pyongyang while the Soviets increased their prices.
A pipeline linking China and North Korea was completed in
1976.41
Even more significant, South Korean officials in 1975
stated that there had occurred a drastic shift in arms supply
to North Korea. In 1972, over 80% of military assistance
had come from the Soviets. By 1975, over 501 of North Korea's
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arms imports were provided by China.
Beginning in 1975, there evolved signs of increasing
strain between Moscow and Pyongyang. Moscow's response to
Pyongyang's economic problems has been unenthusiastic
.
North Korea has defaulted on over $700 million worth of credits
from the Soviets. ^2 Kremlin support of Kim II- Sung 's unifi-
cation policies has also been less than enthusiastic; unifi-
cation would have grave implications for Soviet policy-makers
concerned with Europe. Kim, following a trip to China in 1975,
failed to visit Moscow. Other indications of a chill in
Soviet-North Korean relations included media from both
sides down-playing or omitting anniversary occasions, Kim's
efforts to join the so-called "non-aligned" bloc, Moscow's
obvious avoidance toward any close identification with Kim's
militant stance proclaimed during the 1975 China visit, and
Moscow's invitation to South Korean sportsmen participating
in the world amateur wrestling championships. ^
The August, 1976 axe murders of two U.S. Army officers
at Panmunjom created an extremely unfavorable international
image for North Korea. The action was embarrassing to both
the Soviets and Chinese, who "conspicuously refrained from
commenting on the incident". Washington hardened its com-
mitment to South Korea by providing more military aid.
Conversely, the incident underlined the explosive Korean
situation and fueled US Congressional proponents of American
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disengagement from Korea. Such a turn of events was not con-
sidered to be in the best interest of either Moscow or Peking.
Nveretheless , friendly relations continued between North
Korea and China and between North Korea and the Soviet Union.
Particularly noteworthy was the automatic extension for five
years of the North Korean-Soviet Mutual Security Treaty of
1961. 44
North Korean relations with Peking and Moscow reflected
in 1977 the North's need for economic and military assistance.
There apparently was a slight shift toward better relations
with Moscow. Most likely, this movement is based on a real
need for higher technology weapons and industrial equipment
than was forthcoming from China. Trade agreements were signed
by North Korea with both powers during 1977. Of perhaps some
significance, the Soviet trade delegation came to Pyongyang for
the signing while the Chinese agreement was concluded in Peking. °
The most important guest that Kim Il-Sung has received
to date was Hua Kuo-feng in May, 1978. This was the first
visit to North Korea by the leader of the People's Republic
of China. No Soviet leader has yet visited Pyongyang. Ac-
companying Hua was his minister of economic relations; it
can be assumed that continued Chinese economic and military
aid and co-operation were discussed. This was undoubtedly
good news for a debt-ridden and deficit-plagued North Korea.
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Hua apparently felt that economic good-will from China would
help assure Kim that the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT)
with Japan and the climaxing Sino-US normalization would not
mean that lie was left to fend for himself against Japan and
the United States
.
A significant trend was becoming discernible in the tri-
angular relationship between Pyongyang, Peking and Moscow in
1978. The North Koreans were signaling a willingness to openly
favor the Chinese on a range of issues, to include the Sino-
Soviet conflict. The indicators go back to Hua ' s visit.
While Hua was in Pyongyang, the DPRK media reported a PRC
protest to the Soviets over a border incident^ the Soviet reply
was ignored. ,
'
Shortly following Hua ' s visit, the North Korean press
attacked "dominat ionism" , a code-word North Korea uses when
referring to the Soviet Union. Previously, the North Koreans
had not specifically linked "dominationism" to Soviet policy.
However, following this reprinting of the bitterly worded
anti-Soviet polemic by China's Defense Minister Hou Hsiang-
chien, North Korea appeared more willing to criticize Soviet
policy actions, particularly Soviet military activities in
Africa/" Pyongyang has also criticized Cuba, who often acts
as a surrogate for the Soviets criticizing China, and has
openly acknowledged Sino-Albananian differences, explaining
only China's viewpoint. 49
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In September, Pyongyang- was visited by high level
delegations from both rivals. The Chinese delegation was led
by then Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping. Deng's mission
evidently was to soothe Kim's ruffled feathers over China's
impending signature to the PFT with Japan. Though Kim met
with Teng, he snubbed the Soviet delegation.^' This coolness
was largely due to Moscow's relative stinginess as far as
further aid to North Korea was concerned.
During 1977-1978, Moscow had been unwilling to provide
new aid commitments to North Korea. Most observers believed
this refusal was due to Pyongyang's inability to make good in
its outstanding Soviet debts. While Moscow acted stingy,
Peking was being quite generous. One of the economic agree-
ments promised was a cheap supply of Chinese oil at only half
the price the Soviets were charging the Koreans. ^2
The next month, when Deng agreed with Japanese Prime
Minister Fukuda that there was no danger of war on the Korean
peninsula, it represented a total negation of Kim's previously
stated contention that South Korea was undergoing "war prepara-
tions"." Although Kim was not receiving everything he desired
he must have realized total alienation by either Moscow or
Peking would have severe adverse effects on his economy and
defense status. Chinese willingness to provide economic and
military assistance was no longer based on ideological grounds
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or an "old friends'* rationale. If one desired Chinese aid, he
had to reciprocate in political and strategic support for
China's desire to contain Soviet expansion. 54
Therefore, it is probable that during his May 1978 visit to
North Korea, Hua may have intimated future Chinese action against
Vietnam and attempted to line up support against probable
criticism." if this is true, Hua's strategy worked. The first
official North Korean official to comment on the Sino-Vietnam
War was Kim Yong-nam, chief of the KWP international department.
Commenting to the Japanese JIJI press, Mr. Kim initially took
a neutral position by stating that the border clash was re-
grettable in that both China and Vietnam were responsible for
the conflict. However, Mr. Kim went further by indicating
to JIJI that China counterattacked the Vietnamese invasion.
This assertion, coupled with an earlier attack on the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia clearly placed Pyongyang's support behind
Peking. 56 Furthermore, North Korea provided a temporary home
for long time Peking friend, Prince Sihanouk.
When Washington and Peking announced their intentions
to establish full diplomatic relations, Pyongyang radio on
22 December welcomed the decision calling the event "an
irresistible trend of our time"." China rewarded North Korea's
support by issuing an editorial in the People's Daily on
26 January 1979 calling Kim's proposals for reunification
"rational, reasonable and practical" P% The lack of
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any monitored supporting comment from Moscow media under-
scored the chill prevalent in Soviet-North Korea relations."
Recent indications show that North Korea has modified its
stance toward the Soviets. The normalization of relations
between Peking and Washington and the establishment of tri-
angular ties among Washington, Tokyo, and Peking is not seen
as favorable events by either North Korea or the Soviet Union.
North Korean news media has yet to report the Japan-China
peace treaty. This indicates, at least, that Pyongyang was
more unhappy with that event then the Sino-American normali-
zation. Some Korean experts put this absence of comment to a
fear by Pyongyang that the new PFT would hinder or prohibit
unification of the two Koreas.^
Perhaps more disconcerting than the PFT was to the North
Koreans, was the nullification of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
and Alliance Treaty. The problem for North Korea is that it
has a military alliance with both Moscow and Peking. (Both
these treaties were renewed in summer 1979.) Both treaties
contain agreements that prohibit activities considered hostile
by the co-signor. It is important to note that Moscow's De-
fense Treaty, specifically prohibits North Korea from entering
any alliances hostile to the Soviet Union. The irony of this
situation is that when both treaties were promulgated, they
were directed against the United States, Japan, and South
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Korea. However, the Sino-Soviet dispute has changed old threat
perceptions and caused consternation in Pyongyang . °2 Both
Moscow and Peking regard their alliances with North Korea as
deterrent in purpose. Usually, because they hope never to
have to live up to them, their alliances are mentioned in
public only on special occasions. ^3
North Korea's tilt toward China, clearly evident by its
support on three key issues in 1979, was modified enough
not to antagonize the Soviets. Kim had learned a lesson from
Vietnam by not choosing one communist big brother over the other.
The Soviets have promised increased economic and military
aid, to include advanced MiG-23 fighter aircraft. In return,
the Soviets may be allowed to establish a naval base at Najin.64
It is also worthy to note that unlike China, North Korea has
not condemned $he Soviet's Afghanistan invasion. Kim has neither
supported nor condemned the Soviet act."
It is reasonable to assume then, that both the North Koreans
and the Soviets are watching with considerable interest (and
perhaps apprehension) the changes in Chinese foreign policy
and its trends in domestic politics and economics. The Soviets
have little choice but to wait and see whether future Chinese
policy decisions will result in friction between Peking and
Pyongyang and allow the Soviets to regain a measure of influence.
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F. NORTH KOREAN- SOVIET RELATIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
There are many issues and problems facing North Korean
and Soviet policy-makers when considering their current re-
lationship. However, there are some that may be identified
as being more important than others. First, and perhaps most
important to Soviet planners, North Korea has tilted decisively
toward Peking since 1969. For reasons listed above, Peking
has remained the favorite of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung.
Secondly, Moscow has been reluctant to give whole-hearted
support to Kim's reunification strategy. Soviet media and
leaders have not accorded Kim's policy a high priority.
Moscow's reluctance can be understood more clearly when taking
their European policy (two Germanies) into account. Reluctant
Soviet support of Kim's policy had produced severe strain in
the relationship.
Third, there has been a sharp contrast in content and
tone between Soviet and North Korean commentaries on Korea.
Moscow continually refers to the peoples of "both Korean states",
while Peking and Pyongyang claim North Korea as the sole
legitimate sovereign state. While Pyongyang refers to the need
for"independent" reunification, Moscow invariably drops "in-
dependent", intimating its desire to participate in any future
negotiations settling the Korean problem. °
Fourth, Moscow has not denounced former Secretary Kissinger's
call for a 4-Power conference to discuss problems.
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Pyongyang rejects this proposal, calling for direct North
Korean-United States negotiations. Moscow also continues to
support the view that a North-South agreement is required as
a first step toward solving the Korean problem. Pyongyang
has vascillated on this view. Presently, she is participating
in the preliminary talks with South Korea.
Fifth, the high debt (over $700million) owed the
Soviet Union represents at least one-third of the total $2.1
billion foreign debt accumulated by North Korea. Soviet pres-
sure to repay this debt would undoubtedly push Pyongyang fur-
ther in the Chinese camp. Conversely, Soviet waiver of this
debt could have positive results for North Korean-Soviet re-
lations .
Sixth, Pyongyang remains heavily dependent upon Moscow
for some of its oil requirements, modern combat aircraft,
and air-defense systems. Though North Korea has achieved
limited self-sufficiency, high technology systems are still
beyond her capability. Moscow has been unwilling at least
until this year, to provide more advanced aircraft, air-defense
systems, or large SSMs . North Korea chafes at the fact that
these systems have long since been provided to Syria, Libya,
and Egypt, non-socialist states.
Seventh, Soviet detente with the West and Japan has
been seen by Pyongyang as a dangerous trend for the Communist
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world. On the other hand, still the most Stalinist nation
in the world, Pyongyang is considered by Moscow as an unstable
government.
Finally, even though the Soviets have publicly supported
a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, privately, it is
known that the Soviets consider an American presence more
stabilizing. The Soviets, like the Chinese must be concerned
with Kim's growing capability to undertake independent military
action. Should Kim, through misperceptions of U.S. commit-
ment, attempt to exploit a future withdrawal, the chance of
Soviet and U.S. involvement is very high.
The above differences reflect a basic incompatability of
interests. Soviet leaders do not trust Kim Il-Sung, while
the reverse is probably true. The Soviet Union does
not see a unified Communist Korea under Kim Il-Sung in their
best interest. The Soviet-North Korean relationship resembles
"more a marriage of convenience then a close alliance
and it is beset with chronic strain and tension. "67
Presently, the best options for the Soviets to follow is to
use its influence to preclude any North Korean military act-
ion against the South, do not unilaterally recognize South
Korea, do not publicly advocate a two-Koreas solution, or
lastly do not pressure North Korea to recognize South Korea.
G. NORTH KOREAN- CHINESE RELATIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
Unlike the Soviet policy planners, the issues and prob-
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lems facing Chinese planners are not as numerous nor as
difficult. First, while Peking has been strongly vocal in its
support for reunification, she has insisted in recent years
that reunification be peaceful . Kim's stated policy has been
reunification by any means, including armed force. Unification
under any circumstances would be undesirable to Peking because
of the risk to stability and its current level of influence.
Secondly, Peking's keen interest in a strong Japan has
left not only Japanese Communists and leftists wondering but
also leaders in Pyongyang. Kim must be aware that for China
to woo the conservative Japanese businessman, Peking must assure
them that their investments in South Korea will remain safe.
Finally, for the above reason and, of course, to offset
Soviet power in Asia, Peking favors the maintenance of sta-
bility, i.e., the status quo, and continued U.S. troop
presence. Like the Soviets, Chinese officials have also
expressed their opposition to further U.S. military with-
drawals from North East Asia. They fear the "vacuum" would
be filled by the Soviet Union. 68
H. CONCLUSIONS AND FORECAST
North Korea, has been the exception rather than the rule
when considering the dynamics and history of Asia since 1945.
While most Asian Communist regimes and parties preserved re-
lations with both Peking and Moscow without becoming exces-
sively dependent upon either, North Korea seems to be always
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caught in that web spun by the Sino-Soviet dispute. As long
as the dispute continues, Pyongyang will have to pay the price
for either tilting too far or for taking a neutral stance.
Kim's tactic of playing the Soviet Union off against
China and vice-versa has kept him in a fairly strong position
and has offered limited independence. On the other hand,
he has learned through experience not to lean too far one way,
thus precluding the chance of severing relations. Peking has
recently indicated it is no longer willing to provide support
solely on a ideological basis. Recipients of aid and assis-
tance must support Peking's goals and strategy, including
containing Soviet "hegemonism".
For Kim, this quid pro quo has meant open support of
Peking's position on the Sino-Vietnam War, the Vietnamese
incursion into Cambodia, and most important, the Sino-Soviet
dispute. It has also meant the improbability of receiving any
large amounts of much sought after and needed advanced Soviet
weapons systems. When Pyongyang determines that obtaining
Soviet higher technology is in her best interests, a shift
back to a neutral stance might not be enough for Moscow. The
leaders in the Kremlin would most likely demand a total commit
ment
.
Although the relations among the great powers, especially
China and Russia, will hold an important place in the solution
of the Korean problem the intra-relat ionship betxveen the
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Koreas will ultimately be decisive. An interesting question
which can only be answered in the future asks would a Sino-
Soviet rapprochement facilitate or hinder the prospects for a
Korean settlement? This question most certainly supports
the importance the Sino-Soviet dispute has meant in the past
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V. THE CARTER YEARS
The 1976 United States Presidential campaign must have
caused deep apprehension in Seoul. Its relationship with the
United States Congress had undergone increasing strain the past
3-4 years, and now it was faced with a future President whose
campaign platform included three issues deeping concerning the
leadership in South Korea - a proposed withdrawal of American
combat troops from Korea, an increased interest and concern for
human rights violators and their relationship with the United
States, and, a pledge to significantly reduce the export of
American arms. When analyzing the effects American security
assistance and arms transfers from 1977 has had on South Korea
and the other actors involved in Korea, one sees that the
Carter years have been characterized by a series of issues
rather than a progression of understandings over time. There-
fore, this chapter will focus on the above issues beginning
with Mr. Carter's Withdrawal Plan.
A. THE WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL
By the time President Carter had taken office in January,
1977 all the major actors in the Korean peninsula were watching
with great interest, and some with concern, as to how American
policy in Northeast Asia would be changed and upon what values
it would be based. The first major change in policy came with
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the withdrawal announcement. Though there were powerful
Senators and Congressmen of both parties strongly allied against
the plan, Congressional reaction was for the most part support-
ive. Where the Carter administration's plan received the most
criticism was in Northeast Asia, specifically in South Korea
and Japan. In fairness to Mr. Carter, the scaling down of
American forces in South Korea had been specifically written
into the Democratic platform before he was nominated. ^ In
fact, Congress had approved in 1974 a recommendation by the
House Appropriations Committee that the 2nd Division be
repositioned well to the rear of Seoul and converted into a
genuine reserve force. This committee had further recom-
mended that if the division was not so repositioned, it should
be withdrawn entirely from South Korea beginning in 1976.2
Basically, President Carter had justified his withdrawal
decision on two premises. First, he felt Korea would be
sufficiently developed economically to defend itself at the
end of the proposed withdrawal period, and secondly, the
President and his advisors considered the political climate
in Northeast Asia stable enough to facilitate the pull-out.
^
However, Japanese and South Korean critics of the Carter
plan pointed out that if South Korea was capable of defending
itself because of recent economic successes, shouldn't the
same apply to West Germany? By stressing the paramount
importance of Western Europe and NATO to America's security,
the President was insinuating to Asian allies that their
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importance was secondary to Europe. South Korean and Japanese
criticism also focused on the failure of the Carter Adminis-
tration to obtain a quid pro quo from the Communist powers
in return for the United States drawdown.
4
Though both South Korea and Japan agreed that the with-
drawal was not in their best interests, their reasons varied
somewhat. For South Korea, there were essentially five reasons
why the withdrawal of United States ground forces threatened
the security and stability of Northeast Asia. 5 First, while
the South Korean Army was capable of defending its country
against a North Korean attack, it was certainly not capable
of deterring such an attack. South Koreans firmly believe
in the "trip wire" theory. Secondly, South Korea feels that
the Sino-Soviet dispute has provided Kim Il-Sung the latitude
to take independent action if he so desires. This factor,
coupled with Kim's unswerving 35 year goal for reunification
on his terms, tempered by the knowledge that time is no
longer on his side to see that goal reached, constitutes a
grave danger to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Third, the withdrawal may result in pushing Japan toward
a more neutralist stance or even accommodation with the
Soviets for security reasons . A Soviet aligned and influenced
Japan would possibly favor the North over the South in its
economic and political dealings. Furthermore, a frightened
Japan may take the course of rearming, resulting in increased
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tension for all nations concerned. The Japanese militancy
of the 1930s and 1940s has not yet been forgotten in Korea,
Fourth, the presence of United States forces in Korea is
considered by Seoul as playing a key role in deterring both
Soviet and Chinese pressures. Seoul feels that where the
United States has maintained forward-deployed forces (Western
Europe and Northeast Asia) , the Soviets have displayed
restraint and caution. Finally, a withdrawal may mark the
beginning of the end of an American military presence in Asia.
The apparent unwillingness of the American people, reflected
in U.S. policy by their elected officials in Congress, toward
any re-intervention militarily in Asia, has not been lost on
American analysts in Korea.
Understandably angered over the lack of consultations
before the decision was announced in March, Japan had to
consider both the role the American presence played in deter-
ring a renewed Korean conflict and the consequences of such
a war to herself. On the first issue, Japanese officials made
clear to visiting American officials that the troop presence
served a function that neither South Korea nor Japan could
replace. Tokyo believed that only the presence of American
troops restrains Kim Il-Sung's willingness to attack South.
Additionally, Japanese officials felt that South Korea could
not be trusted not to attack the North, given the nature of




On the second point, views diverged as to what effect
renewed hostilities would have on Japan. Some felt Japan's
security would be threatened by a Communist ruled, united
Korea. Others considered that the Korean Straits provided
enough of a buffer, providing the United States security
commitment remained intact. Japanese officials were reluctant
to openly criticize the Carter Administration for fear that
Congress would call on Tokyo to assume a larger burden of
its own defense or even increase its economic aid to South
Korea. '
Even though most North Korean statements calling for an
American troop withdrawal are commented on with approval by
Chinese media, Peking inwardly worried that developments in
Korea may have a harmful effect on the equilibrium of North-
east Asia. Since China's primary security concern is with
the Soviet Union, any change in the status quo is evaluated
against the advantages the Soviets may gain. Therefore,
China feared a U.S. withdrawal would signal a reduction in
the American commitment to Northeast Asia and enhance Soviet
efforts to fill the vacuum.
8
This paper will not dwell on the vast amounts of Congres-
sional rhetoric concerning the pros and cons of President
Carter's withdrawal plan. 9 However, even though the Presi-
dent has suspended his plan until 1981, there is still the
need to identify the major aspects of the plan with emphasis
on how it fit into the scheme of military assistance and arms
transfers to South Korea.
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B. THE WITHDRAWAL PLAN10
In March, 1977, President Carter announced his intention
to withdraw all 28,000 U.S. ground combat troops from Korea
in 4 to 5 years. The first phase of withdrawal was scheduled
for 1978. However, at the time of this paper, the withdrawal
has been temporarily suspended with only 570 withdrawn.''
The withdrawal was to consist of three phases. Each phase
would include support troops and one brigade from the 2nd
Infantry Division. Under the plan, all ground combat forces
were to be withdrawn by 1981 or 1982. This phasing allowed
the United States to reassess the situation throughout the
withdrawal effort.
To compensate for the removal of the division from the
U.S. -South Korean force structure, the following actions were
to be taken:
1) Provide South Korea $275 million in FMS credits
in FY 1979 and a like amount for each of the next several
years; these FY 1979 credits were to be used to continue
programs already underway to improve firepower and mobility
in the following manner:
a) $35 million plus for improved anti-tank
capabilities -- purchase of TOW missiles and kits to upgrade
M-48 tanks;
b) $52 million to improve air defense by





c) $125 million to procure F-4 and F-5 fighters,
improved air munitions, and radar homing and warning systems;
d) $30 million to improve mobility by purchasing
C-130s and helicopters; and
e) $20 million to purchase HARPOON missiles to
counter North Korean ships and to interdict fast infiltration
craft
.
2) Provide to South Korea on a cost-free basis,
selected items of equipment of the withdrawing forces, or
equivalent items in some particular cases, Identified equip-
ment slated for transfer included:
a) Upgraded M-48 tanks and TOWs; 12
b) Honest John SSMs and howitzers;
c) Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)
;
d) Engineer combat construction equipment, trucks,
and tactical raft sets;
e) Radars and target acquisition equipment; and
f) Communications and air traffic control equip-
ment .
The estimated value of the above equipment is $800 million.
3) To ensure the equipment to be transferred can be
effectively used after the withdrawal, technical and operations
training to the South Korean armed forces were to be accom-
plished via: on-the-job training supervised by U.S. personnel
prior to their withdrawal, by assigning U.S. personnel to
assist in instruction at Korean schools, and by sending South
Korean students under the IMET program to the U.S.
218

The estimated cost was $2.5 million of which $2.0 million was
to be covered under IMET funding and $.5 million provided by
the South Koreans under FMS procedures
.
4) An increase in the USAF presence by adding 12
F-4s to the 60 already thereJ3
5) An increase of U.S. war reserve stocks worth $90
million, for allied support for Korea.
By spring of 1978 President Carter was slowing down the
withdrawal phasing. His excuse was that Congress had to
approve his $800 million in equipment and $250 million in FMS
credits promised to South Korea, or else a possible destabi-
lization might occur. There was also the distinct possibility
that the Koreagate scandals would be linked to further military
aid funds requested for Korea. The stiff opposition from
Congressional critics in the United States as well as from
our East Asian allies, particularly South Korea and Japan,
was also beginning to take its toll. 15
In February, 1979 the President announced a temporary
suspension of the plan, followed by a formal announcement
in July that he would maintain the current strength level
until at least 1981. There were a number of reasons for the
change in Presidential policy. The official reason given
was the increased North Korean personnel and tank strength
provided showed in an updated intelligence estimate. This
new estimate showed that between 1972 and 1977 the North
Koreans had undergone a considerable reorganization of its
219

ground forces.^ Reasons of almost equal value for the
suspension included growing Congressional criticism and
hearings, enhanced allied apprehensions as to American
credibility, the initiation of talks between North and South
Korea, the normalization with China, the Soviet-Vietnamese
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the depose of the
Shah of Iran. However, the growing awareness of the Soviet
strategic challenge due to significant Soviet Pacific Fleet
growth was perhaps, the key factor in Mr. Carter's decision. 1?
The reaction by both South Korea and Japan to the with-
drawal suspension was predictably positive. Equally predict-
able was the North Korean negative reaction. Pyongyang called
the United States' revised estimates of North Korean troop
and tank strengths "lies" and countered with the statement
that the North is "entirely devoted to peaceful construction."^
Pyongyang resumed its anti-American propaganda, calling Carter
a hypocrite and accusing him of stepping up "war preparations
against North Korea. "19 What the North Koreans meant when
they referred to "war preparations" is unclear; however, the
large amount of aid that was being promised to South Korea in
1979 was indeed substantial.
C. CARTER ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL POLICY
When President Carter was candidate Carter he had promised,
"If I become president, I will work... to reduce the commerce
in weapons. "20 However, the amount of arms transferred to
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South Korea the first three years of the Carter Administration
has been more than any other previous administration had
transferred during a like period. On 19 May 1977, Mr. Carter
had proclaimed his new arms transfer and control policy. He
directed that the export of weapons be used only as an
exceptional tool of American foreign policy, that military aid
and the transfer arms would be used only "to promote our
security and security of our close friends." Less than a year
later arms exports were being redefined as an important tool
of American foreign policy. 21
The Carter policy covering weapons exports was delineated
in Presidential Decision 13 (PD-13), an outgrowth of Presidential
Review Memorandum (PRM) 12 on the same subject. 22 Mr , Carter's
approach to weapons exports is keyed to three objectives: first,
to decrease the volume of weapons exports below that exported
in FY 1977 (To do so, Mr. Carter set a dollar ceiling on arms
sales in FY 1978); secondly, to control what the United States
sells, to whom, and for what purpose; and third, to try to
convince other major arms suppliers (especially the Soviet Union)
to follow the American example. 23
The implementation of the new Carter arms transfer policy
was guided by six basic controls: first, the United States
would not be the first supplier to introduce into a region
newly-developed advanced weapons which would create a signifi-
cantly higher combat capability; second, the United States will
not sell or permit coproduction of such weapons until they are
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operationally deployed with U.S. forces; third, the United
States will not allow development of advanced weapons solely
for export; fourth, the coproduction by other countries of
significant weapons, equipment, or major components will not
be permitted; fifth, the transfer of U.S. weapons and equip-
ment to third countries is prohibited without U.S. approval;
and sixth, the promotion of sales of arms by either diplomatic
or military officials is prohibited . 24
In addition to promulgating a new arms transfer policy,
President Carter created the interagency Arms Export Control
Board under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State
for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Mrs. Lucy
Benson. This board with its working groups advise Mrs. Benson
in her recommendations to the Secretary of State of major arms
transfers and security assistance issues. Before any major
arms sales is approved, Mrs. Benson's office reviews the
request and coordinates any recommendations with concerned
executive branch agencies and off ices. 25
There are many loopholes in the Carter policy. Besides
the weapons, equipment, and services sold through Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) , in which the U.S. acts as a middleman
between U.S. companies and the foreign buyers, there is a
commercial sales channel. These commercial sales account for
an additional 10 percent of arms exports not covered by the
Carter policy even though they require State Department and
Commerce Department approval . 26 xh e South Korean government
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has in recent years increased its buys through this channel.
Also not included in the Carter guidelines are services such
as military construction, "non-weapons-related" advice, train-
ing, and like services. The President may also set aside any
part of his policy if extraordinary circumstances arise or if
27he decides the sale is needed to maintain a regional balance.
In spite of President Carter's intentions to slow down
United States arms exports, the opposite occurred. In November
1977 the Defense Department announced that sales ending for
Fiscal Year 1977 (Sept 1977) totaled nearly $11.4 billion,
the highest annual arms sales in United States history to that
date. This higher-than-expected total embarrassed the White
House so much that Lt. General Howard Fish, the Pentagon's
man in charge of arms sales, was relieved. ° The following
year another record was set with nearly $13.6 billion sold or
29
promised to foreign countries. In Fiscal Year 1979, the
total fell slightly to $13.1 billion. The Carter adminis-
tration was finding itself forced to rely increasingly on
the sales of sophisticated arms to back up foreign policy
initiatives. As one expert put it:
"Carter was governor from Georgia who
didn't think the whole thing out very far.
He is just more realistic about it now." 31
By looking at the transfers made to South Korea the past
three years, it is plain the new Carter arms policy has had
little if any adverse effect on Seoul's requests. When com-
paring the transfers made in 1977 (FY 78 figures) to those in
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1978 and 1979 (FY 79-80) one can see there has been a substan-
tial increase (See Tables 17 and 18) during the Carter Adminis-
tration. South Korea, in FY 1978, was the Untied States'
seventh largest FMS purchaser ($390 million) . The following
year Korea jumped to fourth place ($900 million) , exceeded only
by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. 32 Projected sales to the
South in FY 1980 rose to $1700 million.
Carte blanche was not afforded to South Korea's desires
for new technology armaments, however. Against the advice of
both the Pentagon and the State Department, the President
decided not to sell advanced F-16 and A-7 fighters. 33 The
Carter Administration felt that an F-16/A-7 transfer to Korea
would force the Soviets, under understandable North Korean
pressure to introduce MiG-23s as a countermeasure . 34 However,
with the recent reports that North Korean pilots have been
undergoing extensive Mig-23 training in Libya and that the
Soviets will provide two squadrons of the aircraft in the near
future, Mr. Carter may be forced to review that decision. 35
Past American reluctance to supply modern weapons to South
Korea was perhaps the driving force behind Seoul's desire to
build their own defense industries. The initial 1971 Modern-
ization Program was intended to replace worn-out equipment and
to institute the needed defense industries. At the same time
North Korea was stepping up its weapons production and procure-
ment. By 1976, Seoul had realized a successor program was
needed to keep pace with the North Koreans and to fill the
void left by departing American combat troops.
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Because United States security objectives were served
by maintaining and improving the South Korean defensive
capability to deter any attack from the North, United States
efforts to assist in South Korea's Force Improvement Plan (FIP)
made Korea its primary arms customer in East Asia.
D. SOUTH KOREAN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN (1977-81? 6
The South Korean government's Five Year Force Improvement
Plan (FIP) called for the expenditure of $5 billion by 1981,
to include $3.5 billion in foreign acquisition costs. The
South Koreans have asked the United States for a modernization
plan loan of about $1.5 billion stretched out over the five
year period. The Koreans will use a rough equivalent amount
of its own funds for FMS cash purchases . However it needs
the $1.5 billion financing in order to procure sufficient
arms and equipment to meet its modernization goals without
adversely affecting its own economic progress. Much of the
money for the industrial development comes from the 1976 18%
defense tax.
The program concentrates on increasing the number of
licensed production arrangements in Korea of American light
weapons, acquiring advanced fighter aircraft (F-4, F-5),
and the conversion to the Improved Hawk systems. Other
acquisitions covered under the FIP include air traffic control
and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) equipment, TOW anti-
tank missiles, helicopter gunships, air-to-air missiles,
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precision-guided munitions, air defense radars, and a tank-
upgrading program (providing M48 tanks with larger guns)
.
South Korea is also purchasing through FMS financing
artillery - locating radars, Airborne Warning and Control Air-
craft (AWAC) , night vision devices, armored personnel carriers
(APC) , anti-ship missiles, short-range surface-to-air missiles,
anti-submarine aircraft, search-and-rescue helicopters, trainer
aircraft, communications equipment, and operational and main-
tenance items. Commercial purchases will include items such
as spare parts and communications equipment.
Furthermore, more than a dozen new coastal patrol and
interdiction craft (CPIC) and two minesweepers will be built
in American shipyards. Air defense improvements included
replacing aging Honest John and Sergeant missiles with new
Lance missiles. Domestically built artillery and small arms
will be used to improve South Korean ground forces.
Because of the vast amounts of equipment being transferred
under this program, a Defense Field Office (DEFO) was estab-
lished in 1978 to replace the current joint U.S. Assistance
Advisory Group in South Korea. This DEFO manages the U.S./ROK
security assistance program by monitoring the delivery of
equipment and assisting its integration into the Korean defense
structure , 37
In order to better understand how a sale agreement between
South Korea and the United States is processed, a short
explanation is in order. A request for U. S . -manufactured arms
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or military equipment is generally channeled through the DEFO
or the South Korean embassy in Washington, D.C. to the United
States State Department, or through military channels to the
Department of Defense and then to the State Department. If
Mrs. Benson's office, the Defense Department, and the Congress
agree to the sale, the appropriate United States military
service prepares a Letter of Offer (DD Form 1513) for the
material requested. Upon acceptance of the LO by Korean
authorities, it is returned to the issuing United States
military service which in turn implements the contract in
accordance with the same procedures that govern its own procure-
ments. In the case of an arms transfer with a country other
than America, South Korea usually utilizes its embassy to act
as an intermediary .38
While the South Korean economy continues to grow and
expand, the burden of the 5-year Force Improvement Plan is
seen as a possible inhibitor to growth. The policy of high
growth rate coupled with increased defense expenditures and
high inflation which South Korea has accepted since 1974 is
beginning to take its toll. 39 The prospect of producing a
range of equipment including newer versions of the U.S. M-48
tanks, 105mm and 155mm cannon, surface-to-surface missiles,
and the complex Vulcan AA gun has given many South Korean
businessmen reasons to worry. To make it worthwhile in a
business sense, South Korea must look to exporting arms.




American patent holders who would see a South Korean arms
industry an unwelcome competitor .40
Nevertheless, South Korean businessmen have initiated a
modest but growing export industry. The South Korean
electronics industry has set an export target of $5 billion
by 1982. Recently, its shipping industry has sold four patrol
boats to Indonesia, six interceptor crafts to India, and has
had talks with Brazil and Africa on building warships. By
the end of 1977, South Korea had exported over $120 million
in arms and equipment with $110 million sold in 1977 alone. 41
(See Table 14 for a comparison of North-South arms exports.)
Table 14




multiple rocket launchers, Pakistan
artillery
multiple rocket launchers Eqypt
infantry weapons Zaire
patrol/boats/advisors Guyana
MiG 21/23 (Soviet Libya
supplied)/fIown and
serviced by N. Koreans
pilots supplied during Syria/Egypt
1973 war
various missions involving various countries
revolutions - training world
and advisors
troops, F5s, equipment South Vietnam
4 patrol boats Indonesia
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6 interceptor crafts India
electronic equipment ?
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Plans for a second FIP for the years 1982-86 is already
in the planning stages. The projected cost of this plan has
not yet been released. However, a major feature of this
program will be the co-assembly of approximately 70 Northrup
F-5 fighters and trainers. ^2 it is possible that much of
this plan will take into account the recently released
Pentagon Task Force Study of South Korea's defense capabilities.
The study, initiated in 1977, recommended the sale of more than
$8 billion in arms to South Korea to compensate for the planned
withdrawal. The study recommended, among others, that 239
jet fighters, more than 200 helicopters and observation planes,
a large number of missiles, and six destroyers be sold to the
Koreans. It further recommended U.S. assistance in the estab-
lishment of tank and helicopter production facilities . 43 it
is not known whether President Carter has committed the United
States to any of these recommendations.
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When applying American arms transfers to South Korea to
Mr. Carter's six basic controls, one sees that the guidelines
have generally been followed. However, it is likely that in
the not too distant future (perhaps 1981-82), South Korea will
be co-producing fighter aircraft (the Northrup F-5E) with the
United States. Most would have to agree that by any standards
this is a 'sophisticated' weapon and would violate the guide-
lines set under Mr. Carter's fourth basic control. Another
significant policy switch and a violation of his third basic
control, came in January, 1980 when President Carter agreed
to support efforts to build a new American fighter plane solely
for export to replace aging F-5s in service in a variety of
countries, to include South Korea . Officials said the main
factor behind the Carter policy switch was the view that unless
the United States built a new fighter to replace the aging
F-5s, the countries holding those aircraft would turn to other
sources. ^4 This action by Mr. Carter also resulted in freeing
American manufacturers to compete for billions of dollars of
orders that have been off-limits for the first years of the
Carter terms. 45
Mr. Carter's suspension of his withdrawal plan certainly
improved the relationship, for during the first two and one half
years of Mr. Carter's term in office, the climate between
Seoul and Washington could not be described as overly warm.
Marked differences in Mr. Carter's style, policy direction,
and the level of emphasis on human rights had been interpreted




During Mr. Carter's first year in office, the Korean
lobbying scandal, known as "Koreagate," attracted a great
deal of attention through the media and in Congress. Two
investigations were conducted, one by the Justice Department
and the other by the House Ethics Committee .46, South Korea's
initial refusal to comply with investigators produced a
serious strain in the relationship between Seoul and Washington
Seoul's refusal to allow the return of Tong Sun Park, who
investigators claimed was the central figure in an influence
buying scheme among U.S. Congressmen and officials, resulted
in the House Commitee on International Relations refusing to
move on Mr. Carter's proposed transfer of $800 million of
equipment to South Korea under the withdrawal compensation
plan. 47
In October 1977, the House in a unanimous vote of 407 to
adopted a resolution demanding the full cooperation of the
South Korean government in the investigation of the lobbying
scandal. 48 Senator Byrd, Senate Majority Leader, also warned
the Korean government that refusal to cooperate would cause a
negative reaction in the United States that could harm future
United States assistance to Korea. 49 Stunned by these and
other threats that Congress would use every conceivable means
to pressure Seoul, the South Korean government backed down
from its earlier intransigence.
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The Carter Administration attempted to facilitate its own
investigators while also allowing the South Korean government
to retain 'face' in the ensuing investigation. A deal was
agreed upon whereby Washington would limit the Koreagate probe
to United States involvement only, leaving both President Park
and his government out of the influence-peddling charges.
However, the Ethics Committee's chief investigator, Leon
Jaworski, and some Congressmen were not willing to let up
their pressure on Seoul to yield two diplomats, one of whom
was the former ambassador to Washi ngton. 50
Behind their persistance was the belief that if Congress
continued its tough position, as it had earlier, President
Park, faced with a choice of sending former ambassador Kim
Dong Jo to testify, or a cut in U.S. military aid, would opt
for the former. 51 Events soon proved Mr. Jaworski and the
Congress wrong in their assessment of Mr. Park. Not only was
Park opposed to such a concession, the State Department was
similarily adamant about not forcing a diplomat to testify
before any foreign government. It is ironic that these same
Congressmen who felt morally and legally right in pressuring
the former Korean ambassador testify, vilify the Iranian
militants who threaten to force our hostage diplomats to
testify before trials in Tehran.
When the Washington Post and New York Times reported
that the United States had first learned of the influence
lobbying through electronic eavesdropping of President Park's
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Blue House, the Korean government's reaction was one of
subdued anger. Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told the
Times that he had warned the State Department as early as
1970 of a covert South Korean lobby effort. He also asserted
that this Korean effort was aimed at undermining the Nixon
decision to withdraw the 7th Division from South Korea. Mr.
Laird reported that the bugging had occurred between 1967 and
1971, when South Korea had nearly 52,000 of its own troops in
Vietnam. The State Department apparently was not eager to
investigate the Korean lobby "lest it lead to complications
in the war effort." Mr. Laird also stated that he warned the
South Koreans personally that their illegal activities were
jeopardizing the American plan to spend nearly $1.5 billion
to help the 5-Year Modernization Plan initiated in 1971.-5?
Nevertheless, the aid was forthcoming and the influence buying
continued.
On 22 June, 1978 Congress finally got tough with Seoul in
a tangible manner. To show its displeasure over Seoul's
refusal to provide Kim Dong Jo for testimony, $56 million in
food aid was cut off. This action resulted in Kim resigning
as President Park's International Affairs Advisor, but it
also extinguished the last flicker of hope that he or the
South Korean government would cooperate any further with the
investigation.
Shortly after the above amendment was adopted, Representa-
tive Burton, of California, offered another amendment to cut
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off the entire military assistance program for South Korea.
However, this time Congress overwhelmingly defeated the proposal
by a 2-1 margin. Representative Stephen Solarz, of New York,
reflected the majority vote when he stated before a House
Subcommittee
:
"...the overwhelming majority of Members
of the House on a matter involving the
national interest and security recognized
that if we were to cut off all aid to South
Korea, simply because of the Koreagate
scandal, we would be cutting off our nose
in spite of our face." 54
The so-called "Koreagate" scandal ended essentially in
August 1979 when the Justice Department dropped all charges of
illegal lobbying against Tong Sun Park. Besides punishing
few of those in Congress who were implicated, the investiga-
tion failed to prevent Seoul from achieving the ultimate goal
the lobbying effort was intended for: to insure the continuance
of the large amounts of American military and economic aid. 55
Not only was South Korea receiving more and better military
equipment than in the past, but President Carter had also placed
a freeze on his withdrawal program,
F. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS LINKAGE TO ARMS TRANSFERS
Though the Koreagate issue had terminated, Mr. Carter's
interjection of "human rights" considerations into United
States foreign policy has continued. To complement Mr. Carter's
moralistic foreign policy is the 1976 Arms Export Control Act
previously mentioned in this paper. The portion of the Act
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concerned primarily with the issue of human rights is con-
tained in Section 301(a) which revised Section 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," This section defines United
States policy as being that,
"no security assistance may be provided
to any country, the government of which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized
human rights. "57
The Section further directs that the Secretary of State
must send to Congress with any military aid requests a human
rights status report on each country targeted for such aid.
If there are violations cited involving a country receiving
aid, the Secretary must describe what "extraordinary circums-
tances exist," and cite how it relates to the national interest
of the United States. 58 Even with the above reports submitted,
Congress has the right under the 1976 Act to adopt a joint
resolution curtailing or terminating military aid or sales to
countries violating human rights. However, joint resolutions
also require the President's signature to take effect. 59
Mr, Carter's emphasis on morality in foreign policy was
largely due to his perception that America needed to restore
confidence in its own democratic processes after Vietnam and
Watergate. However the perception by the authoritarian Asian
nations, to include South Korea, was that, instead of rectifying
Kissinger's "amorality," Mr. Carter had swung the United States
from one extreme, indifference, to another, over-concern, result-
ing in unacceptable interference in their internal affairs."^
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Within a short time after assuming office, however, Mr.
Carter and his advisors realized the complexities involved in
interjecting morality into foreign policy decisions. The
policy of pursuing a consistent human rights policy in South
Korea met with a number of obstacles. First, United States
security interests in Northeast Asia were still firmly tied
to a viable and strong South Korean government. Secondly, the
opposition parties in South Korea firmly opposed the United
States linking security assistance to human rights pressures,
and thirdly, the South Korean government was becoming less
willing to bow to American influence when it came to matters
they considered internal. Thus, Mr. Carter was more or less
forced to come to grips with a modified policy concerning South
Korea. In March 1977, the Asst. Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs reflected this fact when he reported before a
House Subcommittee:
"We are particularly concerned about
restrictions on political activity which
have led to the arrest of many Korean citizens
voicing peaceful opposition to the present govern-
ment. .. , At the same time, we believe it would
be a serious mistake to cut back our longstanding
assistance to the South Korean armed forces which
helps these forces better cope with the formidable
task of protecting their country against the threat
from the North. Moreover most South Koreans,
including domestic critics of the government,
strongly favor continuation of U.S. -Korean security
ties and assistance."^
When the Secretary of State Vance testified before Congress
in 1977 on countries identified as committing human rights
violations, he defended continued military assistance to South
236

Korea due to security considerations . 62 Inspite of the
administration's desires, there were some reductions in
United States aid that year as a result of American displeasure
over Seoul's human rights record. Mrs. Pat Derian, Mr. Carter's
human rights coordinator was able to block the sale of a
quantity of handcuffs to South Korea on moralistic grounds . 63
Congress also abstained on two Asian Development Bank loans
to Korea in order to express its concern about the human rights
situation. 64
Many in South Korea perceived Mr. Carter's withdrawal
program linked to the American president's human rights crusade.
Even the opposition parties could not perceive how withdrawal
of American troops from the peninsula would help their cause
or the cause of human rights in South Korea. Their reason is
two fold: one, they fear the Communist regime to the north
even more than they disliked President Park and his authoritarian
policies; and second, they felt a militarily strengthened
regime, without the restraining presence of American troops,
would "ride even more roughshod over domestic opposition than
before. "65 a good example of this is the statement made as
early as 1975 by dissident leader Kim Young Sam,
"Korea and America are long-time friends,
but if American tanks and guns are used to
suppress democracy, human rights, and freedom,
and for religious persecution, then this
becomes a very serious matter. But I cannot




Ironically, the groups in Congress opposing military aid
to Seoul on its poor human rights record strengthened President
Park's hand. Park argued that a lessening of necessary aid
required "domestic cohesion" to present a united front to
the North. 67 it also became fashionable, for the first time
in the long relationship between Seoul and Washington, for
senior officials in the Korean government to openly criticize
the United States. Culture and Information Minister, Kim
Seong Jin warned the United States,
"Koreans will never accept the fate of
the Vietnamese... People of a divided
country who have to live with threats to
their security aspire for peace many times more
ardently than people of affluent societies
without security problems... The polemics of
peace and human rights by outsiders is just
academic. We simply cannot allow ourselves
to be the object of charitable idealism and
meaningless theories or discussion. .." 68
By 1978 relations between Seoul and Washington were warming,
but still strained. Mr. Carter's advisors apparently began to
realize their approach on human rights with South Korea was
producing only strained relations. Interestingly, the State
Department's 1978 report on human rights presented a much
improved picture of the situation in South Korea. This report
was angerly denounced by a number of prominent dissidents who
accused the Carter Administration of regressing to the Kissinger
formula, i.e., over-emphasizing South Korea's security at the
expense of human rights. 69 The American officials in Seoul
privately defended the report on the grounds that a better
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image of Seoul was required to impress theCongress, which was
about to consider the 1979 military assistance bill for South
Korea. 70
The value of presenting a better image of South Korea to
the United States was not absent in President Park's considera-
tions either. Prior to his inauguration for a second six-
year term, a term he got through a revision of the South Korean
Constitution, President Park released nearly 4,000 prisoners,
one of whom was Kim Dae Jung, a key figure in South Korea's
opposition parties. This improved image was warmly ack-
nowledged by both the Administration and many in Congress.
With the Koreagate scandal all but forgotten and the supposedly
improvement of South Korea's human rights image, President
Carter announced that he would finally visit Seoul in June
1979.
The proponents of human rights and greater freedoms in
South Korea were on the whole unhappy about the visit because
they believed it would lead to greater repression by the Park
administration. They requested Mr. Carter to take a public
stand while in Seoul calling for the return of democracy to
South Korea. They pointed out that when President Ford had
expressed concern for human rights in private, the pressures
72brought to bear on the Park government were minimal. Park
reacted to this criticism by restricting most of the prominent
dissenters during the Carter visit. '^
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Mr. Carter, the third president to visit South Korea since
Park became its leader, was warmly welcomed by her people.
Mr. Carter apparently had already decided to freeze the
troop withdrawal before he arrived in Seoul. Therefore, the
visit's purpose was three-fold. The first, and primary reason
for the visit was to alleviate the South Korean and Japanese
concern over United States commitments to South Korea. He did
this by freezing the withdrawal and pledging further military
aid to South Korea. ™ The second purpose of the visit was to
attempt to reduce tensions in the peninsula by calling for
three-way talks with North Korea and South Korea. The third
reason was to apply new pressure on Seoul for human rights
reform.
He did the latter by lecturing President Park on a live
telecast broadcast to the entire South Korea countryside. Mr.
Carter called for the need to ease restrictions contained in
the Yushin Constitution and the supporting Emergency Decree
Number 9 which prohibited any criticism of the government
outside the National Assembly building. Mr. Carter cited that
the economic progress achieved by the South Koreans could be
"matched by similar progress through the realization of basic
human aspirations in political and human rights, "75 By saying
so publicly, Mr. Carter didn't repeat the mistake he had made
with the Shah of Iran. South Korea, unlike Iran, was not told
it was such an indispensable factor in United States strategic
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thinking that America would continue providing him a "blank
check on the human rights issue."'
The South Koreans were not happy over the lecture nor
could they comprehend Mr. Carter's seemingly two-path logic on
human rights. As one Seoul official put it:
"Sometimes it seems the U.S. asks
much more of its friends than of countries
that do not even try to measure up to
American ideas on things like human rights. "77
Nevertheless, Seoul responded to Mr. Carter's not so subtle
pressure by releasing 86 dissidents later in the month. '°
The improving relationship was shattered in October when the
Park influenced National Assembly expelled opposition leader
Kim Young Sam. The United States showed its displeasure by
recalling Ambassador Glysteen, the first such recall since
the Kennedy Admin istr^aJ^i0nT,^—
»
Two days later, serious rioting broke out in Pusan and
Masan. Martial law was declared and the student demonstrations
were put down by force. This violence was coincided by the
visit of Defense Secretary Brown and the return of Ambassador
Glysteen. Arriving for the annual U.S. -South Korean security
review, Brown presented President Park with a strongly worded
letter from President Carter complaining about Seoul's failure
to improve its human rights record. 80
Though Secretary Brown delivered the letter, he obviously
was not willing to involve the United States in the internal
problems of Seoul. His primary mission to South Korea was
to discuss upgrading both countries' defense forces on the
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Korean peninsula. For the Koreans, Mr, Brown's visit was
quite lucrative. Not only did Brown agree to allow South Korea
to co-produce the Northrup F-5E, he also promised significant
strengthening of the American forces stationed in South
Korea. Besides deploying AWACS, Orion P-3 long range anti-
submarine patrol planes, and a squadron of Air Force A-10
attack fighters, all to be accomplished by 1981, he promised
adding two artillery battalions and more helicopters to the
2nd Division. The only disappointment for Seoul was the
disapproval of any U.S. submarine transfers. '
Of equal significance, Secretary Brown stated twice for
emphasis during the conference that "the security of the
Republic of Korea is vital to the security of the U.S." This
was in part to refute an earlier suggestion by U.S. Ambassador
to Japan Mike Mansfield "that South Korea was outside the
American defense perimeter in the Pacific." 82 According to
both American and South Korean sources, Secretary Brown's
emphasis on this issue ended Washington's ability to use the
only real influence (security assistance) it has over Presi-
dent Park's internal policies. Though his intentions were
well stated, the bottom line showed that President Carter's
human rights policy influenced South Korea only minimally. Due
to a varietal of reasons, security interests probably being the
most important, security assistance and the vast majority of
arms transfers made were not affected by the human rights
issue. By looking at the record of arms transfers to South
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Korea made from 1977 (See Table 17), there seems to be little
if any linkage between Mr. Carter's human rights policy and
his security assistance program.
The Carter style of implementing stated policy has
disturbed and perplexed American allies in Asia. United States
credibility in Asia has been determined as much by the events
outside Asia as within. The Carter foreign policy failures
in Iran and the Middle East, the giving-up of the Panama Canal,
and the sudden abrogation of the Mutual Defense Agreement
between the Republic of China and the U.S. without prior con-
sultation or advice from allies does not contribute toward
the belief that the U.S. will stand by its commitments in
Asia. The fact that President Carter announced the U.S. troop
withdrawal plan without prior consultations with Japan
angered leaders in Tokyo, who are as much concerned with
84
stability on the Korean peninsula as are South Koreans.
<~
Asian allies may have been even more disturbed over a
1979 disclosure that the United States had planned a clandes-
tine removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea
85
without notifying either Japan or South Korea.
The secret plan, designed to bypass not only Asian allies
but also Congress and the U.S. military, was formulated by
a small Carter transition team in 1976. The group, whose
membership supposedly included Richard Holbrooke, currently
Assistant Secretary of State for Pacific and East Asian Affairs,
Les Gelb, former director of Political-Military Affairs at the
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State Department, and Peter Bourne, formerly head of the White
House drug program, formulated a plan to secretly replace all
American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea with dummy
warheads . °" This group also formulated the initial troop
withdrawal plan. Once in office, President Carter ordered the
Pentagon to act on both decisions. President Carter made it
very clear he was not looking for discussion on the decision -
just implementation. The Joint Chiefs, appalled at the nuclear
decision, threatened to "leak" the plan to the press and Congress
if the President stuck with his decision. The President relented
and the weapons stayed in Korea. When analyzing this story, it
is no wonder why Mr. Carter had been tough on military criticism
in the early years of his administration.
G. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
The only nuclear weapons known to be located on the peninsula
are maintained and controlled by the United States. Though their
presence has acted as an integral facet of the U.S. "nuclear
umbrella" in Northeast Asia, South Korea has been the only Asian
ally willing to permit their deployment on indigenous soil. The
Carter administration, as part of the withdrawal plan and nuc-
lear non-proliferation efforts, had considered removing the land-
based weapons. However, even if this would have been accomplished,
the United States would still have had a formidable nuclear
arsenal of about 192 weapons in South Korea. 87 The table below





































8"(M-110) 28 2 56 lkt
155mm(M-109) 76 2 152 lkt
Surface to Air
Missiles
Nike-Hercules 144 1 144 5kt
Surface to
Surface Mis- 4 20 80 lOOkt
siles Honest
John
Sergeant 2 6 12 lOOkt
Atomic Mines 25-50 1 25-50 5kt
TOTALS 327-352 661-686
Nuclear Weapons
^Estimates based on the following methodology: Nuclear capable
systems in Korea were identified and then, using estimates
based on European load and reload experience, a total for each
system was computed.
**The Hiroshima bomb was 15 kt.
South Korea's policies toward the acquisition of nuclear
arms has reflected the changing environment in Northeast Asia
and its threat perceptions. When the United States had substantial
troops present, to include the above nuclear weapons, the desire
for nuclear arms was usually dormant. However, when the United
States began talking about withdrawing troops, or the percep-
tion of United States defense credibility began to erode, South
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Korea had given serious consideration to developing a nuclear
weapon capability. Such was the case shortly following the last
major withdrawal of United States troops in 1971 and again in
1975 following the fall of South Vietnam. South Korean's fear
of being abandoned by the United States had strengthened the
advocates of nuclear arms in Seoul in each of the above instances.
Thus, in the period between the 1971-72 withdrawal of the 7th
U.S. Infantry Division and the fall of Saigon, Seoul had ini-
tiated a series of efforts to obtain its own nuclear weapons
capability.
At that time, President Park established an ad hoc "Weapons
Exploitation Committee" to begin researching the feasibility of
building a nuclear weapon. This group approached Canada, South
Africa, and France with proposals to purchase commercial reac-
tors and nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Israel was also
approached with a proposal to buy Gabriel surface-to-surface
91 ...
missiles. In the meantime, on April 23. six days before the
fall of Saigon, South Korea had signed the Mon-Froliferation
Treaty under pressure from both the State Department and Congress,
who had threatened to defer financing of a nuclear reactor. 9 ^
The Communist victory in Vietnam, though probably expected,
was difficult to accept in Seoul. Shortly after this impressive
event, President Park was quoted as having said:
"If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be
removed, we would have to start developing ai-emovea ia n x x x a iopi]
nuclear capability to save ourselves. "^
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In reality, President Park, as seen in the events listed above,
had already taken that step. Some members of Congress had
already expressed concern that South Korea might embark on such
a project. Representative Les Aspin, of Wisconsin, demanded
that shipments of enriched uranium needed to fuel South Korea's
two research reactors be halted, asserting that the plutonium
94by-products would be utilized in atomic weapons.
The work done by Park's "Weapons Exploitation Committee"
was uncovered in 19?6 by a special United States intelligence
group organized to track down nations with covert nuclear weapons
programs. Upon learning of the South Korean plan, President
Ford had pressured Seoul into cancelling both the French proces-
sing plant and Israeli missile deals. By threatening to with-
hold export licenses and Export-Import Bank financing for a second
nuclear reactor, South Korea was persuaded not to purchase the
small pilot fuel-reprocessing plant from France. The United
States also arranged with Canada to hold up a sale of a "Candu"
96
reactor to Seoul. Furthermore, the United States persuaded
France to sign an agreement with South Korea stipulating that no
material furnished by France shall:
"be used for the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or to further any other military
purpose or for the manufacture of any other
nuclear explosive device . " 97
Though the Ford Administration's actions were severe regard-
ing Seoul's nuclear dabblings, the large amount of security
assistance promised that year coupled with a renewed statement
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of commitment to South Korean defense needs eased Seoul's security
apprehensions somewhat. It is also important to remember that
South Korea had acquired in 1975 "the means to manufacture a
land-based delivery system when it purchased the complete
Lockheed facility for manufacturing solid-fuel rocket motors.
When the Arms Export Control Act was being formulated in
1976, Senator Stuart Symington added an amendment which has
great significance to South Korea if she decides to again
pursue a nuclear arms capability. The Symington Amendment
required two conditions be met by any country desiring economic
and/or military assistance if that country were also receiving
any equipment, materials, or technology for enriching uranium
or reprocessing nuclear fuel. First, the recipient had to
place delivered items under multilateral control and manage-
ment when available, and second, the country had to agree to
place all such items and all other fuel and facilities under the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEC) safeguards. If any
of the above conditions were violated, aid was to be cut off
unless the President certified in writing to the Congress that
such a termination of aid would adversely affect the security
of the United States, and that the violating country would agree
not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.
°
When the Carter Administration announced its withdrawal
program, Seoul found itself once again questioning American
intentions on remaining a viable presence on the peninsula.
And once again, the proponents of nuclear weapons were being heard
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in Seoul. During the negotiations over the withdrawal program
between South Korean defense officials, United States Under-
Secretary of State Philip Habib and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs George Brown, the Koreans demanded that the nuclear
weapons be handed over to the Korean forces rather than be
withdrawn with the 2nd Division. Habib and General Brown
QQ
refused to even discuss nuclear weapons. When they informed
the Koreans that land-based missiles would be pulled out with
the ground troops, the South Korean Foreign Ministry let it be
known that
:
"Although we do not intend to develop
nuclear arms,... (and) despite the conclusion
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we
have the right to take whatever steps are
appropriate, irregardless of the conclusion
of international treaties or agreements. .." TOO
Perhaps even more significant than the statement of a Korean
government official was the view told the staff of the United
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a leader of the
official opposition in the Korean National Assembly. He
warned that his party might support the demand of some members
of the ruling party that South Korea begin building its own
nuclear weapons. 101
Though South Korea has presently stated it does not intend
to conduct any nuclear weapons production at the present, it
is still necessary to look at the requirements necessary for
either Koreas to attain the capability to produce nuclear arms,
and their present capacity to do so. Three major factors -
fissile materials, weapons fabrication, and delivery systems -
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are essential to the development of nuclear weapons. Of the
three factors, acquisition of fissile materials in suitable
amounts and suitable quality is probably the major problem in
producing atomic weapons. Of the three types of fissile materials
commonly utilized, only plutonium -239 (Pu-239) is presently
affordable and is available to South Korea. As for North
Korea, it is at least 6-10 years behind South Korea's develop-
ment and should be considered in such a context as South Korea's
potentials are discussed.
In order to produce military grade plutonium, a chemical
reprocessing plant or a separation plant is necessary. In
South Korea, development of fuel-recovery technology has been
a top-priority project since 1976. Thus, if South Korea desired
to invest $1-3 million, it could build a separation plant within
one to two years with the capability of producing enough Pu-239
per year for two or three explosive devices. Moreover, South
Korea possesses a sufficient amount of skilled and technically
trained personnel to man such a project. Even in North Korea,
this process may be accomplished, though on a smaller scale. '^
As for delivery capacities, both countries possess a
variety of delivery modes. South Korea has both F-4 fighter
bombers, which can be adapted to carry tactical warheads, and
an indigenously produced surface-to-surface ballistic missile
capable of hitting Pyongyang from inside South Korea. North
Korea has light bombers (11-28) and MiG-21 fighter bombers.
It also has an unguided ballistic missile, the FR0G-5.
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Therefore, as described above, both North and South Korea
have the capacity, if they choose, to go nuclear. However,
there are important disincentives for the future proliferation.
The most important disincentive is the hostile reaction by the
other four actors in the peninsula - the United States, the
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and of course,
Japan. The pressures that the United States might exert on
South Korea have already been discussed (Symington Amendment)
.
However, in order to be able to exert such influence, the
relationship, economically, politically, and militarily,
between Seoul and Washington must remain strong. Recent history
has not shown the Soviet Union nor China willing to help a small
client state attain an independent nuclear capability. Further-
more, it is likely that each would oppose the other from doing
bo..104
Another disincentive would be cost. According to a United
Nations report on proliferation, the ten-year cost of a small
nuclear force would run approximately $2-7 billion. Con-
sidering the burden national defense expenditures has had on
both countries in recent years, the cost of such a program
would be obviously prohibitive. As for incentive to go
nuclear, the only one worthy of mention is enhanced security.
However, that enhanced security may only be illusory. Aliena-
tion from the "big brother" suppliers may, in fact, be detri-




How does the transfer of conventional arms tie in with
possible nuclear weapons proliferation? Various analysts
suggest that the provision of arms and security assistance,
supported by the "nuclear umbrella" and defense pacts, is the
most effective means to prevent nuclear proliferation in the
Korean peninsula. Conversely, the denial of conventional arms
due to policy restraint could force South Korea, at least, to
go nuclear. Once the country acquires nuclear arms, the
more difficult, and less advisable it would be for suppliers to
restrict conventional arms transfers. The result may be an
open-ended arms race, in which the supplier is caught in the
middle
.
In this chapter, covering mainly the Carter years, we have
looked at the impact the Carter Administration has had on South
Korea via its arms control policy, its human rights policy and
the withdrawal program. Additionally, we have seen the United
States Congress begin to assert its influence on arms transfers
and military assistance programs to Korea, with Koreagate,
perhaps, the prime catalyst for this increased interest. Final-
ly, the factor of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula
was discussed. A final section must deal with how some of these
factors and issues have affected the relationships between the
other major actors. The previous chapter had already discussed
the triangular relationship of China, the Soviet Union, and
North Korea. Of equal importance, however, is the state of




Mr. Carter's changed perceptions and mistrust toward the
Soviets due to their opportunism and aggression in South Asia
has placed a chill on detente and has affected American policy
whereever East meets West. This current strain in relations
was not however, on the horizon three years ago. Detente was
as strong as it had ever been when President Carter met with
Premier Erezhnev in Vienna to sign the SALT II Treaty. Rela-
tions with the People's Republic were steadily moving toward
normalization. The Chinese were warning the United States of
Soviet duplicity in SALT II; but, the Chinese were always
crying "wolf" when it came to the Soviets. Sino-Japanese rela-
tions were also progressing smoothly, much to the chagrin of
the Soviets. It must have appeared an opportune time for Mr.
Carter to pull out American troops. The situation on the
Korean peninsula seemed stable and the international arena showed
few problems for the United States except in the Middle East
where Carter's personal diplomacy seemed to be bringing the
Israelis and Fgyptians toward peace.
However, Mr. Carter's announcement of intent to withdraw
the 2nd Division from Korea was met with both concern and
resentment by Japan; resentment over the fact that the surprise
announcement was made by Vice-President Mondial e without consult-
ing with Tokyo, and concern over the sharp change in United
States policy toward Korea. Mr. Carter had not learned a very
important lesson from one of his predecessors, Richard Nixon.
Mr. Nixon's disregard for the importance of cooperation with
253

Japan in the task of creating a new network of constructive
relationships with the Soviet Union and China had been con-
sidered a serious flaw in the execution of successful American
diplomacy. 10 °
Soon after Mr. Carter's election win in November 1976
the Japanese Ambassador to Washington had publicly and official-
ly stated the Japanese government's opposition to any withdrawal
move. But when Mr. Carter took office, his "consultations"
consisted only of calling Prime Minister Fukuda and stressing
(among other items discussed) the need for close Japan-United
States consultations on the military situation in South Korea. '09
It must be remembered that Japanese defense policy is based on
three basic assumptions: 1) the effective functioning of the
Japan-United States Security Treaty; 2) a gradual increase in
Japan's self-defense capabilities; and 3) continuation of the
status quo in Northeast Asia, i.e., continued Sino-Soviet
tension, continued detente between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and a maintenance of a basic military balance in
Korea. 110
Therefore, the attitude of Japan must be taken in the
context of utmost importance when considering changing the status
quo in Northeast Asia. The principal justification for the
American defense commitment to South Korea has been the con-
tinued viability of Japan and its economic importance to the
United States. Following the fall of Saigon, many Japanese
leaders were questioning American defense commitments to Japan
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and to other American allies in Asia. While watching with
apprehension the growth of a great Russian Pacific Fleet,
Japan saw the American Navy decrease almost as significantly.
It was in this context that Japan received from Washington,
the official decision to withdrawal all its ground combat
forces from Korea by 1981. The problem Japan faced until mid-
1979 was how to adjust to this new situation in Northeast
Asia.' 12
While Japanese-American relations were somewhat strained
over the withdrawal issue, Sino-American relations continued
to improve. At the same time the Sino-Soviet dispute was
focusing its attention on Southeast Asia. Border clashes
between Cambodia and Vietnam escalated into a state of open war.
Relations between Vietnam and China became severely strained
over Hanoi's actions against overseas Chinese living in Vietnam.
The Soviet Union, unwilling to allow its new client state to be
influenced by any Chinese threat, signed a treaty of peace and
113friendship with Vietnam on November 3» 1978. Essentially,
a quasi-military alliance, the implications, as perceived by
China, Japan, and the United States, were grave indeed.
The Soviet-American detente began its downward trend when
the Soviets ignored American warnings to stay out of Southeast
Asia. At the same time America and China were on the verge of
normalizing relations. Ey establishing closer relations with
China than with the Soviet Union, both Japan and the United
States were abandoning the concept of tripolarism for bipolarism
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The Soviet Union perceived these moves as a heavy blow to its
114
efforts of collective encirclement of China in Asia. It
was now more important than ever for the Soviet Union to
maintain ties with North Korea.
On Christmas day, 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia with over
100,000 regulars. As of this writing, those forces still
remain in Cambodia. This invasion of Cambodia resulted in
11
5
China beginning to prepare for its own incursion into Vietnam.
"
J
Vietnam's invasion greatly irritated and embarrassed the
Japanese, who were providing economic assistance at the time.
Tokyo froze this aid for less than three months in protest,
a move deeply criticized by the Americans and many Asians as
insufficient. Tokyo was finding itself increasingly entangled
in international political confrontations its post-war diplomacy
had long sought to avoid. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Ohira,
initially slow to respond, began to respond to these external
1 1 fipressures by applying regional Realpolitik. North Korea in
a surprise move openly criticized Vietnam, accusing it of
"dominationism, " a North Korean code-word referring to the
Soviet Union. This action clearly allied Pyongyang with China.
Six days later, on 1 January 1979. the United States and
the People's Republic climaxed their rapprochment by official-
ly normalizing relations. Hoping that this new relationship
might facilitate a lessening of tensions in Korea, Mr. Carter
approached Deng Xiaoping on the subject when he visited
Washington in late January. However, Deng refused to commit
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himself, mostly out of fear that the unpredictable Kim II -Sung
would feel alienated and move closer to the Soviets. When
the United States recognized the People's Republic, it also de-
recognized the Republic of China. Though the event was known
well in advance, South Korea had to have been profoundly
impressed by the ease of President Carter's abrogation of the
Mutual Defense Treaty with the government on Taiwan.
Events in South Asia were also producing strains on
American credibility and the Soviet-American detente. When the
American backed Shah's regime was overthrown in February,
repercussions must have been felt throughout Northeast Asia.
Here was a strong ally of the United States, overthrown with-
out the United States doing anything tangible to come to the
Shah's aid. One can be certain that President Park had some
serious contemplations over this turn of events. The similar-
ities of politics and military structure between Iran and
South Korea were many.
On February 17. 1979 China carried out its pledge to
"punish" Vietnam, when Chinese forces crossed the Vietnamese
border on a ^50 mile front.'' 8 This Chinese invasion deeply
embarrassed the United States and tainted the image of "peace-
T19loving" Chinese. The Soviet Union angerily denounced the
United States as being in collusion with China. President
Carter, very concerned about a Soviet intervention on behalf
of its Vietnamese ally, saw the potentiality of a Sino-Soviet
war. If this occurred, North Korea would surely be tempted to
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launch its own invasion southward. Thus, perhaps based on
this scenario, the updated intelligence estimate of North
Korean tank and personnel strength, and pressure by some Congress-
men, it was no wonder the proposed troop withdrawal was put into
deep freeze.
Because of the above events, the Carter Administration
began to take a new look at Asia and to formulate a policy based
on two goals: 1) to prevent any non-Communist nation from
being drawn into the intra-Communist wars and disputes, and 2)
to protect United States political and economic interests in
1 20Asia. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke told the Koreans that
the new policy meant the United States would "maintain an ability
to react in a region and will remain deeply involved. "-
The assassination of President Park Chung Hee , and the sub-
sequent battle for power in South Korea cast uncertainty over
the future stability of that country and the region. Upon
notification of the assassination, President Carter placed all
U.S. troops in Korea on alert and warned North Korea that the
United States would "react strongly" to any outside attempt to
1 7 7
exploit the situation in the South.
A subsequent military coup on 12 December again changed the
leadership of South Korea. When the coup leaders unilaterally
deployed several battalions of South Korean troops in support
of the coup, troops that were at the time under the control
of the UN Commander, General John A. Wickham, the United States




would be no further actions of this type. ° Whether these
generals will allow the United States to pressure them into
stepping down from power still remains to be seen.
The North Korean reaction to the leadership changes in
Seoul was one of restraint. In early January, however,
Pyongyang requested resumption of the stalled North-South Talks.
Seoul later agreed to send representatives and renew the talks.
With Kim's succession issue and continued problems for the North
Korean economy in the horizon, analysts will be watching with
interest the upcoming (October) 6th Congress of the Worker's
Party. 124
United States - Soviet detente, which is applied selectively
by the Soviets according to its judgement of the gains and losses
in a given situation, was gravely affected by the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in December. Also because of this invasion, talks
between China and the Soviet Union have been suspended. The
relationships throughout Northeast Asia have largely polarized
due to this Soviet aggression. Only North Korea appears to have
manipulated the situation to its benefit. The reports that Kim
may receive advanced MiG-23 fighters in return for allowing
Moscow to establish a naval base in North Korea is indeed ominous
for the future stability of the region.
The Korean peninsula, due to its strategic geopolitical
position remains a crucial area in the manipulation and main-
tenance of the new balance of powers systems in the East Asia/
Western Pacific region. American actions there, whether to stay
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or to depart, will be carefully weighed around the world and
will significantly influence the judgement on whether or not
America is retreating from its free world responsibilities or
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VI. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. REFLECTIONS
By 1946 the two post-war powers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, had established themselves as the protec-
tors, de facto governors, and major suppliers of arms and
security assistance to the Korean people. Much has happened
the past 35 years to change that situation. And though this
change in environment has been caused by the interaction of
many factors, the flow of arms and military assistance to the
peninsula has been one of the more important impacting
variables .
Since the early 1950s the parameters or constants of the
Korean milieu have been two-fold. First, the motives behind
arms transfers and security assistance have remained relative-
ly unchanged. The suppliers desire to continue the patron-
client relationship by binding the Koreans to them through
trade, economic aid, arms transfers, and security assistance.
In their view, this relationship contributes to the well-being
of both supplier and recipient. It also ensures a relative
balance of power and provides a level of influence over
independent actions which could threaten the status quo or
stability of the region. The other constant present is the
volatility of the relationship between North and South Korea.
This continuous North-South confrontation is the parameter in
which all other interactions have revolved, especially the
phenomena of arms transfer and security assistance.
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As seen in the previous chapters, various factors have
influenced the flow of arms and military assistance to North
and South Korea. Perhaps, the two most influential factors
affecting this influx are the changing threat perceptions of
the major power suppliers and the perception of their recip-
ient client as to the willingness of these powers to continue
the supply. The amounts of arms transferred and the level of
technology inherent in those transfers have, in turn, affected
or impacted upon the stability of the region, the supplier-
recipient relationships, and the viability of the recipient
nations' economies.
Reflecting upon the past 35 years of security assistance
provided the two Koreas, one sees that the suppliers' interests
have been and will continue to be the dominant factors in their
provision of military arms and aid. Because the threat of armed
conflict has not diminished significantly since the Korean Con-
flict, the supplier and recipient states' security interests
have been tied to the maintenance of a military equilibrium. To
maintain this equilibrium, a classic example of hegemonic supply
and demand had developed.
The United States has played the key role in the protection
of South Korea since the end of World War II. Although security
assistance to South Koreans prior to and during the Korean War
was comparatively moderate when stacked against Soviet material
assistance to the North, it must be remembered that it was the
United States which provided the largest combat contingent under
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the United Nations force structure. After the armistice, a
Mutual Defense Treaty was signed with Seoul pledging a con-
tinued American commitment to South Korea's defense.
This continuing commitment to defend the viability of
South Korea has been predicated on a pattern of American
strategic policies in Asia and elsewhere in the world. From
Truman and Eisenhower's policy of containment, through Kennedy
and Johnson's policies of flexible response, to the Nixon Doc-
trine advocating increased self-defense efforts by allies,
American policy • toward Asia, and especially Northeast Asia,
has been affected by changing threat perceptions. When the
threat perception shifted, usually the policy of arms aid and
transfer was also shifted to match the change in environment.
The United States has always considered its national
interests best served when there has been peace and access
in Asia. However, the experience of the Korean War had made
the United States wary of any future involvement in another
land war in Asia. Because the American perceived threat was
external, i.e., the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China, the threat of massive retaliation was thought sufficient
to prevent such an involvement. But the effectiveness of
American nuclear deterrence also required a commitment to
provide the means to friendly Asian allies to defend them-
selves against their smaller communist neighbors. Therefore,
besides the mutual defense treaty, South Korea began to be





Shortly following the Korean War, approximately one-
third of the total American security assistance to the Far
East went to South Korea. This massive infusion of arms and
military aid, mostly on a grant aid basis, was to significant-
ly contribute to a successful South Korean economic resurgence.
Though the majority of weapons provided South Korea were WW II
surplus, obsolete, or second-hand, the military equation in
the peninsula remained balanced, primarily by the presence of
two American combat divisions and a small number of air squadrons
When the Kennedy administration shifted the threat per-
ception from external to internal and focused attention on
Southeast Asia, major weapons transfers to South Korea initial-
ly decreased. However, in the latter half of the 1960s, largely
due to the quid pro quo South Vietnam deployment agreement,
South Korea enjoyed a significantly increased infusion of
military aid from the United States.
The most dramatic shift in United States' threat percep-
tion and the correlating change in security assistance policy
developed as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This dis-
integration of cohesiveness within the communist bloc produced
a rearrangement in the pseudo alliances of Asia, a reassessment
of American policy toward the People's Republic of China, and
che subsequent Nixon Doctrine.
America's Vietnam experience also contributed to this
readjustment in security strategy. Once again, American policy
makers were focusing attention toward Northeast Asia and the
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Korean peninsula. South Korea became the last mainland Asian
state where an American presence continued. In accordance
with the Nixon Doctrine of providing the means necessary for
self-defense, South Korea was able to enjoy an increased
input of American made weapons. Significant during this
period was the influx of sophisticated aircraft and missiles
systems. Equally important, Seoul was able to place even
greater emphasis on building its economy without diverting
vast resources to defense. North Korea, not as free to
allocate funds to the domestic sector, found itself falling
behind Seoul in the economy race.
The fall of Saigon in 1975 sent shock waves throughout
the capitals of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Though the
United States was quick to reassure its allies with continued
security commitments, this event signified to them the end of
Pax Americana in Asia. The pursuit of self-reliance was seen
by South Korea as the most effective way to preclude paral-
leling the course taken by the Saigon government.
While Seoul was planning and implementing its military
modernization programs, the American mood toward Korea was
undergoing change. The relationship between America and South
Korea had been characterized by a series of ups and downs
since the Korean War. By the early 1970s the mood was
definitely on a down swing. Americans were asking why the
United was supporting a government which was decreasing
fundamental human liberties, which resorted to kidnapping
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and incarcerations to stifle public criticism, and which
resorted to illegal influence buying to gain continued or
increased military and economic aid. The Ford administra-
tion found itself in a serious quandary. On one hand an
allied and free South Korea was considered essential to the
overall strategic security system of Northeast Asi a - a
system established primarily to protect Japan and U.S.
interests in the area. On the other hand, the United States
would be hypocritical of its own image as the defender of
freedom's basic rights if it did not attempt to influence
Seoul to follow a more democratic orientation.
How to influence or pressure Seoul into acquiescing to
America's varied demands almost became an obsession with part
of the United States Congress. However, by the mid 1970s,
the polity in South Korea had become highly centralized and
was no longer willing to bow unhesitatingly to American pres-
sure. The results were increased emphasis on movement toward
self-reliance for South Korea and a hostile Congress more than
willing to punish Seoul's actions with aid cut-offs. America's
mood swung back again in support of Seoul when North Korean
soldiers murdered two American officers at Panmunjom in August
1976. Though many critics still wondered why it has taken
South Korea so long to establish an ability to defend itself
without the need of American ground troop presence, more
security assistance than ever before was provided to Seoul
along with a pledge by the Ford administration to retain
ground troops in South Korea.
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President Carter's decision to withdraw those ground
forces confirmed to Seoul their suspicions that new American
strategic thinking had downgraded the Korean peninsula's
military importance. President Park's government bargained
skillfully and forcefully over the terms of the withdrawal.
The resulting compensation promised Seoul was enormous in
its context. Though President Carter had campaigned on human
rights, arms control and the restitution of morality into
American foreign policy, the level of influence on South Korea
became increasingly limited. Mr. Carter discovered campaign
promises often are unkept due to the reality of the situation.
When the Carter administration made it clear to all parties
concerned that a free and allied South Korea was an integral
part of United States security interests, the swing back to
"Real politik" was confirmed. Inherent in such a policy
switch was the knowledge in both Seoul and Washington that
the supply of arms would continue no matter what the internal
environment in South Korea, and that military aid would not, or
more realistically, could not be used as an effective influence
tool.
The year 1979 proved an eventful and momentous year for
South Korea. The Republic of Korea had turned 31 years old.
While wracked by mounting inflation, domestic unrest, and a
number of changes in leadership, the commitment by the United
States to support and help defend South Korea was as strong as
it had ever been.
277

While South Korea has been strongly bound to the
United States due to its supplier-recipient relationship,
North Korea since 1953 has followed a policy of greater in-
dependence in its dealings with the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China. Though this line of equidistance
has resulted in minor diversification in weapon sources,
varied influx, and occasional economic hardship, it has
also given Kim Il-Sung the ability to maintain a degree of
autonomy in the Socialist camp.
During the most intense period of the cold war, the
Korean War, North Korea was the only developing country that
received significant amounts of arms on a grant basis from
the Soviet Union. The peak year was 1953. Following the
armistice, the Soviets continued support to Pyongyang, but
with restraint. This restraint was a function of Khrushchev's
policy of peaceful coexistence, which basically meant avoid-
ing military confrontation with the United States. In
essence then, the Soviet military aid to North Korea following
the war was designed to do no more than maintain the balance
between North and South. This assistance was also provided
to exert some influence over the North Koreans and to restrain
any precipitous action that might involve the Soviets as par-
ticipants in another conflict on the peninsula. In accordance




North Korea, unlike its southern adversary, possessed
the option of diversification. Because of the developing
Sino-Soviet dispute, North Korea became the beneficiary of
competitive support as well as the target of competitive
pressure. Kim became very adroit at playing one supplier
off the other. When Soviet tactics became unacceptable
during Khrushchev's anti-cult attacks and later accommodation
with the West over Cuba, North Korea's allegiance swung
toward China. Unwilling to accept this defection, the Soviets
chose to punish North Korea with the most potent influence tool
it possessed short of armed force, the total cut off of
military aid in 1962.
The effects of this action on Pyongyang were varied and
mostly adverse in nature. The cut off of military aid most
affected the economic programs and growth rate of North Korea.
To sustain both a growing economy and a growing military
capacity, Pyongyang had relied considerably on outside aid,
nearly all of it from Moscow or the Soviet influenced Eastern
European states. The subsequent failure of Kim's Seven Year
Economic Plan caused not only domestic hardships, but also
allowed South Korea to catch up and surpass the North in
economic growth.
The Soviets were also losers in this punishment strategy.
Not only was their level of influence substantially reduced,
Pyongyang began siding with Peking on a number of issues
contrary to Soviet viewpoints. Peking also became Pyongyang's
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sole supplier of arms during this period. Though Chinese aid
was substantial and relatively free of the political strings
the Russians had attached, the level of sophistication was
considerably lower than the previously supplied Soviet arms.
Moreover, Chinese economic development was no further along
than North Korea's. These factors convinced Kim Il-Sung
that North Korea, like China, had to move toward total self-
sufficiency. This period marked the beginning of what would
later become an impressive indigenous arms industry, capable
of producing nearly every weapon required in the North's ar-
senal, less sophisticated aircraft and electronics.
When Soviet aid was resumed in 1965, the Russians found
a more independently minded North Korea. Soviet influence
would never be as it was prior to 1962. Though the Soviet
Union continued to be in East Asia, it was not considered of
it. It lacked the cultural and historic ties with North Korea
that China enjoyed. It possessed a past history of aggression
in Northeast Asia, to include the Korean peninsula. And
because of its heavy handedness it its dealings with North
Korea during the Khrushchev years, the Soviets gained a
reputation of not playing fair with a socialist state. The
Soviets, however, did learn from their mistake of cutting
military aid to North Korea. In the future, when Pyongyang
was seen as clearly in the Chinese camp, Moscow would con-
tinue to supply arms and military aid; if for any reason, to
continue a toe-hold in the Korean peninsula.
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Following the anxious years during China's Cultural
Revolution, North Korea once again was wooed by both its
large Communist neighbors. Throughout the latter 1960s and
the 1970s, arms transfers and military aid to North Korea would
be a primary factor in the Sino-Soviet competition for in-
fluence over Pyongyang. It must be understood that though
the Sino-Soviet competition was the primary vehicle that
facilitated the flow of arms to North Korea, events in and
out of Asia also had an effect.
The American and South Korean involvement in South
Vietnam significantly enhanced North Korea's threat percep-
tion of its southern neighbor. The proliferation of Vietnam
related weapon technology had a significant impact on the
increase of weapons technology to the Korean peninsula. When
the quid pro quo arms transfers to South Korea included
sophisticated weapons systems such as F-4 fighter aircraft,
the Soviets were pressured to quickly counter with an equiva-
lent system. Previously, North Korean requests for arms were
made to attain superiority over South Korean forces , or
parity with American systems deployed in Korea. Now, for
the first time, South Korea possessed a more sophisticated
combat aircraft than the North had. These events marked the
end of the suppliers reluctance to provide first-line weapons
systems. The trend was toward qualitative imports. Sophis-
ticated systems brought into the peninsula by one supplier
would be matched by comparative systems transferred to the
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other side's client state. This situation did not result
in an all-out arms race, however, There remained correspond-
ing restraint by all the major suppliers in the technology
level of fighter aircraft, missile systems, and tanks. Of
course, total prohibition of nuclear weapons transfer was
also adhered to by the suppliers.
Since 1973 the Chinese had become Kim's major suppliers
of arms and aid. Soviet-North Korean relations had become
strained due to a number of reasons. These included the
inability of Pyongyang to make good on Soviet loans, the
lack of Soviet support for Kim's reunification policy, and
Soviet-American detente. Following the 1975 communist
victory in Vietnam, Kim Il-Sung made a highly visible trip
to Peking to gain Chinese support for a similar action in
Korea. However, the Chinese were willing to support only a
peaceful reunification program, and reportedly denied Kim's
request for more advanced weapons.
The culminating Sino-American rapprochement, the nor-
malization of relations between Peking and Tokyo, the lack
of total Chinese and Soviet support, and the growing economic
and military viability of South Korea were factors clearly
hindering Kim's unification objective. The military equa-
tion in the peninsula was perceived as becoming less favor-
able for North Korea as time went on. Even with his massive
arms build-up beginning in the early 1970s, Kim's primary
obstacle to a march south was the continued presence of
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American troops. Mr. Carter's announced plan for withdrawing
this obstacle must have delighted Kim. However, it soon
became apparent that not only were the South Koreans and
Japanese unhappy over such a proposal, but Kim's two primary
allies and arms supporters were hinting in private that they
too were not happy to see American presence withdrawn.
There appears to have been a certain structural stability
in the relationship among the three major powers and suppliers
concerned with Korea. Though none of these three saw the
situation as totally satisfactory, all three have found them-
selves unwilling or unable to push too hard for changes.
They fear the status quo would be radically altered causing
adverse reactions for not only regional stability, but also
in established relations among themselves. In recent years,
in large part due to American military and economic assistance,
the Republic of Korea has clearly emerged as a major power in
Northeast Asia. Neither the Soviet Union nor the People's
Republic of China have been totally willing for the sake of
North Korea to ignore this fact.
When Mr. Carter suspended the troop withdrawal and
increased American military aid in support of Seoul's FIP
program, Pyongyang was understandably angered. Particularly
worrisome to Pyongyang is the strides that are being and will
be made by the South in the field of indigenous weapons pro-
duction. Equally troubling to Kim must be the decrease in
American influence over Seoul. However, for a number of
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reasons, it is difficult to envision Park Chung Hee ' s suc-
cessors undertaking a march north. Neither tangible support
nor sympathy would be extended by the United States in such
a situation. Equally important, both North Korea's allies
would not stand by and allow a military imposed unification
of Korea by a non-communist state.
While the ability of the United States to influence
Seoul's actions the past seven years has decreased because of
the South' s economic vitality and the movement away from grant
aid to military sales, there is no reason to believe Soviet
or Chinese ability to influence Pyongyang has increased pro-
portionately. More likely, the recent closeness of Peking
to Washington and the invasion into Afghanistan by the Soviets
have produced a strain in their relationships with North
Korea. While still remaining closer to Peking, the North
Koreans in recent months have indicated a warming toward the
Soviets. An oscillating posture toward Peking and Moscow
has become a fact of life for North Korea.
The problem facing Pyongyang in the not too distant
future is how to continue this trend of relative neutrality
without overly antagonizing either arms patron. As pointed
out earlier, North Korea has a military alliance with both
parties. Both treaties require that North Korea not engage
in activities which are hostile to the co-signor. The
treaty with the Soviets specifically prohibits either party
from entering any alliance with another party hostile to the
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Soviet Union. The dilemma facing Pyongyang, therefore, is
that both treaties negate each other. The North Korean-Chinese
treaty is now anti-Soviet and the Soviet-North Korean treaty
is now anti-Chinese. The likelihood of North Korea 'dropping
Moscow is infeasible because its sophisticated weapons inven-
tory is dependent upon Soviet parts and replacements. In the
same context, since China is currently supplying the majority
of arms and petroleum products without the price tag the
Soviets have demanded, it would be economically counterproduc-
tive to side against the Chinese.
To round out an overview of the past thirty-five years,
it is important to also reflect upon the relationship between
the Korean military establishments and their supplying
patrons. Throughout this period, the leadership in both
Koreas has been predominately senior military officers. Their
influence on the politics and policies of both countries
has been a constant since the Second World War. Because
there had been no example on which to base the newly formed
Korean armed forces following this war, i.e., a native
military tradition, the occupation armies of the Soviet
Union and the United States were mirrored in many ways. The
Americans and Soviets, and to a lesser degree the Chinese,
organized the Koreans in their image, trained them according
to their own tactics, armed them with foreign manufactured





This military assistance was an important vehicle in the
transfer of values and political beliefs from the supplying
patrons' culture and political systems to the recipients'.
In South Korea few, if any, of the military leadership have
not had close contacts with senior American military officers.
Moreover, most have attended at least one American service
school in the United States. Unfortunately, the extent of
North Korean military experience in Soviet or Chinese schools
is not readily available. However, the Korean Workers Party
and the North Korean military are clearly bound together,
with many military members holding roles of extreme importance.
The economic and military programs established within the
North, emulating similar programs in China or the Soviet Union,
show some level of influence accepted by the North Koreans.
Because these military men were firmly established in the
political processes of each country, the civilian leaders have
seen the need to enhance their armed forces by enlarging them,
equipping them with the best arms possible, and allowing them
continued influence and importance. Obviously, the rationale
was to maintain the military establishment's loyalty. The
result has been not only an increased capability of North and
South Korea's military structures, but also the maintenance
of a high level of threat perception and hostility toward each
other. The base reality has been that North and South Korea's
armed forces protect its people and government from the other's




Because so many of South Korea's military leaders have
been introduced to American ideals and values through American
military training and education, it is no wonder that the
military establishment in the South has been so anti-commu-
nist and unwilling in the past to compromise with the North.
Moreover, the imminent possibility of war with North Korea
has tended to strengthen the advice of South Korean military
leaders in government circles, providing the incentive for
advocating tightened controls over the civilian populace,
coupled with enhanced readiness capabilities and posture.
In the South, ex-military leaders such as Park have shown
themselves more capable of controlling their military machines
than the predominantly civilian administrations of Rhee and
Myan. With the recent high levels of military assistance
being provided to both Koreas by their patrons , the respective
military establishments will continue to maintain or even
increase their levels of influence over internal and foreign
affairs
.
The trend toward indigenous arms production, an improved
capacity to afford the best arms money can buy due to success-
ful economic growth rates, and the self-assurance that comes
from both of the above, has enabled the Korean military estab-
lishments to continue their powerful influence on the politi-
cal leanings and foreign policies of their countries. Com-
mensurate with an enhanced self-assurance has come a decreased
willingness to heed advice or bow to the pressures of their
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big-power patrons. ItTis ironic that a relaxation of tensions,
which would facilitate stability on the peninsula and maintain
the status quo, an objective all the major powers desire, has
been largely thwarted by the accommodating of the respective
Korean military establishments by their supplier patrons.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This final section presents the author's perception of
the overall impact arms transfers and military aid has had
on the Korean peninsula and the possibilities for the future.
When assessing the impact of arms flow to the two Korean
states, a number of questions must be raised. First, what
were the major underlying purposes in the supply of arms?
Have these goals been achieved by the major suppliers, and
at what cost?
The United States has had essentially three major pur-
poses for supplying security assistance and arms to South
Korea. First and foremost was the need to maintain peace
and stability on the peninsula and to ensure access for trade,
investment and other peaceful interests. Inherent with peace
on the peninsula is peace in Northeast Asia and access to
Japan for trade and investment. Secondly, there was the need
to maintain the status quo, or better put, continued viability
of a government friendly to and greatly influenced by the
United States. Finally, military aid helped to facilitate
an American presence on mainland Asia and to standardize the
weapons utilized by its South Korean ally.
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In assessing the current situation in South Korea, one
could say all of the above goals have been met. It is there-
fore logical to believe the tool of arms sales and military-
aid has served a valid purpose. However, it would be
ludicrous to assert that the supply of arms and security
assistance were the primary variables responsible for this
success. Economic aid must also be considered as a key
factor. Without the infusion of all three, it is unlikely
that South Korea would be in the position of economic or
military strength it now holds. The costs incurred by the
United States have been enormous. Tens of billions of dollars
and thousands of American lives have been spent to achieve
these goals. Even though the trend in recent years has been
toward decreased influence over South Korean affairs, the
United States will find itself spending even more to support
its policies and presence in South Korea.
The motives by the Soviet Union for supplying arms to
North Korea are not very different from those shown by the
United States. Peace on the peninsula allows the Soviets to
maintain not only trade relations with North Korea, but also
with Japan. Therefore, supplying arms to North Korea in
quantities sufficient for self-defense, but insufficient
enough for a march south, facilitates such an objective. By
supplying arms to North Korea, the Soviet's political self-
interest and image in other parts of the Third World and
communist bloc is enhanced. The Soviets also utilize
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arms transfers as a tool to counter any increased American
influence in the Korean peninsula. By keeping the military
balance between North and South Korea in the North's favor,
the American "influenced" ROK forces are deterred from
"marching north." Finally, arms transfers and sales to North
Korea have been primarily utilized, since the latter 1960s,
to increase Soviet prestige and influence at the expense of
the Chinese.
The only goal the Soviet's have had trouble securing has
been increased influence over North Korea. Though supplying
nearly all the sophisticated weapons to North Korea, the
Soviets have not been able to get Pyongyang to significantly
tilt toward Moscow in the competition for influence with Peking.
As long as Kim Il-Sung remains undisputed leader of North Korea,
North Koreans will be reminded of the "debt" Pyongyang owed
China for its participation in the Korean War. Nevertheless,
Soviet military aid, particularly sophisticated weaponry that
China cannot offer, will continue in the capacity of a carrot
offered in return for enhanced influence, or at least, military
base rights. The Soviets most likely will not repeat their
1962 mistake by cutting off all military aid because Pyongyang
does not respond in accordance with Soviet desires. It is
interesting to note that while munitions industries in the
Soviet Union undoubtedly promote arms sales, the finance
ministry must often oppose such sales. The sale of arms has
undoubtedly complicated the repayment problems of North Korea.
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Chinese motives for supplying arms and military aid to
North Korea is not easily perceived. Since it has provided
less than ten percent of the total arms flow to North Korea
prior to 1973, its initial importance as a supplier had been
less relevant. In past years, probably the most important,
if not the only reason for supplying arms has been to counter
Soviet influence in North Korea. By supplying arms, China
has also allowed Pyongyang some independence from Moscow, a
factor repayed through Kim Il-Sung's initial neutrality and
later tilt toward China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Another
motivation for supplying Pyongyang arms, particularly since
1973, has been insuring that North Korea supports Chinese
foreign policy initiatives with the West (particularly with
the United States and Japan) and its handling of its Vietnamese
neighbor.
Obviously, China does not desire to destroy the new
relationships with the United States and Japan by providing
a dangerously large amount of arms to North Korea. Such a
move would be viewed with great alarm in Tokyo, Washington,
and certainly Moscow, and would produce a strain in relations
with the West. On the other hand, China, more than the Soviet
Union, is contrained in decreasing aid and moral support to
North Korea. To North Korea, the level of military aid has
been an indication of how much support it is receiving in its
unification policies. By significantly decreasing military
aid to Pyongyang, China would be perceived as supporting
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the status quo or the "two Koreas" solution. This not only
would lessen its influence over North Korea, but would be
contrary to its policies regarding reunification with Taiwan.
The cost of providing arms to North Korea must be
taxing on the Chinese. Because China reportedly provides
North Korea most of its arms on a grant or a significantly
reduced price basis, the cost of such aid must be detrimental
to its own on-going Modernization programs. Add to this factor
the enormous cost of three weeks of intense combat last year
with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. One must ask how
much longer China will be able to continue as the primary
supplier of arms to North Korea before economic realities
overshadow the political objectives.
Has the influx of arms and military assistance contributed
to the national security of the recipient nations? Has
receiving major arms heightened or lowered the recipient's
threat perception? And has the security assistance rendered
and arms transferred by the major suppliers been adequate?
Yes-no answers to these questions are difficult to support
or refute. Obviously the environment of the peninsula must
be accounted for when analyzing such questions. The transfer
of arms before and during the Korean War produced a situation
under which the national security interests of all parties,
both supplier and recipient nations, were at stake. Following
the war, the flow of arms to the Korean peninsula was more a




One might assume that South Korea's security would have
been certain without the major military assistance programs
if one believes that American troops deployed in Korea were
sufficient security assurance. However, it is a fairly safe
assumption that without this American troop and air deterrent
present, a South Korea not provided sufficient arms, training,
and logistics would have been a tempting target for the North.
Because the United States did provide considerable security
assistance, much of it in a grant aid form, South Korea was
able to devote considerable resources to economic growth.
This factor has enabled the South in the 1970s to divert more
resources from the domestic sector to the defense sector
without adversely affecting their economic growth rate, as
was experienced by North Korea in the 1960s. If and when the
United States does withdraw its forces from the peninsula,
the contribution American arms transfers and military aid
had had on South Korea's national security will certainly
become clearer.
The large influx of arms into Korea since the latter
1960s has surely heightened the recipients' threat percep-
tions. This heightened perceived threat can prove very
dangerous for the future. The recent input of sophisticated
equipment to Seoul, with orders for more and better equipment,
cannot sit well in Pyongyang. Comparatively, the revised
DIA intelligence estimate of larger North Korean troop and
tank levels have made South Korean leaders, some American
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Congressmen, and the present administration nervous over North
Korean intentions. As seen by past experience, threat per-
ceptions and arms imports act in a directly proportional
manner. When the threat perception on one side has risen,
so does the demand for more and sophisticated weapons. The
receipt of weapons causes the recipient nation's threat
perception to lower. However, on the other side, the reaction will
be the negative. Once again the cycle begins. The only control
to this cycle seems to be the supplier. As seen in the previous
chapters, when recipient threat perception is heightened, sup-
plier threat perception is also raised. This is especially true
on the Korean peninsula because super-power interests have been
inextricably linked with the two developing states. Amicable
relations between the major suppliers may offer the hope of
multi- lateral control vis a vis supplier pressure and influence
over independent actions taken by their client state. As of
this writing, however, there appears little evidence the Carter
administration is currently taking such a strategy tack.
As there has not been war on the peninsula since 1953,
one may be induced to conclude that the supply of arms has been
addquate to maintain stability and the status quo. Of course,
the view from Pyongyang, when taking in account Kim Il-Sung's
strategy for reunification, is quite different from that con-
clusion. However, as previously discussed, the level of the
arms input has been a "function more of the suppliers ' goals
and purposes than of the recipient's. This situation has
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resulted in a no-war no-peace situation for the Koreans.
Moreover, the external support provided has probably done more
to impede unification than any other factor.
As long as the current military equation remains relative-
ly unchanged, North Korea will be able to negotiate from a
position of strength in any North-South Talks. South Korea, on
the other hand, can negotiate only with the known support and
presence of United States troops in Korea. This dependence on
a continued United States presence could produce a psychological
stigma affecting the confidence of its own military. How can
the South Korean military establishment attain the respect and
confidence of the people it is sworn to protect when most
Koreans look to a much smaller American troop contingent as
the main deterrent to invasion from the North?
In the interests of national security, the South and
North Koreans have not desired to continue their dependence
on foreign made weapons. A major change in the arms trade
pattern on the Korean peninsula began in the early 1970s with
the development of minor indigenous arms production. By 1980,
both countries' indigenous arms industries have drastically
reduced their need for the import of foreign produced elementary
weapons systems (vehicles, artillery, tanks, small arms, etc".)
and spare parts for weapons previously provided by their sup-
pliers. The economic growth of the Korean states, coupled
with their increased indigenous capacity has tended to reduce
their dependence on the three major suppliers, with a corollary
decline in their willingness to follow advice.
2Qq

The trend towards arms independence by both Korean states
will continue through the 1980s. This drive for self-sufficiency-
will be fueled by uncertainty regarding the commitments of their
suppliers. One of the central questions South Koreans must be
asking themselves is whether or not the United States can be
trusted. A Korean instructor told this author recently that
there is a proverb making the rounds in Seoul these past
three years: "Don't be deceived by the Soviets, but more
important, don't trust the Americans."
To the South Koreans the relationship with the United
States has not seen much warmth the past five years. South
Koreans have strongly resented their country being treated
by the United States as a buffer between the communist threat
and Japan. Moreover, the realignment in power relationships
in Asia has not improved Seoul's security perceptions. The
United States, under President Carter's helm, has evoked
emotions of vulnerability and abandonment in South Korean
leaders. South Korea seems to have concluded that the only
reliable defense must be achieved through a strong economy
and military- industrial base. If the current FIP is success-
fully completed, South Korea will have attained a position of
parity or superiority in economic and military power relations
with North Korea.
North Koreans must also resent being caught in the see-
saw effects of the Sino-Soviet competition for influence.
North Korea, like its Southern neighbor, has been attempting
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to adjust to the shifting policies of its two suppliers since
1971, when their relationships with the United States began to
change. The maneuvering done by North Korea has not produced
the results desired. The problem is that while Kim was willing
to adjust to the shifting styles of her supplier states, he
was unwilling to adjust his methods of attaining unification.
North Korea must have concluded that the great-power strategic
concept of stability did not allow for his reunification con-
cepts. Therefore, through a limitation of military aid and
arms transfers by North Korea's suppliers, the partition of
Korea is sustained and welcomed by both Pyongyang's allies
and enemies. However, until Pyongyang is certain that Seoul
represents a economically, militarily and politically viable
force no longer dependent on the United States, there will
be little hope for a lessening of tensions on the peninsula.
As long as the tensions on the peninsula remain high,
the two Koreas will have to rely on foreign sources for soph-
isticated arms. This will allow the major suppliers, par-
ticularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to maintain
through military assistance and sophisticated arms transfer
programs a degree of influence on the nature and structure
of the North and South Korean military establishments. To
be able to influence those military establishments is to be
able to influence their respective governments. However,
at present, none of the major suppliers appear to have the
will or the capability to exercise any decisive influence
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over the policies, particularly domestic, of their client
states. Furthermore, under the present conditions, it is
unlikely any of the major suppliers will reduce their level
of flow unilaterally. Most certainly, a precondition would
be the resumption of a healthy Soviet-American detente. In
such an environment, assurances of arms control or a quid pro
quo aid reduction deal might find acceptance.
C. THE FUTURE
Operating under the assumption that the Carter withdrawal
plan will eventually continue, the following situations might
occur. First, because the cost would reach over $2 billion,
without even accounting for the 2nd Division's redeployment
costs, advocates of budget cuts would target in on the program
Moreover, if human rights violations persist in the South, and
the current military leadership does not yield to a more
democratic oriented civilian government, Congressional unhap-
piness will adversely affect the funding and perhaps even the
phasing of the program. These critics will call for reassess-
ments in the whole military assistance program to South Korea.
The danger of these actions lay in the level of American
credibility in Asia. The importance of the United States
living up to its part of any withdrawal agreement cannot be
underestimated.
Nationalism will begin to play a larger role in South
Korea. As the generation that grew up with war passes on,
the newer generations may question the reasoning behind
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opposition to unification. However, to become more attractive
to such reasoning, Pyongyang must ensure its unification
strategy employs peaceful tactics. Most likely, as the North
falls further behind the South economically, the desire for
Pyongyang to achieve a forced reunification will grow; but, the
prospect of victory through the use of force will diminish. If
any temptation for forceful unification were to remain, North
Korea would demand more and better arms from its suppliers. In-
creased arms to the South would develop from the threat cycle.
Upon the death of Kim, some faction within the North Korean
military will have a major say as to his successor. That suc-
cessor may find himself wielding less power than Kim. Since the
military is interested in obtaining more sophisticated weapons
than China can presently offer, a shift toward Moscow might
be the result. Undoubtedly, the death of Kim Il-Sung will
result in renewed security pledges by the Soviets and Chinese
with the possibility of increased military aid. Obviously, a
major influx of arms to North Korea would set off a counter
reaction by the South.
Nearly all Soviet approaches to future Korean problems
will be evaluated against the Sino-Soviet dispute. Encircle-
ment of China will remain the major objective of the Soviets.
The Chinese will also use the Sino-Soviet dispute as background
to any policies toward Korea. Nevertheless, China will find
it more difficult than the Soviets to justify to Pyongyang
any significant agreements involving the United States. Peking
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will find itself in a position that may demand the transfer
to North Korea more aid and arms than it would have preferred
or could possibly afford. A question to be answered in the
future will be what will be the effects on the Sino-North
Korean relationship if American arms transfers (currently
being considered) to the People's Republic of China becomes
reality.
Soviet interest will remain strong in the Korean peninsula
not only because it serves as an important buffer to China,
but also because of Soviet desires to obtain ice-free port
facilities for its expanding and powerful Pacific fleet.
Soviet attitudes may harden on North Korean independence.
Furthermore, the price for arms and aid may involve basing
and port rights, a factor to be seriously considered by all
parties involved.
The major suppliers will remain the same. However, as
the Korean indigenous arms industries produce more and varied
weapons, the less dependent they will be on foreign produced
weapons. The successful completion of the South Korean Force
Improvement Plan will allow Seoul the capacity to build most
of its conventional arms and allow for limited export. Further
more, the agreement to co-produce F-5 combat aircraft will
enable South Korea to indigenously produce such aircraft by the
mid-1980s. Seoul has already taken the initial steps to
supplement United States as a source of technology. If rela-
tions with Washington sour, France would be a prime candidate
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as an alternative source. However, even if South Korea pos-
sessed a plan to adopt a completely different weapon system
beginning this year, based on Egypt's experience, it would
take nearly a decade to make an effective switch.
Because the cost of heavy tanks and high quality sophis-
ticated combat aircraft is extremely high, Seoul will
emphasize in its future purchases of arms, precision-guided
munitions (PGM) . Primarily defense-oriented weapons systems
(TOW, Redeye, Stinger), these represent relatively cheap counter
measures to North Korea's superior numbers in tanks and aircraft.
As South Korea's military inventory grows in quality and quantity,
North Korea may also become more interested in acquiring PGMs
to enhance the North's defense capabilities.
Throughout this paper, the intent has been to show the
changing environment of the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1980,
applying the phenomena of arms transfer and security assistance
as a variable affecting or being affected by the factors chang-
ing the strategic environment. The importance of arms transfers
to both Koreas has been pervasive. While it is safe to assume
it has sufficed somewhat the interests of the suppliers, the
intrinsical importance of arms input to the recipient states has
been harder to measure. The fact that the arms flow into the
peninsula has not produced a war may be only half the story. The
other half may be a dangerous and costly conflict affecting and
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North-South Comparative Military Expenditures 1952-79
North Korea South Korea
Year Total Exp % GNP SNat Bud Total Exp % GNP % Nat Bud
1952 N/A N/A 67 N/A N/A
1953 15.2 154 5.7 10.1
1954 8.0 185 6.6 11.5
1955 6.2 151 5.1 10.9
1956 484. 5 million 5.9 145 4.7 11.4
1957 won (N. Korean) 5.3 146 5.8 13.7
1958 4.8 172 6.2 14.3
1959 3.7 180 6.4 15.8
1960 3.1 178 6.1 15.7
1961 275 2.6 185 5.7 19.2
1962 305 2.6 213 5.9 25.3
1963 280 12.2 1.9 177 4.2 14.9
1964 300 12.0 5.8 167 3.6 10.7
1965 350 14.0 10.1 175 3.7 11.6
1966 350 12.1 12.5 214 4.0 13.7
1967 470 15.7 30.4 238 4.1 14.2
1968 610 17.4 32.4 281 4.2 16.4
1969 615 15.4 31.0 324 4.1 17.8
1970 700 15.0 31.0 334 3.9 17.0
1971 911 17.1 34.1 394 4.3 17.3
1972 584 13.8 17.0 443 4.4 18.2
1973 630 14.0 15.4 470 3.9 13.3
1974 765 15.8 16.1 601 J * it 15.6
1975 950 16.3 16.4 730 3.8 18.0
1976 1030 11.2 16.7 1460 6.2 19.5
1977 1060 10.5 16.6 2033 6.6 19.1
1978 1230 11.4 160) 2586 5.6 19(est)
1979 1231 N/A N/A 3219 6. 4 (est) N/A
1980 4470(est) N/A N/A
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Years 1952-56 (South Korea) are in U.S. $ million at the
1960 exchange rate. Years 1957-1972 (South Korea) are in U.S.
$ million at 1973 rates. Years 1962-1979 (North Korea) and
years 1973-1979 (South Korea are in $ U.S. million at current
rates
.
^Because $ U.S. to won conversion fluctuates and is dif-




SIPRI Yearbook 1978 , Table 6A.17: Far East: constant
price figures, pp. 152-153 ; Table 6A.19: Far East: military




Table 8C.19: Far East: military
expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product, pp.
216-217.
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Security Assistance to the
Fiscal
Year Total
Republic of Korea (U.S. $ mil/FY 4
(Grant) Training FMS 3 DEL'
Fund Del Grant Credit Orders Del EDA
Total US Aid
To E. Asia % To
& Pacific Korea
49-52 11.7 - 160.7 7.3
53-57 527.8 - - 2403.7 30.0
1958 331.1 - - 627.8 52.7
1959 190.5 - - 606.7 31.4
1960 190.2 total total 501.6 37.9
1961 192.2 1950-65 106.3 495.4 38.8
1962 136.9 $970.1 1950-66 523.3 26.2











161.7 153.1 38.6 535.6 35.8
1967 153.
4




253.4 197.4 6.6 - 1.5 1.5 51.4 1495.5 13.7
1969 373.




313.1 466.9 5.0 - - 1.9 133.6 2147.6 22.1
1971 432.
6 521.0 411.7 5.4 15.0 .4 .4 51.0 2559.1 16.9
1972 502.
9
6 470.4 481.2 4,7 17.0 8.8 .4 24.6 3074.7 16.4
1973 291.7 296.6 264.7 2.0 25.0 1,6 2.4 37.3 4708.8 6.2
1974 149.9 91.1 91.7 1.5 56.7 100.3 13.3 35.3 1850.2 8.1
1975 194.4 78.2 134.1 1.3 59.0 214.3 70.9 16.6 1874.9 10.4
1976 437.9 59.4 175.6 2.3 260.0 616.0 161.4 7.0 683.1 64.1
1976T 1,3 1.1
1
- 1.3 - - - - -
1977 169.0 1.1 1 15.3 1.3 152.4 656.1 178.9 7,3 347.7 48.6
1978 302.8 0.4 ll-26.3 1.5 275.0 390.3 414.4 .9 478.5 63.3
1979 N/A 0.9'V N/A 1.8 225.0 900.0 N/A N/A N/A
.
-
1980 N/A 0.9 7 1 N,'A 1.8 225.0 1700.0 N/A N/A N/A -
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* Totals will not necessarily add up due to rounding.
Notes •
-Supply operations only
Excludes undistributi_:ed assistance to Southeast Asia
3FMS legislation included in MAP prior to 1968
^Totals are in Fiscal Year dollars
5Total reflects MAP delivered + FMS Credit + Training
grants
.
^Military Assistance Funding related to South Korean forces
sent to Vietnam not included. See Table 4 in Chapter III.






Table 3.6. U.S. Military Assistance to Third
World Countries, breakdown by U.S. categories, pp. 146-147.
U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Assistance and Related
Agencies, Appropriations for (Fiscal Years 1975-80). Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations , 94th-96th Congresses.
Nathan N. White, U.S. Policy Toward~Korea: Analysis Alter -
natives, and Recommendations
,
(Boulder: Westview , 19 79), p . 22"9
Edward J. Lawrance, consultant to the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, currently teaching at the Naval




Major Arms Transfers to South Korea
1950-1979
Ref Year/
Date Ordered Supplier* Number Item
Date(s)
Delivered
1950 75 NA F-51 Mustang 1950-52
15 Piper L-4 1950-52
15 Douglas C-47 1950-52




1 Patrol Boat "PC" 1950
100 M-Sherman Tank 1950-51
50 M-5 Stuart 1950-51
50 M-24 Chaffee 1950-53
70 M-10 1950-53
200 M-8 Greyhound 1950-59




4 Patrol Boat "PC" 1951
1952 4 Patrol Boat "PCS" 1952
4 Motor Torpedo Boat 1952
1953 1 Frigate "Tacoma" 1953
Norway 2 Oiler 1953
1954 70 M-36 1954-60
3 Aero Cdr 520 aircraft 1954
1955 5 NA F-86F Sabre 1955
1 Oiler 1955
2 Tank Landing Ship 1955
2 Escort "PCE" ships 1955
6 Supply Ship 1955-57
1956 2 Escort "PCE" ships 1956






















9 Medium Landing Ship 1956
3 Coastal Minesweepers 1956






6 Sikorsky S-55 1956
4 Coastal Minesweepers 1957 decommissioned
in 1962
3 Medium Landing Ship 1957
9 Lockheed T-33A 1957
5 Cessna 0-1 A Birddog 1957 Recce Plane
30 NA F-86F Sabre 1958
3 Tank Landing Ship 1958
12 Honest John SSM 1959
2 Tank Landing Ship 1959
1 Escort Transport 1959 modified
destroyer escort
3 Coastal Minesweeper 1959 MPA transfer
1 Rocket Landing Ship 1960




30 NA F-86D Sabre 1960-62 equipped w/ 360
Sidewinder AAM
5 Cessna LC-180 I960
4 Escort, "PCE" Type 1961
50 Mil 3 APC 1961-65
2 Tug 1962
30 NA F-86D Sabre 1962 equipped w/
Sidewinder AAM
16 NA T-28 1962




1 Escort "Auk" class 1963
2 Coastal Minesweeper 1963 MAP transfer




Date Ordered Supplier* Number Item
DateCs)
Delivered Remarks
1964 8 Cessna 185 Skyv/agon 1964
1965 15 Cessna 0-1 E Birddog 1965
30 F-5A Freedom Fighter 1965-66
150 HAWK SAM 1965
25 Nike Hercules SAM 1965
4 Curtiss C-46D 1965-66 MAP
50 105mm howitzer 1965-66
50 155mm howitzer 1965-66 MAP
1966 Japan 2 Kawasaki -Bell KH-4 1966
Canada 10 DHC-2 Beaver 1966
2 Escort Transport 1966
60 2Q3mm howitzer 1966-67 MPA
1967 5 Douglas C-54 1967
2 Curtiss C-46 1967-68 MAP
5 Cessna 0-1 A Birddog 1967-68 MAP
3 Escort Transport 1967 2 transferred
under MAP
2 Escort "Auk" class 1967
1968 2
40
F-5B Freedom Fighters 1968
F-5A Freedom Fighters 1968
MAP
1 Coastal Minesweeper 1968 MAP







9 Patrol Boats 1968-69
1969 19 F-4E Phantom 1969 $52m - ROK
$48m - US MAP
1971
5 Bell UH-ID Helicopters 1969
700,000 M-l rifles 1969











Date Ordered Supplier Number Item
Date(s)
Delivered Remarks
1971 18 F-4D Phantom 1972
10 Grumman S-2 Tracker 1971
12 Honest John SSM 1971
2 Bell 212 Twin Pac 1971
50 203mm Howitzers 1971 MAP
50 M113A APC 1971 MPA
50 M60 Tanks 1971 Transferred from
U.S. 7th Div.
50 Ml 07 Howitzer 1971 MAP
50 M48A2C Patton Tank 1971 MAP
1 Patrol Boat 1971
1 Ofler 1971














1975-76 to arm F-5Es




1 Patrol Boat 1973
2 Coastal Minesweeper 1975











Date Ordered Supplier Number Item
Date(s)
Delivered Remarks



















40 Standard ShShM 1975-77 8 launchers -
use w/ PSMM ships









F-5F Tiger - 2













$81m; mil . trans-
port equip, spares,
training















in add. to 2
previously
acquired




4 del. in '76 w/o
arms; arms: TOW ATM
$58. 2m; part of






Date Ordered Supplier Number Item
Date(s)
Delivered Remarks
1976 200 Hughes AGM-65A
Maverick ASM
1977-78.(150) $10. 2m, arming
60 F-5Es
1152 Hughes TOW ATM 1977-78-(720) arming heli.
421 M-48 main battle
tanks









Fiat-6614 CM APC 1977-20
? Lance SSM 1977
12 Cessna A-37A COIN/
trainer
1977






100 Hughes-500 M 1976-4
defender hel missile 1977-•30
45 Nike Hercules SAM 1977
341 AIM-7E Sparrow AAM 1979
45 Bell UH-1H Cobra Hel
20 Bell UH-1B Hel 1977





18 F-4E Phantom fighter
24 Honest John SSM 1978- 79
15 M-88 Al Tank recovery 1978
vehicle
MIM-23B Hawk SAM 1978
? MM- 38 Exocet ShShM
72 A-10A Fighter 1978-2























Date Ordered Suppl ier Numbe
Date(s)
r Item Delivered Remarks
1978 ? M48A3 Tanks $7.1m






4 Patrol Ship "Asheville"
37 M-109A2 SP Howitzer $24m








60 F-4E Pending LOA
180 F-16A/B Fighter Disapproved by
President























"Foreign Military Markets," Defense Marketing Services (DMS)
,
(Greenwich: DMS, 1976) South America/Australasia (South Korea)
.
"Foreign Military Markets," Defense Marketing Services (DMS ),
(Greenwich: DMS, 1979) South America/Australasia (South Korea).
Arms Trade Registers - The Arms Trade With the Third World , SIPRI 1975,
pp. 12-15.
"Pentagon Plans Sale of $322.6 Million In Arms to 8 Nations," Wall
Street Journal
,
(April 10, 1979), p. 12.
International Defense Review , Vol 12 no. 5, 1979, p. 846.






































15 Yak-17 UTI 1953















4 Fong Shou No,
fighters
2 1957 AN-2 produced
under license in
China






Date Ordered Supplier* Number Item
Date(s)
Delivered Remarks
1958 China 4 I1-28U 1958-59
China 20 Shenyang Yak- 18 1958-59 Supplement those
supplied before '50
by Soviets
China 300 Shenyang F-4 1958-60 Chinese version
of MiG-17











































1967 70 T-54/55 1967
2 Submarine "W" class 1967
7 Gunboat "MGB" type 1967
3 Torpedo Boats
Type
, "PTF " 1967
Ch ina 4 Patrol Boat "Shangh at" 1967







39Q K-13 "Atoll" AAM 1968-71















28 SU-7 FGA 1971
40 "Frog-5" SSM 1971
3 "Samlet" SSM 1971
132 "Styx" ShShM 1971-72 to arm 8 "OSA" class








200 SA-7 SA missi le 1972-73
20 Frog 7 arty rocket 1972-73
50 T-55 tanks 1972-73



























China 3 Submarine "Romeo-L" 1975
1976 China 2 Submarine "Romeo-L" 1976
1978 MiG-23?
Supplier is the Soviet Union unless indicated in this column
Note: More often than not, "date ordered" and "number ordered" are not
available. Information on arms transfers to North Korea is























FEER Asia Yearbook 1980
, pp. 48, 211,


















Yak-18 & Po-2 trainers, 11-10 bombers,
Yak-9P fighters (estimated total =
150 first- line aircraft)
MiG-15, Yak-17, La-9 fighters, 11-12
and Tu-2 bombers, 11-28 twin-jet
bombers (estimated total after war =
250 first-line aircraft)
Additional 11-28 jet bombers Yak-11
MiG-17s begin replacing MiG-lSs^;
An-2
MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-19s
Yak 18s from China










(75) replaced USAF fighter-
bomber wing
F-86 Sabre fighter-bombers
(total by end of 1960 = 200)




Requested F-16s - request
vetoed by President Carter
F-5E (54), F-5F (6), F-4E (18)
F-16 (?)
The first Chinese-built MiG-17 on Soviet license was completed in 1956,
with subsequent production of 20-25 per month. More than likely these
MiG-17s were Chinese built. (From Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1960-61
,




License-Produced Weapons - South Korea
Date in
Year Licenser Item Description Prod,































1976 USA "Hughes" 500 MD
helicopter
1978 100/34
1976 USA "Pazmany" PL-2
light plane
/4
1976 Italy Fiat, 6614 APCs 1977 170/20




One built & delivered by
U.S. in '74. Remaining 4
to be built in S. Korea
S. Korea planning to set
up own hel . industry
3 were built in U.S. ; 4
being built in Korea
South Korea purchased all
plant & equip, from Lock-
heed - developed own
missiles in '78
66 to be assembled in S.
Korea. , 34 del. by USA in
'76-
'77.
S.K. AF built 4 as proto-
type & evaluation as a
trainer aircraft
First 20 built in Italy
Agreed upon when F-16
deal was disapproved. Agree-
ment calls for co-production
of engines & airframes for
36 aircraft w/ Northrop
Corp. Pending Congres-
sional approval.




License-Produced Weapons - North Korea
Date in # Planned/
































Don Hirst, "N. Koreans Making T-62 Tanks", Army Times, No. 23 (8 January
1979), p. 21.




Indigenously Produced Weapons in Korea
South Korea '
The South Korean government's defense industries produce artillery
howitzers, spare parts, rifles, small caliber ammunition, small displace-
ment naval ships, mortars, rocket launchers, Vulcan air defense systems,
tactical communications equipment, medium tanks, and solid fuel rocket
engines for larger surface-to-surface missiles. Under its Force Improve-
ment Program (FIP) launched in 1976, plans call for the eventual capacity
to produce large caliber weapons, armored personnel carriers, helicopters,
fighter aircraft and large naval ships Cfri gates).
Nearly 50 percent of all military equipment utilized by the South
Korean military is indigenously produced. However, as the majority of
South Korea's defense equipment is of United States manufacture, Seoul
remains heavily dependent upon the United States for parts replacement
or the technology to produce them in South Korea, South Korea desires to
export indigenously manufactured arms.
2
North Korea
Except for sophisticated items such as aircraft, electronic equip-
ment and missiles, North Korea can produce virtually all their military
equipment to include T-62 tanks and self-propelled artillery. The arms
base in North Korea is significantly larger and has been established
longer than that of the South's. The present indigenous production base
and stockpiling gives Pyongyang the capability to sustain offensive
operations for several months without the need of external support.
Sources:
I SIPRI Yearbooks 1977, 1978, 1979
"Foreign Military Markets," Defense Marketing Services
,
(Greenwich:
DMS, 1979), South Korea Summary, p. 17.
2SIPRI Yearbooks 1977, 1978, 1979
"U.S. to Beef Up Equipment in Korea," Army Times , No, 30 (February
















3 Mot. Inf. Divs
4 Inf Bdes.
3 Recce. Bdes.



























3SSM Bns. w/ FROG
FR0G-5SSM: 9
260,000 23 Divs.






















SP Guns/How, : 2,000
Mortars: 5,300
TOW, LAW ATGW; Vulcan AA Gun
1 SSM Bn. w/ Honest John
2 SAM Bdes, w/ improved HAWK
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* Figures reflect 1979 updated intelligence reports
** Sources in Seoul say the North Koreans may have already deployed about
2,600 indigenously produced T-62 tanks.
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Total Combat 565 254
Aircraft:
Bombers 11-28: 85 -
Fighters Su-7: 20 F-4D: 18
MiG-15/17/19: 340 F-4E: 19
MiG-21: 120 F-5E/F: 135







Missiles: AA-2 Atoll AAM




CAIM-9L Super Sidewinder and
Maverick ASM on order)
Reserves: 55,000







North Korea South Korea
Personnel
:
27 ,000 47 ,000
Submarines 15 -
Destroyers - 9
Destroyer Escorts - 9
Coastal Escorts - 10
Coastal Patrol Craft 27 33
Fast Patrol Boats,
Guided Missile (SSM) 18 (Styx) 8 (HARPOON, EX0CET)
Fast Patrol Boats 303 5
Coastal Minesweepers - 9
Landing Ships 70 22
Frigates 3 (1 buildin g) -
Motor Gunboats 100 ^
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